A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

parties in the original position: the conception of justice is chosen under
conditions where by hypothesis no one is moved by rancor and spite
(§25). Thus the claims to equality supported by the two principles do not
spring from these feelings. The claims of those affirming the principles
may sometimes express resentment, but this as we have seen is another
matter.
In order to show that the principles of justice are based in part on envy
it would have to be established that one or more of the conditions of the
original position arise from this propensity. Since the question of stability
does not force a reconsideration of the choice already made, the case for
the influence of envy must be made by reference to the first part of the
theory. But each of the stipulations of the original position has a justifica-
tion which makes no mention of envy. For example, one invokes the
function of moral principles as being a suitably general and public way of
ordering claims (§23). To be sure, there may be forms of equality that do
spring from envy. Strict egalitarianism, the doctrine which insists upon an
equal distribution of all primary goods, conceivably derives from this
propensity. What this means is that this conception of equality would be
adopted in the original position only if the parties are assumed to be
sufficiently envious. This possibility in no way affects the two principles
of justice. The different conception of equality which they define is ac-
knowledged on the supposition that envy does not exist.
10
The importance of separating envy from the moral feelings can be seen
from several examples. Suppose first that envy is held to be pervasive in
poor peasant societies. The reason for this, it may be suggested, is the
general belief that the aggregate of social wealth is more or less fixed, so
that one person’s gain is another’s loss. The social system is interpreted, it
might be said, as a naturally established and unchangeable zero-sum
game. Now actually, if this belief were widespread and the stock of goods
were generally thought to be given, then a strict opposition of interests
would be assumed to obtain. In this case, it would be correct to think that
justice requires equal shares. Social wealth is not viewed as the outcome
of mutually advantageous cooperation and so there is no fair basis for an
unequal division of advantages. What is said to be envy may in fact be
resentment which might or might not prove to be justified.
Freud’s speculations about the origin of the sense of justice suffer from
the same defect. He remarks that this sentiment is the outgrowth of envy
10. In this and the next several paragraphs I am indebted to R. A. Schultz for helpful suggestions.
472
The Good of Justice

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and jealousy. As some members of the social group jealously strive to
protect their advantages, the less favored are moved by envy to take them
away. Eventually everyone recognizes that they cannot maintain their
hostile attitudes toward one another without injury to themselves. Thus as
a compromise they settle upon the demand of equal treatment. The sense
of justice is a reaction-formation: what was originally jealousy and envy
is transformed into a social feeling, the sense of justice that insists upon
equality for all. Freud believes that this process is exemplified in the
nursery and in many other social circumstances.
11
Yet the plausibility of
his account assumes that the initial attitudes are correctly described. With
a few changes, the underlying features of the examples he depicts corre-
spond to those of the original position. That persons have opposing inter-
ests and seek to advance their own conception of the good is not at all the
same thing as their being moved by envy and jealousy. As we have seen,
this sort of opposition gives rise to the circumstances of justice. Thus if
children compete for the attention and affection of their parents, to which
one might say they justly have an equal claim, one cannot assert that their
sense of justice springs from jealousy and envy. Certainly children are
often envious and jealous; and no doubt their moral notions are so primi-
tive that the necessary distinctions are not grasped by them. But waiving
these difficulties, we could equally well say that their social feeling arises
from resentment, from a sense that they are unfairly treated.
12
And simi-
larly one could say to conservative writers that it is mere grudgingness
when those better circumstanced reject the claims of the less advantaged
to greater equality. But this contention also calls for careful argument.
None of these charges and countercharges can be given credence without
first examining the conceptions of justice sincerely held by individuals
and their understanding of the social situation in order to see how far
these claims are indeed founded on these motives.
None of these remarks is intended to deny that the appeal to justice is
often a mask for envy. What is said to be resentment may really be rancor.
But rationalizations of this sort present a further problem. In addition to
showing that a person’s conception of justice is not itself founded on
envy, we must determine whether the principles of justice cited in his
explanation are sincerely held as this is shown in their being applied by
him to other cases in which he is not involved, or even better, in which he
11. See