262 BICHSEL, MUKHABBATOV, SHERFEDINOV
repeatedly have flooded downstream areas, since only a part of the quantity can
be held in such facilities as the Kairakkum Reservoir on the border in Tajikistan.
Uzbekistan often has complained about the damage caused by winter flooding and
demands that water should be released mainly in summer so as to prevent flooding
and sustain irrigated crops.
41
A second dispute concerns the economic value of water provided across national
borders. Since independence, Kyrgyzstan has been neither willing nor able to as-
sume the total financial burden of operating and maintaining the Toktogul dam and
hydroelectric station and regulating the flow of water into the Naryn River and
hence the Syr Darya, especially since it is mainly the downstream countries that
benefit from these operations. Kyrgyzstan therefore seeks compensation from the
downstream countries. The annual cost to Kyrgyzstan of maintaining the Toktogul
reservoir and related infrastructure amounts to an estimated US$15–25 million.
Until 2002, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan did not contribute to the cost of maintain-
ing and operating this facility.
Rising gas prices and the shift to a more market-oriented economy have prompted
Kyrgyzstan’s lawmakers to re-evaluate the value of water as a resource. As noted
above, they argue that the Syr Darya waters flowing from Kyrgyzstan bring consider-
able economic benefit to the downstream countries, thanks to irrigated agriculture.
Therefore, they seek to place a specific value or price on water and to charges users
for what they receive from Kyrgyzstan.
42
Uzbekistan to date has been critical of
this notion, questioning whether water can be owned by any country and whether
it should be treated as an economic good at all. Moreover, Uzbekistan asserts that
because Kyrgyzstan provides no “value added” to the water flowing from its terri-
tory, it is hardly justified in asking financial compensation for it.
43
A third point of contention concerns the apportionment of water from the Syr
Darya River and the quantity to which the respective riparian countries are entitled.
Kyrgyzstan contests the old Soviet inter-republican quotas, which designated the
lion’s share of the Syr Darya’s water to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. With the 1992
Almaty Agreement on Water Resources, the new states confirmed that they would
continue to observe the existing quotas for the time being, but did not foreclose
possible changes later. The Agreement assigned 51.7 percent of the river flow to
Uzbekistan, 38.1 percent to Kazakhstan, 9.2 percent to Tajikistan, and only 1 percent
to Kyrgyzstan.
44
The Kyrgyz claim that this arrangement effectively barred them
from developing irrigated agriculture during the Soviet period, and denied them
the economic benefit that would have come from doing so. Kyrgyzstan therefore
seeks to correct what it sees as a historical injustice by claiming enough water to
develop self-sustaining and market-based irrigated agriculture. However, this runs
directly counter to plans by Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, all of which
wish to expand and modernize their own irrigated agriculture.
To
summarize, the various post-Soviet agreements
may have brought into
daylight the complex water and energy issues at stake
in the Ferghana Valley
and in Central Asia as a whole, while giving rise to a more open dialogue about
LAND, WATER, AND ECOLOGY 263
them. However, they have neither resolved these disputes nor foreclosed further
controversies. Indeed, public allegations of breaches of the agreements are now a
common feature of these disputes. In an acknowledgment of this, actual water and
energy transfers between upstream and downstream countries are largely carried
out through annual barter agreements for fuel and water that take place prior to
each new irrigation and heating season.
Thus far, the focus has been on disputes over water and energy among the suc-
cessor states following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. However, no less
serious tensions over water can arise
within states, for the distribution of water
also strains relations between provinces and districts within all the countries of
the Ferghana Valley. For example, Uzbekistan’s downstream province of Khor-
ezm has repeatedly blamed the upstream provinces of Surkhandarya and Bukhara
for worsening its water shortages.
45
In the specific case of the Ferghana Valley, a
number of more local conflicts over water and land have real significance, and as
such require our attention.
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