A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

parts of exposition as, 507–508; objec-
tions to method of considered, 508–
511; some objections to justice as fair-
ness discussed, 511–513; and ethical
variations of initial situation, 512–513
Kaldor, Nicholas, 246n
Kant, Immanuel: in tradition of social
contract, 10; on priority of right, 28n,
38n, 513; theory of the good, 79–80,
351n; publicity condition in, 115, 221,
298n; veil of ignorance implicit in,
121–122, 222; doctrine not egoistic,
127–128; treating persons as ends inter-
preted, 156–159, 437; and Kantian in-
terpretation of justice as fairness, 221–
227; his ethics one of mutual respect,
225; and Rousseau, 225, 233; duty of
mutual aid in, 297–298; on savings,
254; priority rule for requirements,
297–298; on moral learning, 402–403;
on social union, 459n; definition of
envy, 466
Kantian interpretation of justice as fair-
ness, §40:221–227; moral principles as
object of rational choice, 221–222; no-
tion of autonomy in, 222; principles of
justice as categorical imperatives, 222–
223; and mutual disinterestedness, 223–
224; Sidgwick’s objection, 224–225;
original position as procedural interpre-
tation of Kant’s ethics, 226–227; in ex-
planation of moral shame, 390–391; in
psychological understandability of mo-
rality, 417, 418; in idea of social union,
462–463; effect on understanding unity
of the self, 493–495; unanimity condi-
tion of, 494–495; in argument for con-
gruence, 501
Kaufmann, Walter, 469n
Kenny, Anthony, 481n, 482n, 490n.
Keynes, J. M., 146n, 263–264
King, Martin Luther, 320n
Kirchenheimer, Otto, 206n
Kneale, W. K., 161n
Knight, F. H., 199n, 274n, 314n
Kohlberg, Lawrence, 403n, 404n
Koopmans, T. C., 58n, 240n, 253n
Kyburg, H. E., 149n
Lamont, W. D., 351n
Laplace, Marquis de, 146
529
Index

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Laplacean rule, 148
Law of nations, 7, 93, 99, 401; and natu-
ral duties, 99; derivation of, 332–333;
and just war and conscientious refusal,
333–335
Least advantaged class, defined, 83–84
Legal system, defined, 207–208
Legality, principle of, 
see
Rule of law
Legislative stage, 174–175
Legitimate expectations, §48:273–277;
and just law, 207; not based on moral
desert, 273–274; moral worth not re-
warded by following precepts of jus-
tice, 273–275; how arise in well or-
dered society, 275–276; entitlements,
deservingness, and moral worth distin-
guished, 276; distributive justice not
opposite of retributive, 276–277
Leibenstein, Harvey, 400n
Leibniz, G. W. von, 273n
Lessnoff, Michael, 264n
Lewis, C. I., 164n, 165n, 351n
Lewis, D. K., 115n
Lexical order: defined, 37–38; in justice
as fairness, 38–39; as simplifying de-
vice, 38–39, 40, 77–78; of two princi-
ples of justice, 53–54, 130–131; and
lexical form of difference principle, 72.
See also
Priority 
entries
Liberal equality, 57, 63–65
Liberty, concept of, §32:176–180; as pat-
tern of social forms, 55–56, 177, 180n,
210; triadic form of, 177; question of
positive and negative, 176–177; total
system of, 178, 201–202, 213, 220; as-
sessed from standpoint of equal citi-
zens, 178–179, 217; worth of liberty
and the end of social justice, 179; po-
litical, fair value of, 197–199; and rule
of law, 210–213; and paternalism, 218–
220
Life prospects, 
see
Expectations
Linguistic theory, 41, 430
Little, I. M. D., 62n, 124n, 147n, 311n
Locke, John, 10, 28–29, 97, 114, 189–190
Loev, Gerald, 322n
Lorenz, Konrad, 440n
Lottery schemes, 329
Louch, A. R., 291n
Love: defined, 166, 406–407; of many
persons, problem of, 166–167; law of
in psychological laws, 405–408, 411–
412, 416, 433; how related to moral
feelings, 407, 425–429; in explaining
psychological understandability of mo-
rality, 416–417 as family of disposi-
tions, 426–427; hazards of in argument
for congruence, 502–503.