A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

See also
Be-
nevolence; Love of mankind; Superero-
gation; Supererogatory acts
Love of injustice, 385–386
Love of mankind, 166–167, 417, 419, 424
Lovejoy, A. O., 460n
Loyola, St. Ignatius of, 485n
Lucas, J. R., 109n, 116n, 206n
Luce, R. D., 74n, 133n, 150n, 238n,
283n, 392n, 489n
Lyons, David, 20n, 329n
Mabbott, J. D., 20n, 124n, 410n
MacCallum, G. G., 177n
Maccoby, E. E., 408n
Maine, H. S., 285
Majority rule, §54:313–318; bare,
defined, 197; and principle of participa-
tion, 197, 200–201; circumscribed by
constitutional devices, 200–202; and in-
tensity of desire, 202–203, 317–318;
and bill of rights, 203; argument for in
just constitution, 311–312; limits of
majority principle, 311–312; status of,
313–314; role of in ideal procedure,
314–316; contrast with ideal market
process, 316–318; and principle of po-
litical settlement, 318
Marglin, S. A., 136n, 260n
Markets, use of in economic systems,
239–242
Marshall, Alfred, 229
Marx, Karl, 229, 249n, 268n, 271–272n,
460n, 538n
Maximal class of plans, 359, 365
Maximin rule: defined, 132–133; as heu-
ristic device for arranging arguments
for principles of justice, 132–136, 153;
situations when reasonable, 134; and
original position, 134–135
McCloskey, Herbert, 313n
McCloskey, H. J., 30n
McDougall, William, 389n, 404n
Mead, G. H., 410n
Meade, J. E., 241–242, 245n
Meiklejohn, Alexander, 178n
Mens rea,
212
Meritocratic society, 91–92
Method of choice, first-person, 283, 484,
486–489, 492, 494
Militant action, 322–323
Mill, James, 402n
Mill, J. S., 20n, 108, 180n, 197, 374n,
402n, 429n, 460n, 476; on force of pre-
cepts of justice, 23n; on priority prob-
lem, 36; lexical order in, 38n; as hold-
ing average utilitarianism, 140;
530
Index

