LAND, WATER, AND ECOLOGY 271
structure is restored and its existing flaws corrected. Micklin cites Dukhovny and
Sokolov’s estimate that the cost of such repairs throughout
the Aral Sea basin
would reach US$16 billion,
82
a figure that does not include the cost of applying
water-saving technologies or of adding such facilities as the proposed Kambarata
hydropower complex.
83
Identifying sources for so large an investment will be a
major challenge.
It is all too easy to view the updating of irrigation systems solely as a matter
for engineers. However, the physical, economic, and legal configuration of such
systems are shaped as much by the character of property rights and user relations
as by technical considerations.
84
Any effective steps toward improving and expand-
ing irrigation systems in the Ferghana Valley must address the social and political
challenges relating to irrigated agriculture. Decisions on what form of irrigated
agriculture is economically viable, environmentally sustainable, and ethically ac-
ceptable in the Ferghana Valley should ideally be the result of a process of social
negotiation, one that takes into consideration both the existing political economies
and the needs of people’s livelihoods.
Questions pertaining to the same political economies affect not only the cotton
sector in the Ferghana Valley, but also considerably shape the outcomes of inter-
state negotiations over the Syr Darya water. The yearly
barter agreements that
remain the central mechanism to determine water and energy transfers between
upstream and downstream countries are substantially
affected by the domestic
politics in the respective states. Kyrgyzstan’s is still cash-strapped and only to a
limited extent can afford to acquire energy carriers from abroad. Moreover, the
Bakiyev government failed to make investments in energy-related infrastructure.
The need for heating during cold winters looms large, and the government’s in-
ability to provide sufficient electricity for this purpose is more than likely to give
rise to public discontent and political unrest.
85
Operating the Toktogul Reservoir
to generate hydropower in wintertime—if sufficient water is available—therefore
becomes an urgent political and economic concern of the government.
Conversely, political elites in Uzbekistan and to some extent Tajikistan rely
on cotton production in the Ferghana Valley to generate foreign currency and to
support the existing system of social, political, and economic control.
86
This partly
accounts for the leaders’ unwillingness to change to less water-intensive crops in
the Ferghana Valley, as the related economic changes may no longer sustain the
existing political systems based on exploitation and rent-seeking, as is possible
with cotton production. In the absence of alternative domestic political visions, the
annually recurring ad hoc barter agreements on the use of Syr Darya water may
be less the result of inadequate inter-state cooperation, as Western analysts tend
to claim, than of the working out of the particular interests of specific domestic
political actors in each country.
The Ferghana Valley remains a fragile ecological space for the livelihoods of
the large number of people inhabiting the basin. The changing climatic conditions
outlined above could exacerbate the risks and uncertainties. Irregular precipita-
272 BICHSEL, MUKHABBATOV, SHERFEDINOV
tion patterns, the melting of glaciers, and the thawing of permafrost areas have
the potential to increase the frequency and scale of the landslides and mudflows
in the foothills and premontane zones.
87
Equally, the environmental degradations
and hazards resulting from Soviet modernization schemes pose a challenge to the
lives of future residents. However, as states in other world regions have shown, it
is possible to address even such grave challenges with intelligent policies.
The socio-economic decline in the Ferghana Valley after independence prompted
many families to search for additional income outside
agriculture in cities or
abroad.
88
A large number of labor migrants send back remittances to supplement
revenues from agriculture. The influx of these monies is likely to continue to be
of central importance to sustaining livelihoods in the Ferghana Valley.
Recent
research in the valley has show that it is possible for farms themselves to improve
livelihoods and even to reverse the degradation of land and water.
89
Yet while such
developments are promising, they do not obviate the need to focus as well on more
basic political sources of inequalities and injustice.
Water and land are limited in the Ferghana Valley, and might become even scarcer
in the Syr Darya basin over time as climates change and populations increase.
Moreover, the dilapidated infrastructural heritage of the late Soviet period has left
huge problems that must be addressed. These material concerns are at the same
time bound up with state territorialization and the construction of new collective
identities. Yet the evidence presented above suggests that the core conflicts over
land and water do not trace to any inherent ethnic animosities regarding scarce
resources, but to the economic and social modes that define the lives of each group
and sub-group and set them off from others. This becomes particularly relevant as
the ongoing processes of state-building foster new economic and moral attachments.
Therefore, the decisions of the bilateral and tripartite border commissions involving
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan on the final delimitation and demarcation of
borders in the Ferghana Valley will have a decisive impact on these conflicts.
90
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