A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

§29:153–160; first and final statements
of, 53, 266; defined as special concep-
tion when in lexical order, 53–54; as
special case of general conception, 54–
55; as long-run tendency of justice, 55,
132, 541f; primary goods in, 54–55,
79–81; consequences of applying to in-
stitutions, 55–56; representative per-
sons in, 56, 81–86; initial argument
for, 130–132; as maximin solution,
132–135 place of general facts in argu-
ments for, 136–139; argument for from
finality and strains of commitment,
153–154; argument for from publicity
and constraints on agreements, 154–
155; argument for from self-respect
and treating persons as ends, 155–159.
See
also
First principle of justice; Sec-
ond principle of justice
Justice as fairness, §3:10–15; intuitive
idea of defined, 10–12; not an account
of ordinary meaning, 9; hypothetical
nature of, 11, 18–19, 104, 145, 514;
name of explained, 11; analogue of
state of nature in, 11; intuitive idea of
principles of, 13–14; two parts of, 14;
and propriety of term “contract,” 14–
15; limited scope of, 15, 448; as a
deontological theory, 26; and priority
of right, 27–30; embedding of ideals
in, 28, 138–139, 231; appeal to intui-
tion in, 36–40; and priority problem,
36–40; and complexity of moral facts,
40; as a moral theory, 41–45, 104–105;
simplifying devices in, 46, 77–78, 81,
123, 433, 453–454; and pure proce-
dural justice, 104, 118; not egoistic,
127–129; reliance on general facts in,
137–139; concept of impartiality in,
165–166; claims of culture in, 288–
289, 291–292, 387–388; as natural
rights theory, 442–443n; structure of,
496; some objections to considered,
511–513
Justice as regularity, 
see
Justice, formal
Justice between generations: and eugen-
ics, 92–93; and motivational assump-
tion in original position, 111, 121; and
veil of ignorance, 118–119, 121; in sav-
ings problem, 121, 251–258; and lib-
erty of conscience, 183; in historical
tradition of social union, 460–462. 
See
also
Just savings
Justification, §4:15–19, §87:506–514; as
a problem of rational choice, 15–16;
presupposes some consensus, 16–17,
508–509; role of considered judgments
and principles in, 17–19, 105, 508–
511; as mutual support of many consid-
erations, 18–19, 507; Cartesian and
naturalistic rejected, 506–507; three