A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

participate in one another’s nature: we appreciate what others do as things
we might have done but which they do for us, and what we do is similarly
done for them. Since the self is realized in the activities of many selves,
relations of justice that conform to principles which would be assented to
by all are best fitted to express the nature of each. Eventually then the re-
quirement of a unanimous agreement connects up with the idea of human
beings who as members of a social union seek the values of community.
It may be thought that once the principles of justice are given prece-
dence, then there is a dominant end that organizes our life after all. Yet
this idea is based on a misunderstanding. To be sure the principles of
justice are lexically prior to that of efficiency, and the first principle has
precedence over the second. It follows that an ideal conception of the
social order is set up which is to regulate the direction of change and the
efforts of reform (§41). But it is the principles of individual duty and
obligation that define the claim of this ideal upon persons and these do
not make it all controlling. Furthermore, I have all along assumed that the
proposed dominant end belongs to a teleological theory in which by
definition the good is specified independently from the right. The role of
this end is in part to make the conception of right reasonably precise. In
justice as fairness there can be no dominant end in this sense, nor as we
have seen is one needed for this purpose. Finally, the dominant end of a
teleological theory is so defined that we can never finally achieve it and
therefore the injunction to advance it always applies. Recall here the
earlier remarks as to why the principle of utility is not really suitable for a
lexical ordering: the later criteria will never come into play, except in
special cases to break ties. The principles of justice, on the other hand,
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85. The Unity of the Self

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represent more or less definite social aims and restrictions (§8). Once we
realize a certain structure of institutions, we are at liberty to determine
and to pursue our good within the limits which its arrangements allow.
In view of these reflections, the contrast between a teleological theory
and the contract doctrine may be expressed in the following intuitive way:
the former defines the good locally, for example, as a more or less homo-
geneous quality or attribute of experience, and regards it as an extensive
magnitude which is to be maximized over some totality; whereas the
latter moves in the opposite fashion by identifying a sequence of increas-
ingly specific structural forms of right conduct each set within the preced-
ing one, and in this manner working from a general framework for the
whole to a sharper and sharper determination of its parts. Hedonistic
utilitarianism is the classical instance of the first procedure and illustrates
it with compelling simplicity. Justice as fairness exemplifies the second
possibility. Thus the four-stage sequence (§31) formulates an order of
agreements and enactments designed to build up in several steps a hierar-
chical structure of principles, standards, and rules, which when consis-
tently applied and adhered to, lead to a definite constitution for social
action.
Now this sequence does not aim at the complete specification of con-
duct. Rather the idea is to approximate the boundaries, however vague,
within which individuals and associations are at liberty to advance their
aims and deliberative rationality has free play. Ideally the approximation
should converge in the sense that with further steps the cases left unac-
counted for become of less and less importance. The notion guiding the
entire construction is that of the original position and its Kantian interpre-
tation: this notion contains within itself the elements that select which
information is relevant at each stage, and generate a sequence of adjust-
ments appropriate to the contingent conditions of the existing society.
86. THE GOOD OF THE SENSE OF JUSTICE
86. The Good of the Sense of Justice
Now that all the parts of the theory of justice are before us, the argument
for congruence can be completed. It suffices to tie together the various
aspects of a well-ordered society and to see them in the appropriate
context. The concepts of justice and goodness are linked with distinct
principles and the question of congruence is whether these two families
of criteria fit together. More precisely, each concept with its associated
principles defines a point of view from which institutions, actions, and
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The Good of Justice

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plans of life can be assessed. A sense of justice is an effective desire to
apply and to act from the principles of justice and so from the point of
view of justice. Thus what is to be established is that it is rational (as
defined by the thin theory of the good) for those in a well-ordered society
to affirm their sense of justice as regulative of their plan of life. It remains
to be shown that this disposition to take up and to be guided by the
standpoint of justice accords with the individual’s good.
Whether these two points of view are congruent is likely to be a crucial
factor in determining stability. But congruence is not a foregone conclu-
sion even in a well-ordered society. We must verify it. Of course, the
rationality of choosing the principles of justice in the original position is
not in question. The argument for this decision has already been made;
and if it is sound, just institutions are collectively rational and to every-
one’s advantage from a suitably general perspective. It is also rational for
each to urge others to support these arrangements and to fulfill their
duties and obligations. The problem is whether the regulative desire to
adopt the standpoint of justice belongs to a person’s own good when
viewed in the light of the thin theory with no restrictions on information.
We should like to know that this desire is indeed rational; being rational
for one, it is rational for all, and therefore no tendencies to instability
exist. More precisely, consider any given person in a well-ordered society.
He knows, I assume, that institutions are just and that others have (and
will continue to have) a sense of justice similar to his, and therefore that
they comply (and will continue to comply) with these arrangements. We
want to show that on these suppositions it is rational for someone, as
defined by the thin theory, to affirm his sense of justice. The plan of life
which does this is his best reply to the similar plans of his associates; and
being rational for anyone, it is rational for all.
It is important not to confuse this problem with that of justifying being
a just man to an egoist. An egoist is someone committed to the point of
view of his own interests. His final ends are related to himself: his wealth
and position, his pleasures and social prestige, and so on. Such a man
may act justly, that is, do things that a just man would do; but so long as
he remains an egoist, he cannot do them for the just man’s reasons.
Having these reasons is inconsistent with being an egoist. It merely hap-
pens that on some occasions the point of view of justice and that of his
own interests lead to the same course of action. Therefore I am not trying
to show that in a well-ordered society an egoist would act from a sense of
justice, nor even that he would act justly because so acting would best
advance his ends. Nor, again, are we to argue that an egoist, finding
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86. The Good of the Sense of Justice

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himself in a just society, would be well advised, given his aims, to trans-
form himself into a just man. Rather, we are concerned with the goodness
of the settled desire to take up the standpoint of justice. I assume that the
members of a well-ordered society already have this desire. The question
is whether this regulative sentiment is consistent with their good. We are
not examining the justice or the moral worth of actions from certain
points of view; we are assessing the goodness of the desire to adopt a