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A P P L I C A T I O N S O F B R O A D E R C O N C E P T I O N O F M I N D R E A D I N G
Conceptions of mindreading that go beyond the belief
‐
desire model are promising in part because they have the
potential to be more empirically adequate with respect to the diversity of mindreading practices, but they also are
fertile grounds for new, interesting research. Of particular interest is the co
‐
development of mindreading and social
preferences and biases. Historically, research on these two areas has been distinct, but there is emerging empirical
and philosophical work that demonstrates connections between the two developments (Abrams & Rutland, 2008;
Westra, 2017b).
It has long been known that joint attention is foundational for the development of mindreading. Indeed, one of
the earliest signs of autism is the failure to attend to objects others are attending to or get others to attend to
objects. Gaze cueing, an important mechanism of joint attention, consists in following the gazes of other people.
Recent empirical evidence suggests that infants as young as 7 months old preferentially look at the gazes of own
‐
race
adults to guide learning and social interactions (Xiao et al., 2017). Within the first year, infants begin to form prefer-
ences for own
‐
language speakers and expect that people who speak the same language will cooperate, have similar
customs, and like the same foods (Liberman, Woodward, & Kinzler, 2017). After the first year, infants selectively
imitate in
‐
group members (Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum, & Carpenter, 2013). By 5 years old, children perceive less
humanness in faces of out
‐
group members (McLoughlin, Tipper, & Over, 2017) and show in
‐
group favoritism and
out
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group bias even for arbitrary, minimal groups. (Dunham, Baron, & Carey, 2011). From infancy to preschool years,
children go through massive developmental changes in both mindreading and the formation of social preferences.
Indeed, there is good reason to think mindreading and social preferences are very closely related developments
(Aboud, 2003; Abrams et al., 2014; Abrams & Rutland, 2008).
Theories of mindreading that go beyond mere belief and desire attributions are in a good position to explore the
relationship between mindreading development and the formation of social preferences and social biases. In partic-
ular, more comprehensive theories of mindreading theories can shed light on how children learn and reason about
various social groups, the kind of mindreading inferences children are likely to make about members of different
social groups, what are the developmentally natural inferences about in
‐
groups and out
‐
groups and what are cultur-
ally specific conceptions, and how these various developmental processes relate to adults' social preferences and
biases. Examining these issues can also bring new perspective to debates about interventions on agents' social biases.
If we understand the normal developmental trajectory of mindreading and social preference, this can help us to
understand what patterns are universal, what processes are malleable, and what kinds of interventions are likely to
fail given what we know about how they develop.
SPAULDING
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Broader conceptions of mindreading are also well suited for application to more theoretical topics in episte-
mology and ethics. In particular, debates in the epistemology of peer disagreement and the ethics of epistemic
injustice hinge on how we judge others as competent and knowledgeable.
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Judgments that someone is skilled
(or merely faking expertise) and an epistemic authority (or just feigning knowledge) depend on whether and
how we employ stereotypes, the kinds of implicit associations that affect our judgments, character trait inferences
(like honesty or dominance), and of course inferences about that person's beliefs, desires, and intentions. Thus,
more comprehensive theories of mindreading that encompass these phenomena can shed light on how we judge
whether someone is an epistemic inferior, peer, or superior, when these judgments are likely to be accurate, sub-
ject to cognitive errors, or skewed by social biases, and when not to trust these judgments. This insight clearly
would be useful for studying epistemic (testimonial) injustice, which is concerned with how a hearer's prejudices
can upgrade or downgrade a speaker's credibility simply in virtue of the speaker's social group (Fricker, 2007;
Medina, 2013).
Understanding how we make judgments about who is an epistemic inferior, peer, or superior is also important for
debates about what to do when someone you take to be an epistemic peer disagrees with you. The debates about
the epistemology of peer disagreement concern the rational response to finding out that someone you regard as
equally knowledgeable, free from bias, and skilled at reasoning as you, disagrees with you about X. Is it rational for
you to remain steadfast in your judgment about X (Kelly, 2011). Or perhaps the rational thing to do is conciliate
and reduce your confidence in your judgment about X (Christensen, 2007). Surprisingly, this literature involves very
little discussion of how we form judgments about who is an epistemic peer and how reliable these judgments are.
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Steadfast and conciliation views both assume that these judgments about others' epistemic status are straightfor-
ward and typically accurate. It is here that broader conceptions of mindreading can be applied. If our theories of
mindreading suggest that inferences about who is knowledgeable and competent are warped by cognitive errors
and social biases, as I have argued elsewhere that they are (Spaulding, 2016), then this would lend much more
credence to the conciliatory views because it would be likely that we have inappropriately upgraded our own episte-
mic status and downgraded the status of others. If our theories of mindreading suggest that judgments of knowledge
and competence are generally reliable (or reliable in certain conditions), then this would lend support to the steadfast
view (or a nuanced mixed view depending on the context). Either way, it is clear that broader theories of mindreading
can be applied fruitfully to a debate that sorely needs insight from such theories.
This is just a sampling of some of the applications of a more comprehensive views of mindreading.
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The aim is to
demonstrate that not only are these broader conceptions of mindreading well suited to better explain the diversity
and complexity of real
‐
life, they also have fruitful applications in many areas of research.
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