A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

§30:160–168; defined, 20, 22–23, 139–
140; extends principle of choice for
one person to social choice, 21, 23–24;
as teleological theory, 21–23; concep-
tion of good in, 21–22; distribution in,
23; status of precepts of justice in, 23,
25, 269–270; impartial spectator in,
24, 26, 161–166; conflation of persons
in, 24, 26, 162–165; and priority of
right, 27–29; solution to priority prob-
lem, 36; and allocative justice, 77; rela-
tion to imperfect procedural justice,
77; interpersonal comparisons in, 78,
284–285; standard assumptions of,
137–138, 185, 247, 284–285, 445; reli-
ance on general facts in, 137–139; con-
sidered in argument from finality and
stability, 154–159; role of sympathy in,
155, 161–164; and treating persons as
ends, 156–159; and impartial sympa-
thetic spectator definition of right, 161–
163; confuses impersonality with im-
partiality, 163–166; relation to perfect
altruism, 164–165; absence of taking
chances in, 165; and idea of splitting,
166–167; on savings problem, 253,
262. 
See
also
Utilitarianism, average
Values of community: problem of in jus-
tice as fairness, 233–234, 456, 511;
why justice in social union a case of,
462–463; justice as case of, how re-
lated to unanimity condition, 494–495;
congruence confirms justice as case of,
505
Vanek, Jaroslav, 240n
Veil of ignorance, §24:118–123; defined,
11, 17, 118; knowledge of what ex-
cluded by, 11, 16–17, 118–119, 149,
175–176; does not obscure meaning of
original position, 119; not irrational,
120; effect on unanimity condition,
120–121; excludes bargaining, 120–
121; in savings problem, 121, 254–
255; implicit in Kant’s ethics, 121–
122, 222; bounds on complexity of
general facts, 122–123; with mutual
disinterestedness compared to benevo-
lence, 128–129; closes historical re-
cord to parties, 160; variations of in
four-stage sequence, 175–176; and just
savings problem, 254–255; does not
hold in applying principles of rational
choice, 394
Venturi, Franco, 254n
Vickrey, W. S., 141n, 196n, 283n
Viner, Jacob, 399n
Virtues: defined, 167, 382; how distin-
guished from natural assets, 382–383;
as excellences, 390–391; of self-
command, 391, 419, 424; of morality
of authority, 408–409; of morality of
association, 413; judicial, 453; of integ-
rity, 455–456
Vlachos, Georges, 11n
Vlastos, Gregory, 9n
Wages, fair, 268–271
Walras, Leon, 489n
Walzer, Michael, 99n, 330n, 335n
Want-regarding principles, 287
Warnock, G. F., 129n
Warrender, Howard, 211n
Weber, Max, 479n
Wechsler, Herbert, 206n
Well-ordered society, concept of,