A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,
rev. ed., trans. James Strachey (London,
The Hogarth Press, 1959), pp. 51f.
12. See Rousseau, 
Emile,
trans. Barbara Foxley (London, J. M. Dent and Sons, 1911), pp. 61–63.
And also J. N. Shklar, 
Men and Citizens
(Cambridge, The University Press, 1969), p. 49.
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81. Envy and Equality

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would suffer a loss from their being followed. Freud means to assert more
than the truism that envy often masquerades as resentment. He wants to
say that the energy that motivates the sense of justice is borrowed from
that of envy and jealousy, and that without this energy, there would be no
(or much less) desire to give justice. Conceptions of justice have few
attractions for us other than those deriving from these and similar feel-
ings. It is this claim that is supported by erroneously conflating envy and
resentment.
Unhappily the problem of the other special psychologies must go
untouched. They should in any case be treated in much the same way as
envy. One tries to assess the configuration of attitudes toward risk and
uncertainty, domination and submission, and the like, that just institutions
are likely to generate, and then to estimate whether they are likely to
render these institutions unworkable or ineffective. We also need to ask
whether, from the point of view of the persons in the original position, the
conception chosen is acceptable or at least tolerable whatever our special
proclivities may turn out to be. The most favorable alternative is that
which allows a place for all these different tendencies insofar as they are
likely to be encouraged by a just basic structure. There is a division of
labor so to speak between persons with contrary inclinations. Of course
some of these attitudes may earn a premium in the way that certain
trained abilities do, as for example the willingness to be adventuresome
and to take unusual risks. But if so, the problem is on all fours with the
return to natural assets and it is covered by the discussion of distributive
shares (§47). What a social system must not do clearly is to encourage
propensities and aspirations that it is bound to repress and disappoint. So
long as the pattern of special psychologies elicited by society either
supports its arrangements or can be reasonably accommodated by them,
there is no need to reconsider the choice of a conception of justice. I
believe, though I have not shown, that the principles of justice as fairness
pass this test.
82. THE GROUNDS FOR THE PRIORITY OF LIBERTY
82. Grounds for Priority of Liberty
We have already considered the meaning of the priority of liberty and
how it is incorporated into various rules of precedence (§§39, 46). Now
that all the main elements of the contract view are before us, the main
grounds for this priority can be surveyed. I have supposed that if the
persons in the original position know that their basic liberties can be ef-
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The Good of Justice

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fectively exercised, they will not exchange a lesser liberty for greater
economic advantages (§26). It is only when social conditions do not
allow the full establishment of these rights that one can acknowledge
their restriction. The equal liberties can be denied only when it is neces-
sary to change the quality of civilization so that in due course everyone
can enjoy these freedoms. The effective realization of all these liberties in
a well-ordered society is the long-run tendency of the two principles and
rules of priority when they are consistently followed under reasonably
favorable conditions. Our problem here, then, is to summarize and ar-
range the reasons for the precedence of liberty in a well-ordered society
as seen from the point of view of the original position.
Let us begin by recalling the reasons contained in the first part of the
argument for the two principles. A well-ordered society is defined as one
effectively regulated by a public conception of justice (§69). The mem-
bers of such a society are, and view themselves as, free and equal moral
persons. That is, they each have, and view themselves as having, funda-
mental aims and interests in the name of which they think it legitimate to
make claims on one another; and they each have, and view themselves as
having, a right to equal respect and consideration in determining the
principles by which the basic structure of their society is to be governed.
They also have a sense of justice that normally governs their conduct.
The original position is specified to embody the appropriate reciprocity
and equality between persons so conceived; and given that their funda-
mental aims and interests are protected by the liberties covered by the
first principle, they give this principle priority. The religious interest as
guaranteed by equal liberty of conscience was discussed as an example
(§§33–35). In this connection, one should keep in mind that the parties
seek to secure some particular fundamental interest, even though, given
the veil of ignorance, only the general nature of this interest is known to
them, for example, that it is a religious interest. Their aim is not merely to
be permitted to practice some religion or other, but to practice some
definite religion, that is, their religion, whatever it turns out to be (§28). In
order to secure their unknown but particular interests from the original
position, they are led, in view of the strains of commitment (§29), to give
precedence to the basic liberties.
A well-ordered society also realizes the parties’ highest-order interest
in how their other interests, including even their fundamental ones, are
shaped and regulated by social institutions (§26). The parties conceive of
themselves as free persons who can revise and alter their final ends and
who give priority to preserving their liberty in this respect. The manner in
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82. Grounds for Priority of Liberty

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which the principles of justice govern the basic structure, as illustrated by
the account of autonomy and objectivity (§78), shows that this highest-or-
der interest is achieved in a well-ordered society.
Thus the persons in the original position are moved by a certain hierar-
chy of interests. They must first secure their highest-order interest and
fundamental aims (only the general form of which is known to them), and
this fact is reflected in the precedence they give to liberty; the acquisition
of means that enable them to advance their other desires and ends has a
subordinate place. Even though the fundamental interests in liberty have a
definite objective, namely, the effective establishment of the basic liber-
ties, these interests may not always appear to be controlling. The realiza-
tion of these interests may necessitate certain social conditions and de-
gree of fulfillment of needs and material wants, and this explains why the
basic liberties can sometimes be restricted. But once the required social
conditions and level of satisfaction of needs and material wants is at-
tained, as they are in a well-ordered society under favorable circum-
stances, the higher-order interests are regulative from then on. Indeed, as
Mill supposed, these interests become more intense as the situation of
society enables them to be expressed effectively, so that eventually they
are regulative and reveal their prior place.
13
The basic structure is then to
secure the free internal life of the various communities of interests in
which persons and groups seek to achieve, in forms of social union
consistent with equal liberty, the ends and excellences to which they are
drawn (§79). People want to exercise control over the laws and rules that
govern their association, either by directly taking part themselves in its
affairs or indirectly through representatives with whom they are affiliated
by ties of culture and social situation.
So much for the grounds of the precedence of liberty covered in the
first part of the argument for the two principles of justice. We must now
turn to the second part of the argument and ask whether this precedence
will be undermined by the various feelings and attitudes that are likely to
be generated within a well-ordered society (§80). Now it may seem that
even when the essential needs are satisfied and the requisite material
means are attained, people’s concern for their relative position in the
distribution of wealth will persist. Thus if we suppose that everyone
13. See J. S. Mill,