A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

See
also
Difference principle
Deontological theories, 26–27, 35–36
De Roover, R. A., 240n
Descriptive theory of goodness, 356–358
Desert, and distributive justice, 13–14,
88–89, 273–277
Desires: rational (as interests) defined,
359; and rational plans, 359–361;
choice of systems of, 364–365, 498; es-
timating relative intensity of, 368, 483;
to act on principles of rational choice,
as regulative, 364–365; laws governing
changes in systems of, 375, 432–433;
sense of justice as regulative, 430, 491,
497–499, 503; final always plural in
number, 432, 484, 493; derivative and
final distinguished, 432–433; and unity
of the self, 492; final, and finality con-
dition, 498–499, 503
Devlin, Patrick, 291n
Dewey, John, 351n, 358n
Difference principle, §13:65–73; defined,
65–68; in democratic equality, 65; and
perfectly just scheme, 68–70, 71–72;
and scheme just throughout, 68; how
related to efficiency, 69, 71; and chain
connection, 69–72; and close-knitness,
69–72; and average utility, 71; lexical
form of, 72; and interpersonal compari-
sons, 79; relation to principle of re-
dress, 86–87; regards distribution of
natural talents as common asset, 87–
88, 156, 448, 512; and reciprocity, 88–
90; as interpretation of principle of fra-
ternity, 90–91; and meritocratic society,
91–92; and eugenics, 92–93; reasoning
leading to, 130–131; objection that al-
lows excessive inequalities, 135–137;
and Kantian interpretation, 156–157,
437; and social minimum, 252–253;
meaning of in savings problem, 253–
254, 258; and priority of fair opportu-
nity, 265–267; and mixed conceptions,
278–282; regulates balance of pre-
cepts, 280; as political convention of
democracy, 280; relative clarity of,
281–282; and problem of envy, 465–
466, 470; self-respect and index of ex-
pectations, 478–479; and ethical vari-
ations of initial situation, 512–513
Diggs, B. J., 49n
Distribution branch, 245–248
Distribution of natural assets: and intui-
tive idea of the principles of justice,
11, 13; in system of natural liberty, 62–
63; in liberal equality, 63–64; in demo-
cratic equality and difference principle,
87, 156, 447–448, 512; as neither just
nor unjust, 87; and moral worth, 88–
89, 274; and eugenics 92–93; relation
to basis of equality, 443–447; and two
conceptions of equality, 447–448; how
characterizes human sociability and so-
cial union, 459–460
Distributive justice: main problem of, 4,
6–7, 53, 74; and pure procedural jus-
tice, 76–77; as happiness according to
virtue, 273–275; not opposite of re-
tributive justice, 276–277
Division of labor, 463–464, 474
Dobzhansky, Theodosius, 92n
Dominant end: defined, 484; not used in
justice as fairness, 463, 495–496; can-
not be happiness, 484–485; Loyola and
Aquinas as illustrating, 485; extreme
nature of, 485–486; and counting prin-
ciples, 486; use of in hedonism, 486–
490; necessity for choice of, 490–491;
and unity of the self, 492–493
Dostoevsky, Fyodor, 398n
Downs, Anthony, 317n, 431n
Dreben, Burton, 324n
Due process of law, 210
Duncan-Jones, A. E., 354n
Duties to self, 218–219
Duty, all things considered, 299–301
Duty, prima facie, 299–301
Duty to comply, 
see
Political duty
Dworkin, Gerald, 219n
Dworkin, Ronald, 291n, 307n, 339n
Economic systems, §42:234–242; use of
economic theory, 234; private vs. pub-
lic ownership, 235–239; public goods,
235–239; problems of isolation and as-
surance, 237–238; prisoner’s dilemma,
238n; use of markets, 239–242; alloca-
tive and distributive function of prices,
241–242; choice between private-prop-
erty economy and socialism not de-
cided by justice alone, 241–242
Economic theory of democracy, 316–318,
431–432
Edgeworth, F. Y.: 20n, 26, 28, 29, 58n;
his argument for utility principle criti-
