A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

part of their good. Once we acquire a sense of justice that is truly final
and effective, as the precedence of justice requires, we are confirmed in a
plan of life that, insofar as we are rational, leads us to preserve and to
30. See Philippa Foot, “Moral Beliefs,” 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
vol. 59 (1958–
1959), p. 104. I am much indebted to this essay, although I have not followed it on all counts.
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encourage this sentiment. Since this fact is public knowledge, instability
of the first kind does not exist, and hence neither does that of the second.
The real problem of congruence is what happens if we imagine someone
to give weight to his sense of justice only to the extent that it satisfies
other descriptions which connect it with reasons specified by the thin
theory of the good. We should not rely on the doctrine of the pure
conscientious act (§72). Suppose, then, that the desire to act justly is not a
final desire like that to avoid pain, misery, or apathy, or the desire to fulfill
the inclusive interest. The theory of justice supplies other descriptions of
what the sense of justice is a desire for; and we must use these to show
that a person following the thin theory of the good would indeed confirm
this sentiment as regulative of his plan of life.
So much then for defining the question. I now wish to note the grounds
of congruence by reviewing various points already made. First of all, as
the contract doctrine requires, the principles of justice are public: they
characterize the commonly recognized moral convictions shared by the
members of a well-ordered society (§23). We are not concerned with
someone who is questioning these principles. By hypothesis, he concedes
as everyone else does that they are the best choice from the standpoint of
the original position. (Of course, this can always be doubted but it raises
an entirely different matter.) Now since others are assumed to have (and
to continue to have) an effective sense of justice, our hypothetical individ-
ual is considering in effect a policy of pretending to have certain moral
sentiments, all the while being ready to act as a free-rider whenever the
opportunity arises to further his personal interests. Since the conception
of justice is public, he is debating whether to set out on a systematic
course of deception and hypocrisy, professing without belief, as it suits
his purpose, the accepted moral views. That deception and hypocrisy are
wrongs does not, I assume, bother him; but he will have to reckon with
the psychological cost of taking precautions and maintaining his pose,
and with the loss of spontaneity and naturalness that results.
31
In most
societies as things are, such pretensions may not have a high price, since
the injustice of institutions and the often squalid behavior of others ren-
ders one’s own deceits easier to endure; but in a well-ordered society
there is not this comfort.
These remarks are supported by the fact that there is a connection
between acting justly and natural attitudes (§74). Given the content of the
principles of justice and the laws of moral psychology, wanting to be fair
31. See Foot, ibid., p. 104.
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with our friends and wanting to give justice to those we care for is as
much a part of these affections as the desire to be with them and to feel
sad at their loss. Assuming therefore that one needs these attachments, the
policy contemplated is presumably that of acting justly only toward those
to whom we are bound by ties of affection and fellow feeling, and of
respecting ways of life to which we are devoted. But in a well-ordered
society these bonds extend rather widely, and include ties to institutional
forms, assuming here that all three psychological laws are fully effective.
In addition, we cannot in general select who is to be injured by our
unfairness. For example, if we cheat on paying our taxes, or if we find
some way to avoid doing our fair share for the community, everyone is
hurt, our friends and associates along with the rest. To be sure, we might
consider covertly passing on part of our gains to those we especially like,
but this becomes a dubious and involved affair. Thus in a well-ordered
society where effective bonds are extensive both to persons and to social
forms, and we cannot select who is to lose by our defections, there are
strong grounds for preserving one’s sense of justice. Doing this protects
in a natural and simple way the institutions and persons we care for and
leads us to welcome new and broader social ties.
Another basic consideration is this: it follows from the Aristotelian
Principle (and its companion effect) that participating in the life of a
well-ordered society is a great good (§79). This conclusion depends upon
the meaning of the principles of justice and their precedence in every-
one’s plans as well as upon the psychological features of our nature. It is
the details of the contract view which establish this connection. Because
such a society is a social union of social unions, it realizes to a preemi-
nent degree the various forms of human activity; and given the social
nature of humankind, the fact that our potentialities and inclinations far
surpass what can be expressed in any one life, we depend upon the
cooperative endeavors of others not only for the means of well-being but
to bring to fruition our latent powers. And with a certain success all
around, each enjoys the greater richness and diversity of the collective
activity. Yet to share fully in this life we must acknowledge the principles
of its regulative conception, and this means that we must affirm our
sentiment of justice. To appreciate something as ours, we must have a
certain allegiance to it. What binds a society’s efforts into one social
union is the mutual recognition and acceptance of the principles of jus-
tice; it is this general affirmation which extends the ties of identification
over the whole community and permits the Aristotelian Principle to have
its wider effect. Individual and group accomplishments are no longer seen
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as just so many separate personal goods. Whereas not to confirm our
sense of justice is to limit ourselves to a narrow view.
Finally, there is the reason connected with the Kantian interpretation:
acting justly is something we want to do as free and equal rational beings
(§40). The desire to act justly and the desire to express our nature as free
moral persons turn out to specify what is practically speaking the same
desire. When someone has true beliefs and a correct understanding of the
theory of justice, these two desires move him in the same way. They are
both dispositions to act from precisely the same principles: namely, those
that would be chosen in the original position. Of course, this contention is
based on a theory of justice. If this theory is unsound, the practical
identity fails. But since we are concerned only with the special case of a
well-ordered society as characterized by the theory, we are entitled to
assume that its members have a lucid grasp of the public conception of
justice upon which their relations are founded.
Let us suppose that these are the chief reasons (or typical thereof)
which the thin account of the good allows for maintaining one’s sense of
justice. The question now arises whether they are decisive. Here we
confront the familiar difficulty of a balance of motives which in many
ways is similar to a balance of first principles. Sometimes the answer is
found by comparing one balance of reasons with another, for surely if the
first balance clearly favors one course of action then the second will also,
should its reasons supporting this alternative be stronger and its reasons
supporting the other alternatives be weaker. But arguing from such com-
parisons presupposes some configurations of reasons which evidently go
one way rather than another to serve as a bench mark. Failing these, we
cannot get beyond conditional comparisons: if the first balance favors a
certain choice, then the second does also.
Now at this point it is obvious that the content of the principles of
justice is a crucial element in the decision. Whether it is for a person’s
good that he have a regulative sense of justice depends upon what justice
requires of him. The congruence of the right and the good is determined
by the standards by which each concept is specified. As Sidgwick notes,
utilitarianism is more strict than common sense in demanding the sac-
rifice of the agent’s private interests when this is necessary for the greater
happiness of all.
32
It is also more exacting than the contract theory, for
while beneficent acts going beyond our natural duties are good actions
and evoke our esteem, they are not required as a matter of right. Utilitari-
32.