Arabic philosophy

identified with the philosophers’ causal theory (Incoherence, 230).

This refutation is concluded with the announcement that “all temporal

things, their substances and accidents, those occurring in the

entities of the animate and the inanimate, come about through the

power of God . . . He alone holds sole prerogative of inventing them.

It is not the case that some creatures come about through others;

rather, all come about through [divine] power” (Moderation, 99).

Then in a discussion of the term ajal, the predestined term of life

of an individual human, the question arises in the case of decapitation

whether or not it is decapitation that causes death. Al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı

answers:

It ought to be said that [the decapitated individual] died by his ajal, ajal

meaning the time in which God creates in him his death, regardless of

whether this occurs with the cutting of the neck, the occurrence of a lunar

eclipse, or the falling of rain. All these for us are associated things, not generated

acts, except that with some the connection is repeated according to

habit (bi-al-‘a¯da) but with some they are not repeated. (Moderation, 224–5)

The divine eternal will has so ordained it that (barring a miracle,

also preordained by this will), death always follows decapitation,

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Al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı 149

even though the real cause of death is divine power. This is brought

home in al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı’s endorsement of Avicenna’s Aristotelian

demonstrative logic, where the necessary connection in natural

events in effect is denied, substituting for it the habitual uniform

course, in itself contingent, but which, decreed by the divine will,

is the norm. It is this habitual uniform course that is the ultimate

justification for scientific inference, for scientific knowledge.

In the Standard for Knowledge, the logical treatise appended to the

Incoherence, al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı accepts the Avicennian claim that certain

empirical premises yield certainty. How can this be, he poses as an

objection, “when the theologians have doubted this, maintaining

that it is not decapitation that causes death, nor eating satiation,

nor fire burning, but that it is God who causes burning, death, and

satiation at the occurrence of their concomitant events, not through

them?” In response al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı writes:

The theologian admits the fact of death, but inquires about the manner of

connection between decapitation and death. As for the inquiry of whether

this is a necessary consequence of the thing itself, impossible to change, or

whether this is in accordance with the custom (sunna) of God, the exalted,

due to the fulfillment of His will that can undergo neither substitution nor

change, this is an inquiry into the mode of connection, not into the connection

itself.11

Now, Avicenna no less than al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı maintains that observation

by itself shows only concomitance. In addition to the observation of

regularities, he argues, there is “a hidden syllogism,” namely, that

if these past regularities were accidental or coincidental they would

not have continued always or for the most part. From this, Avicenna

draws the conclusion that the regularities derive from the inherent

causal properties of things. Al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı accepts the existence of such

“a hidden syllogism” but draws from it the different conclusion,

namely, that this regularity derives from the decree of the eternal

will.12

occasionalism in the ih. y ￣ a’

When we turn to al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı’s writing after his following the S.

u¯ fı¯

path, particularly his monumental Ih. ya¯ ’, we find confirmation of

the Ash‘arite occasionalist perspective. We meet this confirmation

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150 michael e. marmura

in different contexts of the Ih. ya¯ ’.We find it, as expected, in The Principles

of Belief, which outlines and defends the Ash‘arite articles of

faith, particularly in its endorsement of the doctrine of kasb. Sometimes

we find it unexpectedly in contexts where it appears as though

a comment made in passing. A passage in the Book of Love (Kita¯b

al-mah.

abba) from the Ih. ya¯ ’ is a case in point:

How is it imaginable that the human would love himself and not love his

Lord through whom is his sustenance? It is known that inasmuch as the

one afflicted by the heat of the sun loves the shade, [such a person] would

necessarily love the trees through which the shade subsists. Everything in

existence in relation to the power of God, exalted be He, is like the shade

in relation to the trees and light in relation to the sun. For all [things] are

the effects of His power and the existence of all [things] follows His existence,

just as the existence of light follows [the existence] of the sun and

shade [the existence] of the trees. Indeed, this example is sound relative to

the imaginings of the common people. For they imagine that the light is the

effect of the sun, emanates from it and exists by it.