cized, 147–148; conflation of persons
in, 164n; and cardinal utility, 282
Education, 87, 92, 220, 452
Effective means, principle of, 352–353,
361–362, 486
Efficiency, principle of: defined, 58–60;
and Pareto optimality, 58; applied to
basic structure, 61–62; not a principle
524
Index

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of justice, 62; role of in system of natu-
ral liberty, 62–63; role of in liberal
equality, 63–64; relation to difference
principle, 69, 71
Efficiency, problem of, 5–6
Egalitarianism, 471–472
Egoism: types of listed, 107; inferior al-
ternatives to principles of justice, 103,
117–118; excluded by constraints of
right, 114, 117–118; general, as no
agreement point, 117–118; justice as
fairness not a case of, 127–128; and ca-
pacity for moral feelings, 427; problem
of distinguished from problem of con-
gruence, 497–498; and punishment,
504–505
Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Irenäus, 378n, 379n, 440n
Embedding: 28, 138–139, 231–232, 256–
257, 285, 287
Emotive theory of meaning, 357
Ends, 
see
Desires
Entitlements, 276
Envy, §§80–81:464–474; forms of
defined, 466–468; problem of defined,
465–466, 468; and rationality, 124–
125, 464–465; and two-part argument
for principles of justice, 124, 464–465;
special psychologies, 465–466, 474;
not a moral feeling, 467, converses of,
467–468; excusable envy, 468; dispos-
ing conditions of, 469; in well-ordered
society of two principles of justice,
469–471, 479; and equality, 471–474;
and conditions of original position,
472; Freud on, and genesis of sense of
justice, 472–473; and index of expecta-
tions, 478–479; how dealt with by
caste and feudal systems, 479–480
Equal liberty of conscience, §§33–
35:180–194; and arguments for first
principle of justice, 180–181; how
leads to equal rights, 181–183; case for
strengthened when descendants consid-
ered, 183; Mill’s arguments for, 184–
185; equal liberty insecure on teleologi-
cal principles, 185; grounds for state’s
regulation of, 186–187; appeal to com-
mon sense and public knowledge in
regulating, 188–190; and toleration,
188–190; toleration of the intolerant,
190–194; and stability of just institu-
tions, 192–193; equal liberty and moral
and cultural differences, 193–194, 583;
and perfectionism, 287–290
Equal participation, principle of §§36–37:
194–206; defined, 194, 196; two as-
pects of political justice, 194; features
of a constitutional regime, 195–196,
199–200; extent of defined, 197; fair
value of rights established by, 197–
198; historical failure of constitutional
regimes, 198–199; does not define an
ideal of citizenship, 200; three ways of
limiting, 200; justification for constitu-
tional devices limiting extent, 200–
202; and intensity of desire, 202–203;
justification for inequalities of, 203–
204; Mill on plural voting, 204–205;
grounds for self-government, 205–206
Equal respect, right to in determining
principles for basic structure, 475
Equality, basis of, §77:441–449; moral
personality as 17, 289, 442–443, 505f;
and natural rights, 442n; and natural at-
tributes, 443–446; objection to proce-
dural interpretation of, 444; in tele-
ological theories, 445; as a potentiality,
445–446; simplicity of, relative to
other views, 446–447; and reciprocity,
447; and two conceptions of equality,
447–448; and limits of justice as fair-
ness, 448
Equality, tendency to §17:86–93; princi-
ple of redress, 86–88; distribution of
natural talents as a common asset, 87,
156, 447–448, 585; and reciprocity, 88–
90; and harmony of interests, 89–90;
principle of fraternity, 90–91; differ-
ence principle prevents meritocratic so-
ciety, 91–92; eugenics, 92–93; and
envy, 471–474
Equality of consideration, 444
Equality of fair opportunity, §14:73–78,