ties in objective goods. Now I assume that the main psychological root of
the liability to envy is a lack of self-confidence in our own worth com-
bined with a sense of impotence. Our way of life is without zest and we
feel powerless to alter it or to acquire the means of doing what we still
want to do.
8
By contrast, someone sure of the worth of his plan of life and
his ability to carry it out is not given to rancor nor is he jealous of his
good fortune. Even if he could, he has
no desire to level down the
advantages of others at some expense to himself. This hypothesis implies
that the least favored tend to be more envious of the better situation of the
more favored the less secure their self-respect and the greater their feeling
that they cannot improve their prospects. Similarly the particular envy
aroused by competition and rivalry is likely to be stronger the worse one’s
defeat, for the blow to one’s self-confidence is more severe and the loss
may seem irretrievable. It is general envy, however, that mainly concerns
us here.
There are three conditions, I assume, that encourage hostile outbreaks
of envy. The first of these is the psychological condition we have just
noted: persons lack a sure confidence in their own value and in their
ability to do anything worthwhile. Second (and one of two social condi-
tions), many occasions arise when this psychological condition is experi-
enced as painful and humiliating. The discrepancy
between oneself and
others is made visible by the social structure and style of life of one’s
society. The less fortunate are therefore often forcibly reminded of their
situation, sometimes leading them to an even lower estimation of them-
selves and their mode of living. And third, they see their social position
as allowing no constructive alternative to opposing the favored circum-
stances of the more advantaged. To alleviate their feelings of anguish and
inferiority, they believe they have no choice but to impose a loss on those
better placed even at some cost to themselves, unless of course they are to
relapse into resignation and apathy.
Now many aspects of a well-ordered society work to mitigate if not to
prevent these conditions. In regard to the first condition,
it is clear that,
although it is a psychological state, social institutions are a basic instigat-
ing cause. But I have maintained that the contract conception of justice
8. This sort of hypothesis has been proposed by various writers. See, for example, Nietzsche,
On
the Genealogy of Morals,
trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York, Random House,
1967), I, secs. 10, 11, 13, 14, 16; II, sec. 11; III, secs. 14–16; and Max Scheler,
Ressentiment,
trans.
W. W. Holdheim (Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1961), pp. 45–50. For a discussion of Nietzsche’s
notion of ressentiment,
see Walter Kaufmann,
Nietzsche
(Princeton, Princeton University Press,
1950), pp. 325–331.
469
81. Envy and Equality
supports the self-esteem of citizens generally more firmly than other
political principles. In the public forum each person is treated with the
respect due to a sovereign equal; and everyone has the same basic rights
that would be acknowledged in an initial situation regarded as fair. The
members of the community have a common sense of justice and they are
bound by ties of civic friendship. I have already discussed these points in
connection with stability (§§75–76). We can add that the greater advan-
tages of some are in return for compensating benefits for the less favored;
and no one supposes that those who have a larger share are more deserv-
ing from a moral point of view. Happiness according
to virtue is rejected
as a principle of distribution (§48). And so likewise is the principle of
perfection: regardless of the excellences that persons or associations dis-
play, their claims to social resources are always adjudicated by principles
of mutual justice (§50). For all these reasons the less fortunate have no
cause to consider themselves inferior and the public principles generally
accepted underwrite their self-assurance. The disparities between them-
selves and others, whether absolute or relative, should be easier for them
to accept than in other forms of polity.
Turning to the second condition, both the
absolute and the relative
differences allowed in a well-ordered society are probably less than those
that have often prevailed. Although in theory the difference principle
permits indefinitely large inequalities in return for small gains to the less
favored, the spread of income and wealth should not be excessive in
practice, given the requisite background institutions (§26). Moreover the
plurality of associations in a well-ordered society, each with its secure
internal life, tends to reduce the visibility, or at least the painful visibility,
of variations in men’s prospects. For we tend to compare our circum-
stances with others in the same or in
a similar group as ourselves, or in
positions that we regard as relevant to our aspirations. The various asso-
ciations in society tend to divide it into so many noncomparing groups,
the discrepancies between these divisions not attracting the kind of atten-
tion which unsettles the lives of those less well placed. And this ignoring
of differences in wealth and circumstance is made easier by the fact that
when citizens do meet one another, as they must in public affairs at least,
the principles of equal justice are acknowledged. Moreover in everyday
life the natural duties are honored so that the more advantaged do not
make an ostentatious display of their higher estate calculated to demean
the condition of those who have less. After all, if the disposing conditions
for
envy are removed, so probably are those for jealousy, grudgingness,
and spite, the converses of envy. When the less fortunate segments of
470
The Good of Justice
society lack the one, the more fortunate will lack the other. Taken to-
gether these features of a well-ordered regime diminish the number of
occasions when the less favored are likely to experience their situation as
impoverished and humiliating. Even if they have some liability to envy, it
may never be strongly evoked.
Finally, considering the last condition, it would seem that a well-or-
dered society as much as any other offers constructive alternatives to
hostile outbreaks of envy. The problem of general envy anyway does not
force us to reconsider the choice of the principles of justice. As for
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