jUNE 2009 15
was about 70 percent in the FSU and even higher in the countries of
Eastern Europe (Peachey and Roe, 2001). The depth of the finan-
cial assets, however, was partly explained by a monetary overhang
associated with repressed inflation. The macroeconomic instability
and high inflation that persisted for almost a decade in many post-
Soviet countries wiped out the real value of financial wealth and
severely shattered the general public’s confidence in deposit-taking
institutions.
Uzbekistan adopted a more or less “wait and see” approach to transi-
tion in the early 1990s before seriously considering implementation of
market reforms in 1993 (Ruziev, Ghosh, and Dow, 2007). Therefore,
the collapse of trust in the banking sector occurred with a lag. As Figure
1 shows, in 1993, the ratio of broad money (M2) to GDP was about 53
percent in Uzbekistan, whereas it had already fallen to about 16 percent
in the Kyrgyzstan and about 28 percent in Kazakhstan in the same year.
The ratio declined gradually in Uzbekistan and reached its trough in
2003 at only about 10 percent. The figure improved very slightly in
subsequent years: about 12 percent in 2004, about 14 percent in 2005,
and about 15 percent in 2006. Nevertheless, the ratio of broad money
to GDP in the country still remains extremely low when compared to
that of neighboring Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where recovery has
been stronger and more persistent since 2000. In fact, the Uzbek figure
is one of the lowest among all TEs.
The particularly rapid decline of this ratio over 1993–95 in Uzbeki-
stan was associated with rapid reduction in the real value of financial
claims as a result of high inflation, which resulted in a large transfer
of wealth from creditors to debtors and subsequently led to the loss
of confidence in the Uzbek banking system (World Bank, 1999, p.
33). Moreover, freezing of the household sector’s
bank deposits
during the introduction of the national currency in 1993–94 and the
negative real interest paid on deposits associated with high inflation
also contributed to this sharp downfall.
As Table 4 shows, although the authorities managed to reduce
the inflation rate to two-digit figures a couple of years after the
introduction of the national currency in July 1994, the real interest
rate paid on bank deposits, measured as a difference between the
deposit rate and the EBRD’s estimated rate of inflation, remained
16 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC TRANSITION
negative up until 2003. Although
inflation has been contained,
and hence the real interest rate has become positive since 2003,
the impact of these changes in increasing the general public’s trust
in deposit-taking institutions has been minimal. The fact that the
ratio of broad money to GDP has increased very little since 2003 is
hardly surprising, because confidence building is a time-consuming
process that depends upon several factors.
Broad money is composed of currency, current account depos-
its, and various other time deposits. As the general public’s trust
in banks picks up, the size of bank deposits increases and so does
the size of broad monetary aggregates. In this sense, broad money
measures the degree of trust the general public has in deposit-taking
institutions. Since banks mediate between savers and borrowers,
trust is important for banks: to be able to grant more credits, they
simply need to attract more deposits. In other words, there is a direct
link between broad money, the major component of which is bank
liabilities, and bank assets.
5
Since the ratio of broad money to GDP
has been very low in Uzbekistan, one would naturally expect that
the ratio of bank assets to GDP would also be very low. Surpris-
ingly, however, the ratio of bank assets to GDP in Uzbekistan has
Figure 1.
Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: