ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1991 235
Ferghana states in this area
present a picture of contrasts,
each of them worth
reviewing in turn.
Professor B. Berkinov observed that privatization in Uzbekistan went through
three stages. The first, from 1992 to 1993, was a period of “small privatization,”
when 29,000 houses, and small- and medium-sized shops and consumer services
were converted to private or communal ownership. Workers’ collectives received
substantial benefits, such as the free transfer of fixed assets that had depreciated by
more than 70 percent, and the right to buy small enterprises at a discount. As for the
rural
population, each family received land adjacent to its home for private use.
In the second stage, from 1994 to 1998, privatization took place among me-
dium- and large-scale enterprises in light industry, machinery, building materials,
road transport, and agriculture, as well as other sectors of the economy not deemed
strategic by the state. Real estate and securities markets began to form during this
period. Small businesses were sold to private owners, while medium- and large-
scale enterprises were transformed into joint-stock companies with shares divided
among the staff (25 percent), the state (26 percent), enterprises that consume the
firm’s products (10 percent), foreign investors (10 percent), and open sales (30
percent).
12
The third stage, which began in 1999 and continues to the present, seeks to
attract investments to enterprises that are unprofitable, inefficient, or insolvent. It
does this by offering the state’s share of such properties at zero redemption cost for
investment obligations.
13
This included the privatization of large-scale state-owned
enterprises in strategic sectors, such as fuel and energy, metals, and chemicals. In
the Uzbek part of the Ferghana Valley, approximately 2,000 government enterprises
and agencies in various branches of the economy were privatized from 2000 to
2007. As part of this process, 154 joint stock companies were established, as well
as 290 limited liability companies. Another 900 state-owned properties were sold
to private ownership.
The privatization process in Kyrgyzstan can be divided into four stages. The first
phase, from 1992 to 1993, encouraged citizens to buy shops and household service
firms. Progress on privatizing
larger firms proceeded slowly, not least because
controlling stakes ended up in the hands of the former managers. Thanks to this,
the first phase of privatization did not lead to greater efficiency or real management
changes. The absence of capital markets posed an additional barrier to privatization,
as did the fact that the same administrative organs that heretofore had mismanaged
industry were now responsible for drafting the plan for privatization. Consequently,
property rights were insufficiently firm to attract investors.
The second stage, which fell in 1994 and 1995, revolved around creating a much
broader class of private business owners, so that together they could defend their
interests in the marketplace. The introduction of privatization vouchers in 1994 and
the establishment of auction centers in every province jump-started this process.
Fifty cash auctions were carried out and shares were offered in 547 industries, 283
of which were successfully privatized. Specialized investment funds emerged to
236 ZOKIROV,
UMAROV
accumulate citizens’ vouchers and convert them into shares. These coupons had been
intended to help Kyrgyz citizens participate in the privatization process, which the
government hoped would encourage them to support further economic reform.
The third stage (1996–97) involved the incorporation and privatization of such
strategic entities as Kyrgyztelecom, Kyrgyzstan Aba Joldoru, Manas International
Airport, and the main power companies, among others. However, an overwhelming
portion of shares remained in the hands of the government, with private investors
holding only insignificant stakes. For example, electric companies sold only 6.3
percent of their shares to private investors, Kyrgyztelecom 8 percent; the interna-
tional airport, 12 percent. Investors saw this phase as incomplete and unsuccessful,
resulting in large frozen assets.
The fourth stage began in 2000 and continues to the present. This phase again
focuses on large, strategic enterprises, including energy companies, hydroelectric
projects, Kyrgyztelecom, Kyrgyzgas, the Dastan Electric Works and, again, the
international airport. In June 2007, Kyrgyzstan privatized the large Severelectro,
Bishkekteploset, and HPP Bishkek electric companies, and also issued a license
for the private construction and management of the Kambarata Hydroelectric Sta-
tions 1 and 2.
In its privatization, Tajikistan favored the direct sale of industries through public
auctions organized by the government, with only a partial application of a voucher
system. A first phase, which concluded in 1999, involved the privatization of small-
and medium-sized industrial enterprises; the second phase, which lasted until 2003,
provided for the auction or sale of medium- and large-scale enterprises; while the
third phase, which extended from 2004 to 2007, addressed the privatization of
certain important medium and large-scale enterprises in mechanical engineering,
chemicals, mining, and construction materials, as well as the restructuring of natural
monopolies and extremely large enterprises.
By the start of 2006 only 351 industrial enterprises had been privatized, a mere
4 percent of the country’s enterprises. Even today only 31.1 percent of the total
have been privatized, with fully 37 percent of them in Sughd province (mainly
Ferghana), in Soviet times the country’s most developed region.
14
This relatively
low number traces to a public fear of destabilization that was the heritage of years
of civil war; the fact that 56 percent of the population lived below the poverty level
in 2008 and have therefore been excluded from participating in the privatization
process. It also was fostered by the absence of a post-privatization support system
for new entrepreneurs, and lack of access to loans for renovating facilities, and the
corruption of the process, which allowed certain individuals to snap up firms at
unreasonably low prices and immediately resell them at 5 to 50 times more than
they had paid.
15
All three Ferghana countries recently have divided large enterprises into smaller
firms in order to facilitate privatization. In fact, this has had the effect of splintering
organic enterprises into uncoordinated pieces, leaving a multiplicity of owners at
a single site, with each making his own arrangements for utilities and raw materi-