A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

Philosophy,
vol. 40 (1965). This usage is not adhered to in his 
Aristotle’s
Ethical Theory.
484
The Good of Justice

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makes one happy, includes and orders a plurality of aims, whatever these
are. On the other hand, it is most implausible to think of the dominant end
as a personal or social objective such as the exercise of political power, or
the achievement of social acclaim, or maximizing one’s material posses-
sions. Surely it is contrary to our considered judgments of value, and
indeed inhuman, to be so taken with but one of these ends that we do not
moderate the pursuit of it for the sake of anything else. For a dominant
end is at least lexically prior to all other aims and seeking to advance it
always takes absolute precedence. Thus Loyola holds that the dominant
end is serving God, and by this means saving our soul. He is consistent in
recognizing that furthering the divine intentions is the sole criterion for
balancing subordinate aims. It is for this reason alone that we should
prefer health to sickness, riches to poverty, honor to dishonor, a long life
to a short one, and, one might add, friendship and affection to hatred and
animosity. We must be indifferent, he says, to all attachments whatsoever,
for these become inordinate once they prevent us from being like equal-
ized scales in a balance, ready to take the course that we believe is most
for the glory of God.
19
It should be observed that this principle of indifference is compatible
with our enjoying lesser pleasures and allowing ourselves to engage in
play and amusements. For these activities relax the mind and rest the
spirit so that we are better fitted to advance more important aims. Thus
although Aquinas believes that the vision of God is the last end of all
human knowledge and endeavor, he concedes play and amusements a
place in our life. Nevertheless these pleasures are permitted only to the
extent that the superordinate aim is thereby advanced, or at least not
hindered. We should arrange things so that our indulgences in frivolity
and jest, in affection and friendship, do not interfere with the fullest
attainment of our final end.
20
The extreme nature of dominant-end views is often concealed by the
vagueness and ambiguity of the end proposed. Thus if God is conceived
(as surely he must be) as a moral being, then the end of serving him above
all else is left unspecified to the extent that the divine intentions are not
clear from revelation, or evident from natural reason. Within these limits
a theological doctrine of morals is subject to the same problems of bal-
ancing principles and determining precedence which trouble other con-
19. See 
The Spiritual Exercises,
The First Week, the remarks under the heading “Principle and
Foundation”; and The Second Week, the remarks under the heading “Three Occasions When a Wise
Choice Can Be Made.”
20. 
Summa Contra Gentiles,
bk. III, ch. XXV.
485
83. Happiness and Dominant Ends

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ceptions. Since disputed questions commonly lie here, the solution pro-
pounded by the religious ethic is only apparent. And certainly when the
dominant end is clearly specified as attaining some objective goal such as
political power or material wealth, the underlying fanaticism and inhu-
manity are manifest. Human good is heterogeneous because the aims of
the self are heterogeneous. Although to subordinate all our aims to one
end does not strictly speaking violate the principles of rational choice
(not the counting principles anyway), it still strikes us as irrational, or
more likely as mad. The self is disfigured and put in the service of one of
its ends for the sake of system.
84. HEDONISM AS A METHOD OF CHOICE
84. Hedonism as a Method of Choice
Traditionally hedonism is interpreted in one of two ways: either as the
contention that the sole intrinsic good is pleasurable feeling, or as the
psychological thesis that the only thing individuals strive for is pleasure.
However I shall understand hedonism in a third way, namely, as trying to
carry through the dominant-end conception of deliberation. It attempts to
show how a rational choice is always possible, at least in principle.
Although this effort fails, I shall examine it briefly for the light it throws
upon the contrast between utilitarianism and the contract doctrine.
I imagine the hedonist to reason as follows. First he thinks that, if
human life is to be guided by reason, there must exist a dominant end.
There is no rational way to balance our competing aims against one
another except as means to some higher end. Second, he interprets plea-
sure narrowly as agreeable feeling. Pleasantness as an attribute of feeling
and sensation is thought to be the only plausible candidate for the role of
the dominant end, and therefore it is the only thing good in itself. That, so
conceived, pleasure alone is good is not postulated straightway as a first
principle and then held to accord with our considered judgments of value.
Rather pleasure is arrived at as the dominant end by a process of elimina-
tion. Granting that rational choices are possible, such an end must exist.
At the same time this end cannot be happiness or any objective goal. To
avoid the circularity of the one and the inhumanity and fanaticism of the
other, the hedonist turns inwards. He finds the ultimate end in some
definite quality of sensation or feeling identifiable by introspection. We
can suppose, if we like, that pleasantness can be ostensibly defined as that
attribute which is common to the feelings and experiences toward which
we have a favorable attitude and wish to prolong, other things equal.
486
The Good of Justice

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Thus, for purposes of illustration, one might say that pleasantness is that
feature which is common to the experience of smelling roses, of tasting
chocolate, of requited affection, and so on, and analogously for the oppo-
site attribute of painfulness.
21
The hedonist maintains, then, that a rational agent knows exactly how
to proceed in determining his good: he is to ascertain which of the plans
open to him promises the greatest net balance of pleasure over pain. This
plan defines his rational choice, the best way to order his competing aims.
The counting principles now apply trivially, since all good things are
homogeneous and therefore comparable as means to the one end of plea-
sure. Of course these assessments are plagued by uncertainties and lack
of information, and normally only the crudest estimates can be made. Yet
for hedonism this is not a real difficulty: what counts is that the maximum
of pleasure provides a clear idea of the good. We are now said to know the
one thing the pursuit of which gives rational form to our life. Largely for
these reasons Sidgwick thinks that pleasure must be the single rational
end that is to guide deliberation.
22
It is important to note two points. First, when pleasure is regarded as a
special attribute of feeling and sensation, it is conceived as a definite
measure on which calculations can be based. By reckoning in terms of the
intensity and duration of pleasant experiences, the necessary computa-
tions can theoretically be made. The method of hedonism provides a
first-person procedure of choice as the standard of happiness does not.
Second, taking pleasure as the dominant end does not imply that we have
any particular objective goals. We find pleasure in the most varied activi-
ties and in the quest for any number of things. Therefore aiming to
maximize pleasurable feeling seems at least to avoid the appearance of
fanaticism and inhumanity while still defining a rational method for first-
person choice. Furthermore, the two traditional interpretations of hedon-
ism are now easily accounted for. If pleasure is indeed the only end the
pursuit of which enables us to identify rational plans, then surely pleasure
would appear to be the sole intrinsic good, and so we would have arrived
at the principle of hedonism by an argument from the conditions of
rational deliberation. A variant of psychological hedonism also follows:
for although it is going too far to say that rational conduct would always
consciously aim at pleasure, it would in any case be regulated by a
schedule of activities designed to maximize the net balance of pleasurable
21. The illustration is from C. D. Broad,