way. We should not attempt to give form to our life by first looking to the
good independently defined. It is not our aims that primarily reveal our
nature but rather the principles that we would acknowledge to govern the
background conditions under which these aims are to be formed and the
manner in which they are to be pursued. For the self is prior to the ends
which are affirmed by it; even a dominant end must be chosen from
among numerous possibilities. There is no way to get beyond deliberative
rationality. We should therefore reverse the relation between the right and
the good proposed by teleological doctrines and view the right as prior.
The moral theory is then developed by working in the opposite direction.
I shall now try to explain these last remarks
in the light of the contract
doctrine.
85. THE UNITY OF THE SELF
85. The Unity of the Self
The outcome of the preceding discussion is that there is no one aim by
reference to which all of our choices can reasonably be made. Significant
intuitionist elements enter into determining the good, and in a teleologi-
cal theory these are bound to affect the right. The classical utilitarian tries
to avoid this consequence by the doctrine of hedonism, but to no avail.
We cannot, however, stop here; we must find a constructive solution to the
problem of choice which hedonism seeks to answer. Thus we are faced
once again with the question: if there is no single end that determines the
appropriate pattern of aims, how is a rational plan of life actually to be
identified? Now the answer to this question has already been given: a
rational plan is one that would be chosen with
deliberative rationality as
defined by the full theory of the good. It remains to make sure that, within
the context of a contract doctrine, this answer is perfectly satisfactory and
that the problems which beset hedonism do not arise.
As I have said, moral personality is characterized by two capacities:
one for a conception of the good, the other for a sense of justice. When
realized, the first is expressed by a rational plan of life, the second by a
regulative desire to act upon certain principles of right. Thus a moral
person is a subject with ends he has chosen,
and his fundamental prefer-
ence is for conditions that enable him to frame a mode of life that
expresses his nature as a free and equal rational being as fully as circum-
stances permit. Now the unity of the person is manifest in the coherence
of his plan, this unity being founded on the higher-order desire to follow,
in ways consistent with his sense of right and justice, the principles of
491
85. The Unity of the Self
rational choice. Of course, a person shapes his aims not all at once but
only gradually; but in ways that justice allows,
he is able to formulate and
to follow a plan of life and thereby to fashion his own unity.
The distinctive feature of a dominant-end conception is how it sup-
poses the self’s unity is achieved. Thus in hedonism the self becomes one
by trying to maximize the sum of pleasurable experiences within its
psychic boundaries. A rational self must establish its unity in this manner.
Since pleasure is the dominant end, the individual is indifferent to all
aspects of himself, viewing his natural assets of mind and body, and even
his natural inclinations and attachments, as so many materials for obtain-
ing pleasant experiences. Moreover, it is not by aiming at pleasure as his
pleasure but simply as pleasure that gives unity to the self. Whether it is
his pleasure or that of others as well which
is to be advanced raises a
further matter that can be put aside so long as we are dealing with one
person’s good. But once we consider the problem of social choice, the
utilitarian principle in its hedonistic form is perfectly natural. For if any
one individual must order his deliberations by seeking the dominant end
of pleasure and can secure his rational personhood in no other way, then it
seems that a number of persons in their joint efforts should strive to order
their collective actions by maximizing the pleasurable experiences of the
group. Thus just as one saint when alone is to work for the glory of God,
so the members of an association of saints are to cooperate together to do
whatever is necessary for the same end.
The difference between the
individual and the social case is that the resources of the self, its mental
and physical capacities and its emotional sensibilities and desires, are
placed in a different context. In both instances these materials are in the
service of the dominant end. But depending on the other agencies avail-
able to cooperate with them, it is the pleasure of the self or of the social
group that is to be maximized.
Further, if the same sorts of considerations that lead to hedonism as a
theory of first-person choice are applied to the theory of right, the princi-
ple of utility seems quite plausible. For let us suppose first that happiness
(defined in terms of agreeable feeling) is the sole good. Then, as even
intuitionists concede, it is at least a prima
facie principle of right to
maximize happiness. If this principle is not alone regulative, there must
be some other criterion such as distribution which is to be assigned some
weight. But by reference to what dominant end of social conduct are
these standards to be balanced? Since this end must exist if judgments of
right are to be reasoned and not arbitrary, the principle of utility appears
to specify the required goal. No other principle has the features necessary
492
The Good of Justice
to define the ultimate end of right conduct. I believe that it is essentially
this reasoning that underlies Mill’s so-called proof of utility.
29
Now in justice as fairness a complete reversal
of perspective is brought
about by the priority of right and the Kantian interpretation. To see this
we have only to recall the features of the original position and the nature
of the principles that are chosen. The parties regard moral personality and
not the capacity for pleasure and pain as the fundamental aspect of the
self. They do not know what final aims persons have, and all dominant-
end conceptions are rejected. Thus it would not occur to them to acknowl-
edge the principle of utility in its hedonistic form. There is no more
reason for the parties to agree to this criterion than to maximize any other
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