This, however, is pure error, since it has been revealed to the masters [of

those who know by means] of the heart (li-arba¯b al-qulu¯ b) by a revelation

that is clearer than what is observed by sight that the light comes about

“by invention” (ikhtira¯ ‘n) from the power of God, exalted be He, when it

happens that the sun and opaque bodies face each other, just as the sun, its

eye, its shape and form occur through the power of God, exalted be He. But

the purpose of examples is to explain, the truth not being sought in them.

(Ih. ya¯ ’ IV.293, 22–9)

What we have here is the use of the common belief in the efficacy

of natural things – proclaimed a pure error – as an example to

illustrate a point. The sun and the opaque body it faces are not the

real causes. They are merely the habitual or occasional causes. This

point becomes more explicit in al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı’s discussion of astrology

in the Ih. ya¯ ’. The discussion first occurs in The Book of Knowledge.

Astrology, according to al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı, is inferring (and predicting)

temporal events from astral causes, this, in principle, being similar

to the physician’s inferring from the pulse what malady will

take place. This, he affirms, “is knowledge of the currents [of events

according] to the custom (sunna) and habit (‘a¯da) of God, exalted be

he, in his creation” (Ih. ya¯ ’ I.30). Some prophets in the past have been

endowed with this astral predictive ability. The religious law, however,

blames the practice of astrology, because it is harmful to most

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Al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı 151

people. The main source of this harm is that when told that “these

effects occur subsequent to the movement of the stars, they come to

believe that the stars are the things that are efficacious” (Ih. ya¯ ’ I.31).

For the perception of the weak, as distinct from those well grounded

in knowledge, is confined to the intermediaries, not realizing that

the celestial orbs are compelled entities behaving in subjection to

divine command.

This is complemented by a discussion of astrology in The Book

of Patience and Gratitude (Kit ¯ ab al-s.

abr wa al-shukr). Al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı

writes:

You must not think that belief in the stars, the sun, and moon [as being]

compelled by the command of God, praised be He, in matters for which [the

former] are rendered causes in accordance with [divine] wisdom is contrary

to the religious law – [this] by reason of what has come down in it by way

of prohibiting belief in the astrologers and astrology. Rather, prohibition

concerning the stars consists of two things.

One of them is that [these heavenly bodies] enact their effects, independently,

and that they are not compelled under the management of a Manager

that created and subdued them. This would be infidelity (kufr).

The second is to believe the astrologers in the detail of what they inform

about the effects, the rest of creation not sharing in the apprehension [of

such effects]. This is because [the astrologers] state [things] out of ignorance.

For the knowledge of the stars’ determination [of events] was a miracle to

some prophets, peace be on them, but this science became obliterated. What

remains is a mixture where truth and error are not distinguished. For the

belief that the stars are causes (asba¯b) for effects (a¯ tha¯ r) that come about

by the creation of God, exalted be He (bi-khalq al-La¯hi ta‘a¯ la¯ ), in the earth,

plants, and animals, does not belittle religion. (Ih. ya¯ ’ IV.114, 20–8)

The key expression in this last paragraph is “by the creation of God.”

The asba¯b, “causes,” are not the things that bring about those effects

in the earth, plants, and animals. The effects come about by God’s

creation. But then, what does al-Ghaza¯ lı¯ mean by “causes” (asba¯b),

“intermediaries” (was ¯ a’it.

), and things acting through God’s “compulsion”

(taskh¯ır)? One has to look carefully at the context and

extract his meaning from it. Read in proper context, when al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı

speaks of “causes” other than God, what he is referring to are the

habitual causes. Some of these (but not all) constitute conditions for

the creation of the habitual effects – the creation of will, knowledge,

and life in humans are conditions preceding the creating of human

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152 michael e. marmura

power, for example. And when he speaks of intermediaries, “compelled

to act,” particularly angelic intermediaries, at first sight he

seems to be endowing these with causal efficacy. But some of his

statements indicate the opposite of this.

