266 BICHSEL, MUKHABBATOV, SHERFEDINOV
mon in the Syr Darya, although its impact is particularly felt further downstream.
50
Salinity negatively affects crop yields, as it reduces the ability of plants to absorb
water and therefore inhibits their growth. It also may have negative health effects
on both humans and livestock.
51
Salinity continues to be high in the central part
of the Ferghana Valley, where there is also considerable soil contamination from
chemical agents.
52
The Ferghana Valley is also plagued by waterlogging. This happens when ir-
rigation systems apply excessive amounts of water to inadequately drained land,
causing rising groundwater tables. Because waterlogging compacts the subsoil,
it may reduce yields. There is a link between salinization and waterlogging, as
farmers often apply ever-greater quantities of water to fields with high salinity in
order to flush out the salt. Besides wasting water, this practice also leads to further
rises in the water tables. Waterlogging also can damage buildings, creating damp
conditions that are injurious to human health. By lifting water tables, it also may
contaminate drinking water with bacteria, salts, and agrochemicals, and cause pol-
luted runoff water and drainage from irrigation to mix with aquifers from which
household drinking water is drawn.
53
Tensions have arisen in the southern part of
the Ferghana Valley over alleged waterlogging of downstream areas by upstream
users. Tajikistan particularly suffers from high water tables caused by a combination
of
intensive irrigation, insufficient drainage, and leaking reservoirs.
54
The use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides
has contaminated both water
and soil in the Ferghana Valley, as have chemical industries and hazardous waste.
Even as the Soviet Union focused on large-scale cotton production in the Ferghana
Valley, it established a number of substantial industrial enterprises there. Most
were mining or processing industries producing metals, oil, gas, chemicals, and
textiles. With the death of the Soviet economy, most of these industries either have
drastically reduced their operations or closed their doors. Untreated tailings and
accumulated pollutants abounded, some of them near enough to water sourses and
towns as to endanger human health. In the northern part of the Ferghana Valley
there are a number of plants for mining uranium or processing radioactive waste. At
the Mailuu-Suu uranium mine there is a danger of radioactive soils being washed
further into the Syr Darya basin, and thus polluting the water and land of large
numbers of people. In the southern Kyrgyz part of the Ferghana Valley there are
a large antimony plant at Kadamjai, a mercury plant in Aidarken, and the former
lead mine at Kant. Tailing dumps and mud storage ponds with leaking protective
dams threaten to contaminate water and soil at all three locations.
55
Even before 1991 most of the irrigation canals and pumps, and nearly the entire
drainage systems for the Ferghana Valley, were in need of rehabilitation. The suc-
cessor states took on this problem as a kind of unpaid debt from the past. While
they assumed responsibility for maintaining the primary canals and reservoirs, to a
large extent they have parceled out maintenance of the on-farm infrastructure to the
water users. In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan this was done through a formal process
of privatization, which transferred on-farm infrastructure to irrigation communities,
LAND, WATER, AND ECOLOGY 267
or if they existed, to WUAs.
56
While in Uzbekistan this has not been done de jure,
the actual practice is that any water user who wants the infrastructure to remain
operational must clean and repair it on his own.
57
Ill-maintained infrastructure thus became a burden not only to the new govern-
ments but also to irrigation communities to whose responsibility or even property
the infrastructure has been devolved, and who generally have limited funds to carry
out repairs. Julia Bucknall suggests that this may create a vicious circle in which
a reduced water supply gives rise to falling income, which means fewer funds for
repairs and hence even less available water.
58
This is particularly the case for the
foothills, which entered the system of irrigated land only with the expenditure of
enormous funds from the central government of the USSR. However, the porous
soil of the foothills requires more water than do fields on the plains. Because of
this, the productivity of water and hence the return on investments in these zones
is significantly lower than in the plains, which leaves
less money for essential
maintenance.
The challenge to maintain somehow the irrigation infrastructure is both a cause
and effect of the difficult socio-economic circumstances of many Ferghana Valley
residents. Poverty is generally a rural phenomenon in Central Asia, where 80–90
percent of the poor depend on agriculture and animal husbandry for their liveli-
hoods.
59
This is also true for the Ferghana Valley, where rural dwellers constitute
roughly 70 percent of the total.
60
This highlights the reality that disputes over the
inter-state allocation of water resources, far from
being merely dry arguments
waged among diplomats, actually determine the economic fate of many people in
the Ferghana Valley. Poor households lack the funds to shift to other lines of work
and therefore depend all the more on irrigated agriculture to sustain them. This
prompts Bucknall, in the same work cited above, to suggest that investments to
prevent further deterioration of the irrigation infrastructure benefit the poor even
more than larger-scale farmers, so greatly do the former depend on irrigation for
their existence.
61
To be sure, poverty is linked as much with soil fertility as with
access to water.
62
Yet water remains, as always, the
sine qua non of agrarian life
in the Ferghana Valley.
Post-Soviet institutional changes have highlighted the many and complex power
relationships which affect the distribution of water. Processes of redistribution
or privatization allowed well-placed individuals and groups to capture the most
productive land within irrigation systems. Furthermore, individuals may use their
social position to influence, or even bribe, water authorities to upgrade their water
supply to the detriment of poorer water users.
63
Such rural inequalities are also
institutionalized. Thurman notes that joint stock companies in Uzbekistan are often
the first to receive water, followed by private farm enterprises and then individual
peasant farms.
64
In all three countries private garden plots are generally the lowest
priority when irrigation water is being allocated. However, those same plots are
crucial to the welfare of large numbers of families. Since these same poorer families
are less able than their wealthier neighbors to lease additional land, the process
268 BICHSEL, MUKHABBATOV, SHERFEDINOV
easily becomes self-reinforcing, especially in the Tajik and Uzbek sectors of the
valley. Finally, irrigation is the very foundation of the complex political economy
of cotton in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Any change in the irrigation system directly
affects the lives of the countless subsistence laborers who grow and harvest the
cotton, no less than the local or provincial elites who speak publicly in behalf of
the industry and benefit handsomely from its successes.
65
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