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Banking Sector Development in Uzbekistan
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Problems of Economic Transition · June 2009
DOI: 10.2753/PET1061-1991520201 · Source: RePEc
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Kobil Ruziev
University of the West of England, Bristol
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Problems of Economic Transition
, vol. 52, no. 2, June 2009, pp. 3–41.
© 2009 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved.
ISSN 1061–1991/2009 $9.50 + 0.00.
DOI 10.2753/PET1061-1991520201
K
obil
R
uziev
and
d
ipaK
G
hosh
Banking Sector Development
in Uzbekistan
A Case of Mixed Blessings?
Using grass-roots-level data, this article analyzes factors that contrib-
ute to the current backwardness of the Uzbek banking sector. The study
attempts to show that despite considerable progress achieved in terms
of modernizing payments systems, embracing international account-
ing standards, and establishing a two-tier banking system, not much
improvement has been made in terms of financial intermediation in
the country. It argues that the Uzbek government’s post-independence
policy of not dismantling the old style of monetary management, which
was prompted by the need to prevent the economy from dramatic reduc-
tion in output and employment, has outlived its usefulness and should
now be reformulated to promote a banking system able to cope with
the needs of a market-based economy.
3
Kobil Ruziev is a lecturer in economics at the School of Management and
Business, University of Wales Aberystwyth, who has also worked for the National
Bank of Uzbekistan. His research areas are economic transformation in former
centrally planned economies, money and banks in emerging economies, and
institutional economics. Address correspondence to School of Management and
Business, University of Wales Aberystwyth, Aberystwyth SY23 3DD, Wales,
UK; e-mail: kkr@aber.ac.uk.
Dipak Ghosh is senior lecturer in the Department of Economics at the Univer-
sity of Stirling and director of MBiTE. Within a broad area of interest in economic
growth, development, and structural change, his research and teaching interests
are emerging country finance, financial exclusion, poverty issues, post-Keynesian
growth, and money, banking, and finance in transition economies. Address cor-
respondence to Department of Economics, University of Stirling, Stirling FK9
4LA, Scotland, UK; e-mail: dipak.ghosh@stir.ac.uk.
4 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC TRANSITION
Financial deepening is a necessary but not a sufficient condi-
tion for promoting economic growth. A good example of this is
the former Soviet Union (FSU), where a relatively high level of
economic development was achieved without any accompanying
financial deepening. Nevertheless, the existence of a strong correla-
tion, though not necessarily of exact causation, between financial
deepening and economic growth in market economies cannot be
denied (Fry, 1995; Goldsmith, 1969). As Levine observed “although
conclusions must be stated hesitantly and with ample qualifications,
the predominance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence
suggests a first-order relationship between financial development
and economic growth” (1997, p. 688).
The fact that centrally planned economies had an underdeveloped
financial sector and that financial deepening plays an important role
in market economies necessitated the transformation of the system-
specific monobank sector of the centrally planned economies into
a two-tier banking sector integrated into a market economy—a
task common to all transition economies (TEs). Despite the com-
monality of this task, however, individual countries pursued dis-
similar reform strategies. With hindsight, it can be observed that
economic rationale did not always prevail over political factors
in policy-making in the TEs (Luong and Weinthal, 2001; Roland,
2002). As a result, despite similar initial conditions, the quality of
institutional development differs substantially across individual
countries after more than fifteen years of transition.
In general, the experience of East European countries in transi-
tion differs from that of the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS), which experienced central planning for a much longer period
than the former group of countries. The peculiarity of transition
experience, as reflected in the widening variation of institutional
quality across transition economies, was elegantly termed the
“Great Divide” by Berglof and Bolton (2002). The differences are
especially contrasting with respect to the fast-reformers in advanced
transition economies of the Central and East European and the
Baltic States (CEEBS), most of which have already crossed the
Great Divide, and the poorer and slow-reformer countries of the
CIS, which have yet to cross it.
jUNE 2009 5
In terms of general financial deepening, all transition economies
are still behind the standards enjoyed by the advanced market
economies. However, in terms of institutional quality, the advanced
transition economies of CEEBS are not that far from their mar-
ket economy counterparts, at least as measured by the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s indexes of financial
sector reform (EBRD, 2007). In stark contrast, the poorer and
slow-reformer economies of the CIS such as Armenia, Azerbai-
jan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan,
the so-called CIS-7, are financially underdeveloped even by the
standards of the transition economies (de Nicolo, Geadah, and
Rozhkov, 2003).
The purpose of this article is to investigate the sources of fi-
nancial development or, to be more precise, underdevelopment in
Uzbekistan, which, among the CIS-7, lies furthest from the Great
Divide. The interesting thing about the Uzbek case is that in 1989
Uzbekistan was the third-largest country in terms of population,
about 20 million, and fourth in terms of territory, about 447,000
square kilometers, within the FSU. It was, and still is, the most
populous country in Central Asia. Despite this, less attention has
been given in the literature to the analysis of the Uzbek transition
experience, especially with regard to its financial sector develop-
ment. Nonetheless, the main reason for this lack of research depth
was not lack of interest or disregard; rather it was mainly a result
of the inaccessibility of Uzbek macroeconomic and microeconomic
data (World Bank, 2003).
1
Although data availability is still an issue, since 2002 the Uzbek
authorities have made some macroeconomic data more accessible
to a wider audience (IMF, 2007, p. 14). Since that time, two papers
have emerged in the literature: Ergashev (2006) has discussed the
public sector reforms, and Akimov and Dollery (2006) have dis-
cussed the financial sector reforms from a general perspective.
2
In
a way, this article too is a product of this relatively recent trend.
However, this article differs from the other two in the following
aspects. First, it focuses on the banking sector reforms only, carries
out a step-by-step analysis of banking sector development, and dis-
cusses current problems peculiar to the Uzbek experience. Second,
6 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC TRANSITION
in addition to available macroeconomic data, it uses grassroots-level
data collected by means of interviews with a cross-section of the
banking sector practitioners. Various reports and instructions of the
Central Bank of Uzbekistan (CBU) are also extensively used in
the analysis. The study attempts to show that, despite considerable
progress achieved in terms of payments system modernization,
embracing international accounting standards, and establishing a
two-tier banking system, not much improvement has been made
with respect to financial intermediation in the country. The article
analyzes factors that have contributed to the backwardness of the
Uzbek banking sector.
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