This assumption is likewise part of the background of the theory of
justice. It follows that certain ways of dealing with envy and other aber-
rant propensities are closed to a well-ordered society. For example, it
cannot keep them in check by promulgating false or unfounded beliefs.
For our problem is how society should be arranged if it is to conform to
principles that rational persons with true general beliefs would acknowl-
edge in the original position. The publicity condition requires the parties
to assume that as members of society they will also know the general
facts. The reasoning leading up to the initial agreement is to be accessible
to public understanding. Of course, in working out what the requisite
principles are, we must rely upon current knowledge as recognized by
common sense and the existing scientific consensus. But there is no
reasonable alternative to doing this. We have to concede that as estab-
lished beliefs change, it is possible that the principles
of justice which it
seems rational to acknowledge may likewise change. Thus when the
belief in a fixed natural order sanctioning a hierarchical society is aban-
doned, assuming here that this belief is not true, a tendency is set up in
the direction of the two principles of justice in serial order. The effective
protection of the equal liberties becomes increasingly of first importance
in support of self-respect and this affirms the precedence of the first
principle.
83. HAPPINESS AND DOMINANT ENDS
83. Happiness and Dominant Ends
In order to be in a position to take up the question
of the good of justice, I
shall discuss the manner in which just institutions frame our choice of a
rational plan and incorporate the regulative element of our good. I shall
approach this topic in a roundabout fashion by returning in this section to
the concept of happiness and noting the temptation to think of it as
determined by a dominant end. Doing this will lead naturally into the
problems of hedonism and of the unity of the self. How these matters are
connected should be apparent in due course.
Earlier I said that, with certain qualifications,
a person is happy when
he is in the way of a successful execution (more or less) of a rational plan
of life drawn up under (more or less) favorable conditions, and he is
reasonably confident that his intentions can be carried through (§63).
Thus we are happy when our rational plans are going well, our more
important aims being fulfilled, and we are with reason quite sure that our
good fortune will continue. The achievement of happiness depends upon
480
The Good of Justice
circumstances
and luck, and hence the gloss about favorable conditions.
While I shall not discuss the concept of happiness in any detail, we
should consider a few further points to bring out the connection with the
problem of hedonism.
First of all, happiness has two aspects: one is the successful execution
of a rational plan (the schedule of activities and aims) which a person
strives to realize, the other is his state of mind, his sure confidence
supported by good reasons that his success will endure. Being happy
involves both a certain achievement in action
and a rational assurance
about the outcome.
15
This definition of happiness is objective: plans are to
be adjusted to the conditions of our life and our confidence must rest
upon sound beliefs. Alternatively, happiness might be defined subjec-
tively as follows: a person is happy when he believes that he is in the way
of a successful execution (more or less) of a rational plan, and so on as
before, adding the rider that if he is mistaken or deluded, then by contin-
gency and coincidence nothing happens to disabuse him of his miscon-
ceptions. By good luck he is not cast out of his fool’s paradise. Now the
definition to be preferred is that which best fits
the theory of justice and
coheres with our considered judgments of value. At this point it suffices
to observe, as I indicated a few pages back (§82), that we have assumed
that the parties in the original position have correct beliefs. They ac-
knowledge a conception of justice in the light of general truths about
persons and their place in society. Thus it seems natural to suppose that in
framing their plans of life they are similarly lucid. Of course none of this
is strictly argument. Eventually one has to appraise the objective defini-
tion as a part of the moral theory to which it belongs.
Adopting this definition, and keeping in mind the account of rational
plans presented earlier (§§63–65), we can interpret the special charac-
teristics sometimes attributed to happiness.
16
For example, happiness is
self-contained: that is, it is chosen solely for its own sake. To be sure, a
rational plan will include many (or at least several) final aims, and any of
these may be pursued partly because it complements and furthers one or
more other aims as well. Mutual support
among ends pursued for their
own sake is an important feature of rational plans, and therefore these
ends are not usually sought solely for themselves. Nevertheless executing
15. For this point see Anthony Kenny, “Happiness,”
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