languages. Furthermore, he claims that language play is instrumental in advancing
the development of learners’ linguistic systems in that it includes prediction, valida-
tion, restructuring, and consolidation of newly developed understandings of the L2,
thereby increasing levels of metalinguistic awareness and leading to language
learning.
In addition, Belz (2002) found that language play in an emerging L2 can bring
forth a sense of multicompetence. That is, through the creation and use of hybrid
forms of language, learners in Belz’s study came to better understand their first lan-
guage as well as the L2, leading to a feeling of being part of a larger multilinguistic
community, which in some cases enhanced their sense of identity.
Semiosis and Second-Language Learning
Semiotics is defined as the science of signs and signifiers (e.g., Barthes 1977;
Hodges and Kress 1989; Peirce 1958; Saussure 1974). Of particular relevance to the
current study is use of native, foreign, and target languages as constitutive elements
of a new, hybrid system of signs, which are created by combining and recombining
existing signs to express new meaning (Anzaldua 1989; Kramsch 2000; Lantolf
1993). This process, according to Kramsch (2000, 139), is not “an innocent re-label-
ing of the familiar furniture of the universe. It reconfigures one’s whole classification
system.” That is, learning another language is the process of creating, conveying, and
exchanging signs; it is not primarily the acquisition of grammatical elements as much
of the L2 acquisition literature characterizes it.
In relation to this transformation of signs, it is important to note that although in
the early stages of his thinking Vygotsky focused on the idealization of sign-medi-
ated self regulation, by the end of his life he had become centrally concerned with
meaning making and its relationship to consciousness, hypothesizing consciousness
as a system of psychological processes with semantic structure (Luria 1928). More-
over, Vygotsky theorized that linguistic signs, as elements of speech (including inner
speech), are correlatives of consciousness as its basic unit but not correlatives of
thought and that meaning is the path from thought to words (Prawat 1999).
According to Vygotsky (1997), the structure of thought flows through phases or
stages. In the early stages, thought originates as
sense
or direct embodied impres-
sions of what things are or might be, assuming an imagistic form; in later stages,
systems of signs or codes (e.g., language) take the key role. Within this process,
meaning making is conceptualized as neither equal to speech (mostly process) nor
equal to thought (content) but as both and in equal measure, which, combined, “me-
diate between holistic, imaginal thinking and the instantiation of that thinking in a
verbal format” (Prawat 1999, 269). Furthermore, Prawat (1999) argues that overall
this process is highly akin to Charles S. Peirce’s notion of
Do'stlaringiz bilan baham: