A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

particular point of view, that of justice itself. And we must evaluate this
desire not from the egoist’s standpoint, whatever this might be, but in the
light of the thin theory of the good.
I shall assume that human actions spring from existing desires and that
these can be changed only gradually. We cannot just decide at a given
moment to alter our system of ends (§63). We act now as the sort of
person we are and from the wants we have now, and not as the sort of
person we might have been or from desires we would have had if earlier
we had only chosen differently. Regulative aims are especially subject to
this constraint. Thus we must decide well in advance whether to affirm
our sense of justice by trying to assess our situation over a fairly extensive
future. We cannot have things both ways. We cannot preserve a sense of
justice and all that this implies while at the same time holding ourselves
ready to act unjustly should doing so promise some personal advantage.
A just person is not prepared to do certain things, and if he is tempted too
easily, he was prepared after all.
30
Our question concerns then only those
with a certain psychology and system of desires. It would obviously be
demanding too much to require that stability should not depend upon
definite restrictions in this respect.
Now on one interpretation the question has an obvious answer. Sup-
posing that someone has an effective sense of justice, he will then have a
regulative desire to comply with the corresponding principles. The crite-
ria of rational choice must take this desire into account. If a person wants
with deliberative rationality to act from the standpoint of justice above all
else, it is rational for him so to act. Therefore in this form the question is
trivial: being the sorts of persons they are, the members of a well-ordered
society desire more than anything to act justly and fulfilling this desire is