In the chapter on divine unity, the Basis of Trust (Ih. ya¯ ’ IV.240ff.),

al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı tells us that it is revealed to the gnostic that “there is no

agent except God . . . and that he has no partner sharing his act.”

The same act, however, is sometimes attributable to the servant in

the sense that he is the locus of divine action, but to God in terms

of causal efficacy, that is, in terms of “the connection of the effect

to the cause and the created thing to his creator” (Ih. ya¯ ’ III.123). It is

in terms of this that in the Qur’ ¯an the act is sometimes attributed to

God, sometimes to the servant, sometimes to angels. But if God is

the only true agent, “no partner sharing his act,” one must conclude

that the angel, like the human servant, is the locus of divine action

and is an intermediary only in this sense.

Al-Ghaza¯ lı¯’s occasionalism pervades the Ih. ya¯ ’. How then does

this tally with al-Ghaza¯ lı¯’s criticisms of Ash‘arite kala¯m, in the

Ih. ya¯ ’ and elsewhere?13 The main reason that underlies his many

criticisms is epistemological. Al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı holds that the main function

of Ash‘arite kala¯m is the defence of traditional Islamic belief

against “heretical innovations.” This function is not unimportant.

For a firm hold of this traditional belief which entails utter devotion

to the one God and the piety that attends it is the basis for

salvation in the hereafter for all Muslims; and for those pursuing

the mystical path, the necessary foundation for their ascent towards

gnosis. But the act of defending traditional belief is only a means to

an end. When kala¯m is taken as an end in itself it leads to the error

that it constitutes what is experientially religious. Moreover, even

the most sincere and religiously motivated theologians who direct

their thought to attaining “one of the realities,” can be veiled by

beliefs “that solidify in their souls, and become fixed in their hearts,

becoming a veil between them and the apprehension of realities”

(Ih. ya¯ ’ III.13, 19–20).

This brings us to the main concern of al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı in his mystical

writings, namely “the apprehension of realities.” These realities

belong to the divine world of the unseen (‘a¯ lam al-malaku¯ t). Direct

experience of them involves mystical vision. It is this mystical vision

that yields certainty.Now, for al-Ghaza¯ lı¯, while Ash‘arite kala¯mcan

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Al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı 153

be a veil preventive of this mystical vision, it can also constitute a

move toward it. This brings us back to his statement about hismajor

Ash‘arite work, the Moderation in Belief. He states that this work

not only supersedes the official Ash‘arite kala¯m works in ascertaining

what is true, but is “closer to knocking at the doors of gnosis.”

In what way, then, can Ash‘arism be close to knocking at the doors

of gnosis?

There is one Ash‘arite doctrine in particular which al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı

relates to the mystic vision. This is the doctrine of acquisition, kasb,

which is at the heart of the causal question. The basic premise of this

doctrine – repeatedly and unequivocally affirmed in the Ih. ya¯ ’ – is that

each and every human act is the direct creation of divine power. To

formulate intellectually the doctrine of kasb is one thing. To understand

what it means in the cosmic scheme of things is another. Al-

Ghaz¯ al¯ı tells us quite plainly that this understanding is attainable

only through mystical vision. What we have here are in effect two

different, but complementary, levels of knowing.

To return to more mundane matters, it is al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı’s discussions of

causality that are of special significance for the history of Arabic philosophy.

Although theologically motivated, his argument that necessary

causal connections in nature are provable neither logically

nor empirically remains philosophical. In his adoption of Avicennian

demonstrative logic (by reinterpreting causal sequences on occasionalist

lines), al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı brings home the point that science rests on the

belief in nature’s uniformity. This belief he shares with Avicenna.

