and aims, being adjusted to one another by the public conception of
justice, simplify decision by offering definite ideals and forms of life that
have been developed and tested by innumerable individuals, sometimes
for generations. Thus in drawing up our plan of life we do not start de
novo; we are not required to choose from countless possibilities without
given structure or fixed contours. So while there is no algorithm for
settling upon our good, no first-person
procedure of choice, the priority of
right and justice securely constrains these deliberations so that they be-
come more manageable. Since the basic rights and liberties are already
firmly established, our choices cannot distort our claims upon one an-
other.
Now given the precedence of right and justice, the indeterminacy of
the conception of the good is much less troublesome. In fact, the consid-
erations that lead a teleological theory to embrace the notion of a domi-
nant end lose their force. First of all, the purely
preferential elements in
choice, while not eliminated, are nevertheless confined within the con-
straints of right already on hand. Since men’s claims on one another are
not affected, the indeterminacy is relatively innocuous. Moreover, within
the limits allowed by the principles of right, there need be no standard of
correctness beyond that of deliberative rationality. If a person’s plan of
life meets this criterion and if he succeeds in carrying it out, and in doing
so finds it worthwhile, there are no grounds for saying that it would have
been better if he had done something else.
We should not simply assume
that our rational good is uniquely determined. From the standpoint of the
theory of justice, this assumption is unnecessary. Secondly, we are not
required to go beyond deliberative rationality in order to define a clear
and workable conception of right. The principles of justice have a definite
content and the argument supporting them uses only the thin account of
the good and its list of primary goods. Once the conception of justice is
established, the priority of right guarantees the precedence of its princi-
ples. Thus the two considerations that make dominant-end conceptions
attractive for teleological theories are both absent in the contract doctrine.
Such is the effect of the reversal of structure.
Earlier when introducing the Kantian interpretation of justice as fair-
ness, I mentioned that there is a sense in which the unanimity condition
on the principles of justice is suited to express
even the nature of a single
self (§40). Offhand this suggestion seems paradoxical. How can the re-
quirement of unanimity fail to be a constraint? One reason is that the veil
of ignorance insures that everyone should reason in the same way and so
the condition is satisfied as a matter of course. But a deeper explanation
494
The Good of Justice
lies in the fact that the contract doctrine has a structure opposite to that of
a utilitarian theory. In the latter each person draws up his rational plan
without hindrance under full information, and society then proceeds to
maximize the aggregate fulfillment of the plans that result.
In justice as
fairness, on the other hand, all agree ahead of time upon the principles by
which their claims on one another are to be settled. These principles are
then given absolute precedence so that they regulate social institutions
without question and each frames his plans in conformity with them.
Plans that happen to be out of line must be revised. Thus the prior
collective agreement sets up from the first certain fundamental structural
features common to everyone’s plan. The nature of the self as a free and
equal moral person is the same for all, and the similarity in the basic form
of rational plans expresses this fact. Moreover, as
shown by the notion of
society as a social union of social unions, the members of a community
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