314
BABADJANOV, MALIKOV, NAZAROV
armed group Adolat resorted to crude pressure and blackmail, including the kidnap-
ping of children and relatives of the conservative imams. Several cases ended with
the murder of the kidnapped children. For example, the son of the current Chief
Imam Khatib of Namangan, Abd al-Hayy qori, was kidnapped and killed because
his father did not agree to cooperate with the Wahhabis.
49
Thus, the Wahhabis’ post-Soviet spiritual nihilism and maximalism degener-
ated into direct aggression, which had both a religious and social dimension. The
movement was evolving in the direction of political radicalism and extremism.
Following
independence, doctrinal issues began to slip into the background as
disputes focused increasingly on politics. A main topic
of debates and clashes
between the believers and the government was the form of power and its place in
the sharia. Even fiercer was the struggle over the position of the mufti of SADUM
and, separate from that, over the Directorate of the Muslims. These took the form
of demonstrations, which the Wahhabis called
yurish, a medieval term for a military
campaign. Demonstrations by believers became common. The organizations did
nothing to hamper the natural aggressiveness of young and inexperienced men—
and in fact encouraged them.
Islamic demonstrations of this kind became an integral part of the religious
revival and of the struggle among religious leaders for influence and followers.
One such demonstration, which occurred in the fall of 1991 on the square in Tash-
kent near the former Hast Imam Mosque of the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims,
reflected the very complex relationships among believers from different regions.
The demonstration was actually a test of wills between the faithful from Andijan
in Ferghana and the faithful of Tashkent. The latter demanded that the mufti of
the Directorate, who was from Andijan, yield his place to the representative from
Tashkent. The Tashkent crowd threatened to “rip Muhammad-Sadiq up and stuff his
body with straw,” all the while chanting
Allahu Akbar (God is Great). In response,
the crowd from the Ferghana Valley seemed out for blood in “mercenary” Kukcha
(the old district of Tashkent), and issued various threats accompanied various by
its own chants of
Allahu Akbar. Only the intervention of the police and city elders
averted bloodshed.
Similar demonstrations connected with struggles between Wahhabi and con-
servatives over the control of mosques were common in the cities of the Ferghana
Valley, notably Namangan, Andijan, and to a lesser extent Osh. In each case a very
aggressive crowd of mostly young people assembled and was encouraged by the
religious leaders.
The issue of freedom in general, and of religious freedom in particular, posed
a unique and difficult challenge to the unprepared public in the early days of per-
estroika. Nor is this surprising, in light of the fact that the perestroika movement
itself had only a primitive and totally homogenous understanding of religion and
religious values and, in fact, possessed a rather anarchistic understanding of free-
dom. At the same time, the freedom of religion that suddenly appeared had both
positive aspects and a negative side, namely a certain socio-political nihilism that
ISLAM IN THE FERGHANA VALLEY 315
arose with the de-legitimation of all authority and quickly degenerated into simple
aggression and terrorism. With the first appearance of the radical manifestations
of re-Islamization, it was clear that intra-confessional differences, sometimes with
a regional dimension, had become a major force for destabilization across the
region. In Tajikistan at this time youths, drawn largely from among the religious
fundamentalists, tied black scarves on their heads with the words of the faith in one
God (“La ilaha illa-1-lah”), and also organized demonstrations, thus contributing to
the outbreak of the civil war. In Osh young Wahhabis, encouraged by their leaders,
began seizing mosques, mounting demonstrations, and joining in the battle for the
mosques in Andijan and Namangan.
Thanks to this, in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan the question of regula-
tions to ensure stability arose even before the new governments appeared. About
this time the American expert Zbigniew Brzezinski declared that religious conflict
in Central Asia would turn the region into something like the Balkans. The situation
had indeed become very tense and complicated by the mounting economic dif-
ficulties, which brought a humanitarian catastrophe in their wake. Besides this, the
success of the Taliban in Afghanistan marked the emergence of a very aggressive
Islamic state, ready to intervene in the internal affairs of its neighbors.
The new governments of the region, with no experience in the politics of religion,
sought ways to stabilize the situation. Most found means for doing so within their
own countries, in their own environments. The most dramatic challenges arose from
the very aggressive actions of the fundamentalists in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In
Tajikistan this eventually led to the legalization of the IRPT, while in Uzbekistan
the government mustered enough will and determination to stop all acts of extreme
aggression by the new Islamists.
Viewing this situation in hindsight, it seems clear that the collapse of the USSR
did not leave Central Asian champions of the new political Islam in a mood to
engage in accommodating dialogue. This was especially
the case in Tajikistan
and not least of all within the IRPT.
50
Quite the contrary, once they gained full
freedom of religion, the Islamists of the region charged forward to establish an
Islamic state based solely on sharia law, all the while showing extreme intoler-
ance toward the governments, infidels, and apostates. The latter were in fact those
Muslims satisfied with the religious freedom they now enjoyed and disinclined to
engage in confrontations amid what was already a very fragile political, social,
and ethnic situation.
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