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(continued)
justice, 8, 212, 343; and penal sanc-
tions, 212, 277; and priority rules, 212,
267.
See also
Strict compliance
Idealism, 232–233
Ideals, of roles, 404n, 409–410, 413,
414
Illocutionary forces, 356–358
Impartial sympathetic spectator: in defini-
tion of right, 161–162; in utilitarian-
ism, 23–24, 26, 29–30, 161–166;
Hume’s account of, 161–163, 165–
166, 233
Impartiality, 163–166
Inclusive end, 484, 489
Inclusiveness, principle of, 362
Indeterminacy of justice, 176, 318; of
choice, 484, 490, 493–494
Indifference, principle of, 485
Indifference curves, 33–34
Inheritance, 245–246
Initial situation: defined, 15–16, 105; rela-
tion to original position, 16–17, 105;
many interpretations of, 105, 109; as
analytic method of comparing concep-
tions of justice, 105, 165; list of vari-
ations and elements of, 126–127; ethi-
cal variations of, 512
Instability, two kinds of, 295–296, 435
Institutions, §10:47–52; defined, 47–48;
arrangement of major, primary subject
of principles of justice, 6–7, 47; exist-
ence and publicity of rules of, 48–49;
constitutive rules of distinguished from
strategies, 49–50; and artificial iden-
tification of interests, 49; and formal
justice, 50–52; as defining content of
obligations, 97
Integrity, virtues of, 455–456
Interpersonal comparisons of well-being:
in utilitarianism, 78, 284–285; in jus-
tice as fairness, 79–80, 81; role of pri-
mary goods in, 79, 81, 188; and unity
of expectations, 151–153; and some
procedures of cardinal utility, 282–
285; moral presuppositions in, 284–285
Intuitionism, §7:30–36; broad vs. tradi-
tional sense of, defined, 30–31; types
of, by levels of generality, 31–33; rep-
resented by indifference curves, 33–34;
and priority problem, 34–35, 36–37; in-
complete but not irrational, 34–35, 36–
37; may be either teleological or deon-
tological, 35; in mixed conceptions,
279–281; in more common forms of
perfectionism, 286–287, 290–291
Isolation problem, 237–238, 295
James, William, 390n
Jealousy, 467–468, 472–473
Jevons, W. S., 38n
Jouvenal, Bertrand, 287n
Judicial virtues, 453
Just savings principle, §44:251–258; mo-
tivation assumption for, 111, 121, 254–
256; needed to determine social mini-
mum, 251–252; and time preference,
253, 259–262; in classical utilitarian-
ism, 253, 262; construction of in con-
tract theory, 253–258; relation to differ-
ence principle, 253–254; public
savings policies and democratic princi-
ples, 260–262; and priority questions,
263–264; in final statement of two prin-
ciples, 266–267; and principle of politi-
cal settlement, 318.
See also
Time pref-
erence
Just war, 332–335
Justice, concept of: as distinct from con-
ception of, defined, 5, 8–9; as first vir-
tue of institutions, 3–4, 513; principles
of assign basic rights and duties and
regulate competing claims, 4–6, 9,
112; primary subject of, basic struc-
ture, 6–10, 47; but one part of a social
ideal, 8–9
Justice, conceptions of: as distinct from
concept of, defined, 5, 8–9; role of
principles of, 4–6, 9; distinguished
from social ideals, 9; content of, 129–
130; degrees of reasonableness of, 309–
310.
See also
Stability, of conceptions
of justice
Justice, formal, 50–52, 156, 207–210,
441–442
Justice, general conception of: principle
of stated, 54; relation to two principles
of justice (as special conception), 54–
55, 217–218; lacks definite structure, 55
Justice, natural duty of: defined, 99, 293–
294; and political obligation, 100, 296,
310n; and toleration of the intolerant,
192; argument for, 293–296; and duty
to a just constitution, 308–312; weight
of and civil disobedience, 336
Justice, primary subject of, 6–10.
See
also
Basic structure
Justice, role of, §1: 3–6; as first virtue of
institutions, 3–4, 513; to assign basic
rights and duties and to regulate com-
peting claims, 4–5; concept and con-
ceptions of distinguished, 5; and other
social problems, 5–6
Justice, substantive, 50–52
Justice, two principles of special concep-
528
Index
tion of, §11:52–56, §26:130–139,
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