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arguments for liberty considered, 184–
185; argument for plural voting, 204–
205; on value of self-government, 205–
206; on balancing precepts of justice,
268; on moral learning, 403, 439;
proof of utility interpreted, 492–493
Miller, G. A., 358n
Mixed conceptions, §49:277–285; list of,
107; appeal of, 278; with social mini-
mum and distributional constraints,
278–279; institutionistic features of,
279–281; and difference principle, 280–
282; vagueness of, 281–283; cardinal
utility and interpersonal comparisons,
282–285
Moderate scarcity, 110, 226
Moore, G. E., 30, 35, 287n
Moral attitudes, 
see
Moral sentiments
Moral education, 429
Moral geometry, 105, 109
Moral learning theory: two traditions of,
401–404; presupposes moral theory,
404, 430, 434; in justice as fairness,
429–439
Moral person (personality): defined, 11,
17, 442; as basis of equality, 17, 289,
442–447; and perfectionism, 289; and
duty of mutual respect, 297; freedom
and equality of 475; and unity of the
self, 491–492
Moral principles, function of, 113–114,
115–116, 510–511
Moral psychology, principles of, §75:429–
434; first law, 406, 429; second law,
412–413, 429; third law, 414–415, 429–
430; refer to the principles of justice,
430; moral conceptions in psychologi-
cal and social theory, 430–432, 434; as
laws of transformation of systems of
final ends, 432–433; as reciprocity prin-
ciples, 433; and relative stability, 434–
439; and evolution, 440–441
Moral reasons, 97, 300-301, 306
Moral sentiments, §§73–74:420–429; in
what sense independent of contingen-
cies, 416; some terms for explained,
420; relation to characteristic sensa-
tions and behavior, 420–421; moral
principles in explanations of, 421–422;
how resolved and relation to attitudes
of others, 422–423; guilt and shame,
424; connection with natural attitudes,
425–427; as normal feature of human
life, 427–429; egoists incapable of,
428; may take irrational forms, 428–
429
Moral theory: nature of, §9:40–46; as at-
tempt to describe our moral capacities,
41–42; compared with linguistics, 41,
430; considered judgments in, 42–44,
507–509; and reflective equilibrium,
42–44; as a theory of moral senti-
ments, 44; place of definitions in, 44–
45, 95–96, 112–113, 130; what to ex-
pect of, 46, 176, 319–320; simplifying
devices in, 46, 77–78, 433; general
facts in, 137–139, 234, 372–373, 399,
404–405; role of in psychological and
social theory, 430–432, 434. 
See
also
Justification
Moral worth of persons, §66:380–386;
defined, 382–384; not a basis of dis-
tributive justice, 274–275; problem be-
longs to full theory of good, 349–350,
381–382; primary goods established,
380–381; distinguished from natural as-
sets, 383; and idea of function, 384;
definition of good extended to other
cases, 384–385; as itself a good, and
question of congruence, 496–504
Morality of association, §71:409–413; as
second stage of morality, 409; institu-
tional context and role ideals of, 409–
410; intellectual development in, 410–
411; second psychological law and
(association) guilt, 411–412; and Aris-
totelian principle, 413; features and vir-
tues of, 414
Morality of authority, §70:405–409; as
first stage of morality, 405; family as
institutional context of, 405; first psy-
chological law and (authority) guilt,
406–407; conditions favorable to ac-
quiring, 407–408; features and virtues
of, 408–409
Morality of principles, §72:414–419; as
final stage of morality, 414; institu-
tional context of, 414; third psychologi-
cal law and (principle) guilt, 414–416;
sense of justice and particular attach-
ments, 416; psychological under-
standability of, 416–419; two forms of,
their features and virtues, 419
Morgan, G. A., 286n
Murphy, J. G., 11n, 221n
Musgrave, R. A., 243n, 247n
Mutual advantage, 
see
Reciprocity
Mutual aid, duty of, 98, 297–298, 357
Mutual disinterestedness: defined, 12;
and circumstances of justice, 110–112;
distinguished from egoism, 111; and
meaning of rationality, 125; combined
with veil of ignorance compared to be-
nevolence, 128–129, 131; and principles
531
Index

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Mutual disinterestedness 
(continued)
for guiding benevolence, 167; in
characterization of autonomy, 223–
224, 511
Mutual respect, duty of, 94, 156, 297, 447
Myrdal, Gunnar, 140n
Nagel, Thomas, 166n, 371n
Nash, J. F., 116n
National interest, legitimate, 332–333
Natural aristocracy, 57, 64–65
Natural assets, 
see
Distribution of natural
assets
Natural attitudes: and moral sentiments,
405–408, 412–413, 414–418, 425–
429; and sense of justice in argument
for congruence, 499–500
Natural abilities, and basis of equality,
444–447
Natural duties, §19:98–101, §51:293–
301; defined, 98–99; order of choice
of, 93–95; duty of justice and other ex-
amples of, 98–99; relation to super-
erogatory acts, 100–101; to other gen-
erations, 183, 258; argument for duty
of justice, 293–296; duty of mutual re-
spect, 297; of mutual aid, 297–298; pri-
ority problem for, 298–299; prima fa-
cie duty and duty all things considered,
299–301
Natural justice, precepts of, 209–210
Natural lottery, 
see
Distribution of natural
assets
Natural rights, 25, 28, 505n
Naturalism, 506–507
Near justice, state of, 311, 312; defined,
309, 319
Necessary truth, 19, 44, 506
Need, precept of, 244–245, 271, 274
Neumann-Morgenstern definition of car-
dinal utility, 283–284
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 22, 286, 469n
No offense without a law, precept of, 209
Noblesse oblige,
64, 100
Noncomparing groups, 387–388, 470–
471, 477–478, 479
Nonideal theory, 215–218, 267, 308–309,
343; defined, 216. 
See also