What he does not share with him, as already indicated, is the justification

of this belief.

notes

1 Al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı [110], 101–2.

2 Ibid., 65–8.

3 Al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı [111], 7, 46; hereafter Incoherence.

4 Al-Ghaza¯ lı¯, Ih. ya¯ ’ ‘ulu¯m al-dı¯n, 4 vols. (Cairo: 1377 A.H./1957 C.E.),

hereafter Ih. ya¯ ’.

5 Al-Ghaz¯al¯ı, Kit ¯ ab al-arba‘¯ın f¯ı us.

u¯ l al-dı¯n (The Book of Forty on the

Principles of Religion), ed.M.M. Abu¯ al-A‘la¯ (Cairo: 1964), 22 (hereafter

Arba‘¯ın).

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154 michael e. marmura

6 See the author’s “Al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı’s Chapter on Divine Power in the

Iqtis.a¯d,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 4 (1994), 279–315. For a rival

interpretation of Ghaz¯ al¯ı on this point, see Frank [108] and Frank [109];

my response to Frank’s interpretation is presented in Marmura [118].

See also the review of Frank [109] in A. Dallal, “Ghazali and the Perils

of Interpretation,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 122

(2002), 773–87.

7 For a discussion of al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı’s reinterpreation and adoption of

Avicenna’s demonstrative logic, see Marmura [116].

8 Al-Ghaza¯ lı¯, Jawa¯hir al-Qur’a¯n (Jewels of the Qur’a¯n), ed. M. R. R.

al-Qabbani (Beirut: 1986), 39.

9 The literature on the discussion of causality in this chapter

is extensive. See, for example, in chronological order, Fakhry

[107]; H. A. Wolfson, “Nicolas of Autrecourt and Ghazali’s Argument

against Causality,” Speculum 44 (1969), 234–8; B. Kogan,

“The Philosophers al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı and Averroes on Necessary Connection

and the Problem of the Miraculous,” in Morewedge

[32], 113–32; L. E. Goodman, “Did al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı Deny Causality?”

Studia Islamica 47 (1978), 83–120; I. Alon, “Al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı on

Causality,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 100 (1980),

397–405; B. Abrahamov, “Al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı’s Theory of Causality,” Studia

Islamica 67 (1988), 75–98; S. Riker, “Al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı on Necessary Causality,”

The Monist 79 (1996), 315–24; B. Dutton, “Al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı on Possibility

and the Critique of Causality,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology

10 (2001), 23–46. See also my own studies of the question in Marmura

[116], [117], [118], and [119].

10 Al-Ghaza¯ lı¯, al-Iqtis.a¯d fı¯ al-i‘tiqa¯d (Moderation in Belief), ed. I. S.

C﹐ ubukc﹐u and H. Atay (Ankara: 1962), 215 (hereafter Moderation). It

is not clear whether in the Ih. ya¯ ’ Ghaza¯ lı¯ continues to adhere to this

doctrine of the soul; there are suggestions of a shift from this doctrine

toward an immaterial one. But this is not definite; see Gianotti [112].

11 Al-Ghaza¯ lı¯,Mi‘ya¯ r al-‘ilm(The Standard for Knowledge), ed. S. Dunya

(Cairo: 1961), 190–1. See also above, n. 6.

12 Ibid., 188–9, 191.

13 For a detailed discussion of this question, see Marmura [119].

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josef puig montada

8 Philosophy in Andalusia:

Ibn B¯ajja and IbnT.

ufayl

From the first incursion of Islam into Spain in 710 until the eventual

success of the Christian reconquest in 1492, the Iberian peninsula

was partially or wholly under Muslimrule, the westernmost outpost

of a sprawling Muslimempire. For many decades the intellectual and

cultural climate of “al-Andalus” was thus subsidiary to that of the

East. Philosophy was no exception: it came first from the East, but

in time acquired an autonomous life. This is reflected in the history

of Andalusian philosophy, which at first followed in the footsteps of

al-F ¯ar¯ab¯ı and Avicenna, but soon developed along two very different

paths. On the one hand, the Andalusians took up al-F ¯ar¯ab¯ı’s project

of reconstructing and further developing the thought of Aristotle, a

process that would culminate in the commentaries of Averroes. On

the other hand, Andalusian philosophers were attracted by S.

u¯ fism.

Most prominently, the mystic Ibn ‘Arab¯ı hailed from al-Andalus.

But as will be indicated below, even authors who worked within

the falsafa tradition were not immune to the appeal of the S.

u¯ fı¯s.

This chapterwill illustrate these competing traditions in the thought

and writings of the two most significant Muslim philosophers of

al-Andalus prior to Averroes: Ibn B¯ajja (known as Avempace to the

Latins) and IbnT.

ufayl.

ibn ba￣ jja (avempace)

In his account of the study of the sciences in al-Andalus, Abu¯ al-

Q¯asimS. ¯a‘id ibnS.

¯a‘id (d. 1070) mentioned those who were interested

in philosophy in the broad sense up to his time.1 Most were physicians,

while others were devoted to the natural sciences and logic.

Those who cultivated natural philosophy and metaphysics were few

155

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156 josef puig montada

and their writings have not reached us, except those of Sulaym¯an Ibn

Jabirw¯ al, known also as Ibn Gabirol or Avicebron (1021–58),2 whom

he records among the Jewish scholars.

Abu¯ Bakr ibn al-S. a¯ ’igh, Ibn Ba¯ jja, could not be mentioned by Ibn

S.

¯a‘id since he was born in Saragossa in a year between 1085 and

1090. At the time, Saragossa was the capital of the kingdom of the

Banu¯ Hu¯ d and the petty king ‘Ima¯d al-Dawla might have protected

Ibn B¯ajja, but he stayed in power only until 1110. He was then overthrown

by ‘Alı¯ ibn Yu¯ suf ibn Ta¯ shufı¯n (1107–43), the ruler of the

North African dynasty of the Almoravids, who replaced him with

his brother-in-law, Abu¯ Bakr ibn Ibra¯hı¯m al-S. ahrawı¯, better known

as Ibn T¯ıfilw¯ıt, as governor of the province.3

Ibn B¯ajja had poetical talent and mastered the muwashshaha

genre.4 His panegyrics were rewarded with the generosity of his

patron and his intelligence earned him an appointment as a vizier,

but Ibn T¯ıfilw¯ıt died soon, in 1116, fighting against the Christians;

Ibn B¯ajja composed elegies in his memory. Eventually, the Christian

king Alfons I of Aragon conquered Saragossa on December 18, 1118,

and Ibn B¯ajja had to flee. He first found shelter in X`atiba at the court

of the emir Abu¯ Ish. a¯q Ibrahı¯m ibn Yu¯ suf ibn Ta¯ shufı¯n, brother of

the caliph and governor of the Eastern part of al-Andalus. Ibn B¯ajja

remained for the rest of his life within the Almoravid circle and

served for about twenty years in Granada as vizier of the governor

Yah. ya¯ ibn Yu¯ suf ibn Ta¯ shufı¯n. We know that in 1136 he was

in Seville and that his disciple, Abu¯ al-H. asan ibn al-Ima¯m, also a

vizier, accompanied him. Ibn B¯ajja wanted to go to Oran but he died

in Fez in May 1139 (Ramadan 533 A.H.). Ibn Ma‘yu¯ b, a servant of

his enemy the physician Abu¯ al-‘Ala¯ ’ ibn Zuhr, was suspected of

poisoning him with an eggplant. Ibn Zuhr was not his only foe; the

personal enmity of Ibn Kh¯aq¯an against himis well known to us since

he attacked Ibn B¯ajja in the entry he devoted to him in his collection

of poetry, accusing himeven of depriving God of his attributes (ta‘t.

¯ıl).

The Almoravids bestowed favor on Ibn B¯ajja and other non-religious

scholars, among themM¯ alik ibnWuhaib, who was hismain teacher.

The positive environment for study created during the time of the