A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

Principles of Political Economy,
ed. by W. S. Ashley (London, Longmans
Green, 1909), p. 210. The reference is to the first part of the last paragraph of §3 of ch. 1 of bk. II. If
we read this passage to imply the notion of a hierarchy of interests, which leads to a lexical ordering,
the view I express in the text is essentially Mill’s. His contention here fits the passage in 
Utilitarian-
ism,
ch. II, pars. 6–8, which was cited along with other references in footnote 23 of ch. I.
476
The Good of Justice

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wants a greater proportionate share, the result could be a growing desire
for material abundance all the same. Since each strives for an end that
cannot be collectively attained, society might conceivably become more
and more preoccupied with raising productivity and improving economic
efficiency. And these objectives might become so dominant as to under-
mine the precedence of liberty. Some have objected to the tendency to
equality on precisely this ground, that it is thought to arouse in individu-
als an obsession with their relative share of social wealth. But while it is
true that in a well-ordered society there is presumably a trend to greater
equality, its members take little interest in their relative position as such.
As we have seen, they are not much affected by envy and jealousy, and
for the most part they do what seems best to them as judged by their own
plan of life, and those of their associates, without being dismayed by the
greater amenities and enjoyments of others socially more distant. Thus
there are no strong propensities prompting them to curtail their liberties
for the sake of greater absolute or relative economic welfare.
Of course, it does not follow that in a just society everyone is uncon-
cerned with matters of status. The account of self-respect as perhaps the
main primary good has stressed the great significance of how we think
others value us. But in a well-ordered society the need for status is met by
the public recognition of just institutions, together with the full and di-
verse internal life of the many free communities of interests that the equal
liberties allow. The basis for self-respect in a just society is not then one’s
income share but the publicly affirmed distribution of fundamental rights
and liberties. And this distribution being equal, everyone has a similar
and secure status when they meet to conduct the common affairs of the
wider society. No one is inclined to look beyond the constitutional affir-
mation of equality for further political ways of securing his status. Nor,
on the other hand, are men disposed to acknowledge a less than equal
liberty. For one thing, doing this would put them at a disadvantage and
weaken their political position. It would also have the effect of publicly
establishing their inferiority as defined by the basic structure of society.
This subordinate ranking in public life would indeed be humiliating and
destructive of self-esteem. And so by acquiescing in a less than equal
liberty one might lose on both counts. This is particularly likely to be true
as a society becomes more just, since equal rights and the public attitudes
of mutual respect have an essential place in maintaining a political bal-
ance and in assuring citizens of their own worth. Thus while the social
and economic differences between the various sectors of society, the
noncomparing groups as we may think of them, are not likely to generate
477
82. Grounds for Priority of Liberty

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animosity, the hardships arising from political and civic inequality, and
from cultural and ethnic discrimination, cannot be easily accepted. When
it is the position of equal citizenship that answers to the need for status,
the precedence of the equal liberties becomes all the more necessary.
Having chosen a conception of justice that seeks to eliminate the signifi-
cance of relative economic and social advantages as supports for men’s
self-confidence, it is essential that the priority of liberty be firmly main-
tained.
In a well-ordered society then self-respect is secured by the public
affirmation of the status of equal citizenship for all; the distribution of
material means is left to take care of itself in accordance with pure
procedural justice regulated by just background institutions which narrow
the range of inequalities so that excusable envy does not arise. Now this
way of dealing with the problem of status has several advantages. Thus,
suppose that how one is valued by others did depend upon one’s relative
place in the distribution of income and wealth. In this case having a
higher status implies having more material means than a larger fraction of
society. Everyone cannot have the highest status, and to improve one
person’s position is to lower that of someone else. Social cooperation to
increase the conditions of self-respect is impossible. The means of status,
so to speak, are fixed, and each man’s gain is another’s loss. Clearly this
situation is a great misfortune. Persons are set at odds with one another in
the pursuit of their self-esteem. Given the preeminence of this primary
good, the parties in the original position surely do not want to find
themselves so opposed. It would tend to make the good of social union
difficult if not impossible to achieve. The best solution is to support the
primary good of self-respect as far as possible by the assignment of the
basic liberties that can indeed be made equal, defining the same status for
all. At the same time, relative shares of material means are relegated to a
subordinate place. Thus we arrive at another reason for factoring the
social order into two parts as indicated by the principles of justice. While
these principles permit inequalities in return for contributions that are for
the benefit of all, the precedence of liberty entails equality in the social
bases of respect.
Now it is quite possible that this idea cannot be carried through com-
pletely. To some extent men’s sense of their own worth may hinge upon
their institutional position and their income share. If, however, the ac-
count of social envy and jealousy is sound, then with the appropriate
background arrangements, these inclinations should not be excessive.
But theoretically we can if necessary include self-respect in the primary
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The Good of Justice

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goods, the index of which defines expectations. Then in applications of
the difference principle, this index can allow for the effects of excusable
envy (§80); the expectations of the less advantaged are lower the more
severe these effects. Whether some adjustment for self-respect has to be
made is best decided from the standpoint of the legislative stage where
the parties have more information and the principle of political determi-
nation applies. Admittedly this problem is an unwelcome complication.
Since simplicity is itself desirable in a public conception of justice (§49),
the conditions that elicit excusable envy should if possible be avoided. I
have mentioned this point not to settle it, but only to note that when
necessary the expectations of the less advantaged can be understood so as
to include the primary good of self-respect.
The second part of the argument seems to confirm, then, the priority of
liberty. Still, some may object to this account of the priority of liberty that
societies have other ways of affirming self-respect and of coping with
envy and other disruptive inclinations. Thus in a feudal or in a caste
system each person is believed to have his allotted station in the natural
order of things. His comparisons are presumably confined to within his
own estate or caste, these ranks becoming in effect so many noncompar-
ing groups established independently of human control and sanctioned by
religion and theology. Men resign themselves to their position should it
ever occur to them to question it; and since all may view themselves as
assigned their vocation, everyone is held to be equally fated and equally
noble in the eyes of providence.
14
This conception of society solves the
problem of social justice by eliminating in thought the circumstances that
give rise to it. The basic structure is said to be already determined, and
not something for human beings to affect. On this view, it misconceives
men’s place in the world to suppose that the social order should match
principles which they would as equals consent to.
Contrary to this idea, I have assumed all along that the parties are to be
guided in their adoption of a conception of justice by a knowledge of the
general facts about society. They take for granted then that institutions are
not fixed but change over time, altered by natural circumstances and the
activities and conflicts of social groups. The constraints of nature are
recognized, but men are not powerless to shape their social arrangements.
14. On this point, see Max Weber,