A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
vol. 66
(1965–1966), pp. 101f.
16. Notably by Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics,
1097a15–b21. For a discussion of Aristotle’s ac-
count of happiness, see W. F. R. Hardie, 
Aristotle’s Ethical Theory
(Oxford, The Clarendon Press,
1968), ch. II.
481
83. Happiness and Dominant Ends

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the entire plan, and the enduring confidence with which this is done, is
something that we want to do and to have only for itself. All considera-
tions including those of right and justice (using here the full theory of
good) have already been surveyed in drawing up the plan. And therefore
the whole activity is self-contained.
Happiness is also self-sufficient: a rational plan when realized with
assurance makes a life fully worthy of choice and demands nothing
further in addition. When circumstances are especially favorable and the
execution particularly successful, one’s happiness is complete. Within the
general conception one sought to follow, there is nothing essential that is
lacking, no way in which it could have been distinctly better. So even if
the material means that support our mode of life can always be imagined
to be greater, and a different pattern of aims might often have been
chosen, still the actual fulfillment of the plan itself may have, as com-
positions, paintings, and poems often do, a certain completeness which
though marred by circumstance and human failing is evident from the
whole. Thus some become exemplars of human flourishing and models
for emulation, their lives being as instructive in how to live as any philo-
sophical doctrine.
A person is happy then during those periods when he is successfully
carrying through a rational plan and he is with reason confident that his
efforts will come to fruition. He may be said to approach blessedness to
the extent that conditions are supremely favorable and his life complete.
Yet it does not follow that in advancing a rational plan one is pursuing
happiness, not at least as this is normally meant. For one thing, happiness
is not one aim among others that we aspire to, but the fulfillment of the
whole design itself. But also I have supposed first that rational plans
satisfy the constraints of right and justice (as the full theory of the good
stipulates). To say of someone that he seeks happiness does not, it seems,
imply that he is prepared either to violate or to affirm these restrictions.
Therefore the acceptance of these limits should be made explicit. And
secondly, the pursuit of happiness often suggests the pursuit of certain
sorts of ends, for example, life, liberty, and one’s own welfare.
17
Thus
persons who devote themselves selflessly to a righteous cause, or who
dedicate their lives to furthering the well-being of others, are not nor-
mally thought to seek happiness. It would be misleading to say this of
saints and heroes, or of those whose plan of life is in some marked degree
supererogatory. They do not have the kinds of aims that fall under this
17. For these two qualifications, see Kenny, “Happiness,” pp. 98f.
482
The Good of Justice

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heading, admittedly not sharply defined. Yet saints and heroes, and per-
sons whose intentions acknowledge the limits of right and justice, are in
fact happy when their plans succeed. Although they do not strive for
happiness, they may nevertheless be happy in advancing the claims of
justice and the well-being of others, or in attaining the excellences to
which they are attracted.
But how in general is it possible to choose among plans rationally?
What procedure can an individual follow when faced with this sort of
decision? I now want to return to this question. Previously I said that a
rational plan is one that would be chosen with deliberative rationality
from among the class of plans all of which satisfy the principles of
rational choice and stand up to certain forms of critical reflection. We
eventually reach a point though where we just have to decide which plan
we most prefer without further guidance from principle (§64). There is
however one device of deliberation that I have not yet mentioned, and this
is to analyze our aims. That is, we can try to find a more detailed or more
illuminating description of the object of our desires hoping that the count-
ing principles will then settle the case. Thus it may happen that a fuller or
deeper characterization of what we want discloses that an inclusive plan
exists after all.
Let us consider again the example of planning a holiday (§63). Often
when we ask ourselves why we wish to visit two distinct places, we find
that certain more general ends stand in the background and that all of
them can be fulfilled by going to one place rather than the other. Thus we
may want to study certain styles of art, and further reflection may bring
out that one plan is superior or equally good on all these counts. In this
sense we may discover that our desire to go to Paris is more intense than
our desire to go to Rome. Often however a finer description fails to be
decisive. If we want to see both the most famous church in Christendom
and the most famous museum, we may be stuck. Of course these desires
too may be examined further. Nothing in the way that most desires are
expressed shows whether there exists a more revealing characterization of
what we really want. But we have to allow for the possibility, indeed for
the probability, that sooner or later we will reach incomparable aims
between which we must choose with deliberative rationality. We may
trim, reshape, and transform our aims in a variety of ways as we try to fit
them together. Using the principles of rational choice as guidelines, and
formulating our desires in the most lucid form we can, we may narrow
the scope of purely preferential choice, but we cannot eliminate it alto-
gether.
483
83. Happiness and Dominant Ends

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The indeterminacy of decision seems to arise, then, from the fact that a
person has many aims for which there is no ready standard of comparison
to decide between them when they conflict. There are many stopping
points in practical deliberation and many ways in which we characterize
the things we want for their own sake. Thus it is easy to see why the idea
of there being a single dominant end (as opposed to an inclusive end) at
which it is rational to aim is highly appealing.
18
For if there exists such an
end to which all other ends are subordinate, then presumably all desires,
insofar as they are rational, admit of an analysis which shows the count-
ing principles to apply. The procedure for making a rational choice, and
the conception of such a choice, would then be perfectly clear: delibera-
tion would always concern means to ends, all lesser ends in turn being
ordered as means to one single dominant end. The many finite chains of
reasons eventually converge and meet at the same point. Hence a rational
decision is always in principle possible, since only difficulties of compu-
tation and lack of information remain.
Now it is essential to understand what the dominant-end theorist
wants: namely, a method of choice which the agent himself can always
follow in order to make a rational decision. Thus there are three require-
ments: the conception of deliberation must specify (1) a first-person pro-
cedure which is (2) generally applicable and (3) guaranteed to lead to the
best result (at least under favorable conditions of information and given
the ability to calculate). We have no procedures meeting these conditions.
A random device provides a general method but it would be rational only
in special circumstances. In everyday life we employ schemes of delib-
eration acquired from our culture and modified during the course of our
personal history. But there is no assurance that these forms of reflection
are rational. Perhaps they only meet various minimum standards which
enable us to get by, all the while falling far short of the best that we might
do. Thus if we seek a general procedure by which to balance our conflict-
ing aims so as to single out, or at least to identify in thought, the best
course of action, the idea of a dominant end seems to give a simple and
natural answer.
Let us consider then what this dominant end might be. It cannot be
happiness itself, since this state is attained by executing a rational plan of
life already set out independently. The most we can say is that happiness
is an inclusive end, meaning that the plan itself, the realization of which
18. The terminology of “dominant” and “inclusive” ends is from W. F. R. Hardie, “The Final Good
in Aristotle’s Ethics,”