Arabic philosophy

efficient cause (al-‘illa al-fa¯ ‘iliyya) seemed the closest of Aristotle’s

four causes (the efficient, final, formal, and material) to the idea of

“agent” (fa¯ ‘il), and thus most easily naturalized into a philosophical

discourse in which God acts with will.35

Subsequent chapters in this volume on metaphysics and psychology

will treat the issues introduced here in a way more congenial

to those whose interest in Avicenna’s ideas is solely (or primarily)

philosophical. My goal in this chapter has been to locate Avicenna

in the history of philosophy: to unearth the philosophical challenges

that most demanded Avicenna’s attention; to describe the spectrum

of responses open to him at that time, given the raw materials he

probably had in front of him; and to explain why he chose one

option over another. Avicenna, it turns out, is situated at the end

of one period of synthesis – the Ammonian synthesis – and at the

beginning of another, a new synthesis of Avicenna’s metaphysics

and Muslimdoctrine. A daunting amount of scholarly work remains

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Avicenna 133

to be done on the 800-year history of efforts by post-Avicennian

mutakallimu¯ n to appropriate and naturalizeAvicenna’smetaphysics

into their kala¯m.36 But I hope that I have given a hint here of the richness

of the sources to bemined, and made the beginnings of a case for

viewing these mutakallimu¯ n – Sunnı¯ as well as Shı¯‘ı¯ – as the torchbearers

of the Avicennian tradition in Islamic intellectual history.

notes

1 See Gohlman’s remarks in his edition and translation of Avicenna,

Gohlman [91], 13, 91–113, and 143–52; G. C. Anawati, Mu’allafa¯ t Ibn

S¯ın¯ a (Cairo: 1950); and Y. Mahdav¯ı, Fihrist-i Mus.

annafa¯ t-i Ibn-i Sı¯na¯

(Tehran: 1954). Bibliographies of Avicenna’s works can also be found in

Janssens [95] andDaiber [1]; a chronology of the major works is proposed

by Gutas [93]. Avicenna’s major works include The Healing (al-Shifa¯ ’),

covering the exact sciences, logic, natural philosophy, and metaphysics;

The Salvation (al-Naja¯ t), a summary drawn from The Healing and from

a number of Avicenna’s earlier works; and The Pointers and Reminders

(al-Isha¯ ra¯ t wa-al-tanbiha¯ t), a late work composed for his advanced students

and requiring a great deal of decompression, and which was consequently

much commented upon by subsequent Muslim thinkers.

2 At least until a number of twentieth-century Arab intellectuals made

Averroes a hero of Arab (or more generally, Muslim) rationalism; on this

see A. von Ku‥ gelgen, Averroes und die arabische Moderne: Ansa¨ tze zu

einer Neubegru¨ ndung des Rationalismus im Islam (Leiden: 1994).

3 On the textual transmission of Avicenna’s works into Latin, see

d’Alverny [248]; for a study of how a number of Avicenna’s psychological

theories were received and appropriated by Latin thinkers, see

now Hasse [251].

4 I chose these three issues not only because they are basic but because

I have worked at length on them already and am therefore confident of

my analysis. Readers interested in seeing a detailed treatment of them,

as well as textual evidence supporting my views, should consult Wisnovsky

[105].

5 Avicenna, Autobiography, 18.4 (English trans. at Gohlman [91], 19).

6 See D. Gutas, “Avicenna’sMadhhab with an Appendix on the Question

of the Date of his Birth,” Quaderni di studi arabi 5–6 (1987–8), 323–36.

7 Avicenna, Autobiography 22.6–7 and 24.6–7 (English trans. at Gohlman

[91], 23 and 25); see also Ibn Khallika¯n,Wafaya¯ t al-a‘ya¯nwa-anba¯ ’ abna¯ ’

al-zama¯n, ed. M. ‘Abd al-H. amı¯d, 6 vols. (Cairo: 1949), vol. I [#182],

420.10–11.

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134 robert wisnovsky

8 Avicenna, Autobiography, in Gohlman [91], 36.8–38.2 (my trans.).

9 See Avicenna, al-Naj ¯ at, ed. M. S.

. al-Kurd¯ı (Cairo: 1913), 300.2–310.7

(English trans. at Avicenna [205], 56–64); Avicenna, Kita¯b al-shifa¯ ’:

t.

abı¯‘iyya¯ t (6): al-nafs, ed. F. Rahman (as Avicenna’s “De Anima”:

Arabic Text) (Oxford: 1959), 5.3–5.5.4, 223.11–234.11; French trans. J.

Bakosˇ (as Psychologie d’Ibn Sı¯na¯ (Avicenne) d’apre`s son oeuvre ash-

Shifa¯ ’) (Prague: 1956), 158–66; Avicenna, Liber de Anima seu Sextus

de Naturalibus (medieval Latin trans.), ed. S. van Riet, 2 vols. (Leiden:

1968 and 1972), 105.40–126.26.

10 For a fuller discussion of the “lesser” and “greater” harmonies see

Wisnovsky [105].

11 OnPhiloponus Arabus seeR.Wisnovsky, “Yah.

y¯a al-Nah.w¯ı (John Philoponus),”

in Encyclopedia of Islam [16], vol. XI, 251–3.

12 On the complex relationship between the Theology of Aristotle and the

Enneads, see now P. Adamson, The Arabic Plotinus: A Philosophical

Study of the “Theology of Aristotle” (London: 2003).

13 This distinction is stated most canonically by Ammonius’ student

Asclepius, In Metaph. [= CAG VI 2] 5.1 (ad 1013a17), 305.2–17. See

Wisnovsky [232] for a discussion of the history of this exegetical

trend.

14 E.g., Aristotle, De Anima, I.4, 408b18–19; De Anima, II.1, 413a3–9;

De Anima, III.4, 429a22–5; Parts of Animals, I.1, 641a32–641b10; GA,

II.3, 736b28–30; Metaphysics, VI.1, 1026a5–6; and Metaphysics, XII.3,

1070a24–6.

15 Al-Shifa¯ ’: kita¯b al-nafs 1.1, 15.17–16.17 (medieval Latin trans., ed. van

Riet, 36.43–37.68; French trans. by Bakoˇs, 12–13).

16 On Avicenna’s floating man, and on its relation to Descartes’ cogito,

see Marmura [214] and Druart [89], who refer to earlier works. See also

below, chapter 15.

17 For another example of how Avicenna can be fruitfully compared with

another philosopher of theAmmonian synthesis, seeA. Stone, “Simplicius

and Avicenna on the essential corporeity of material substance,”

in Wisnovsky [104], 73–130.

18 On this problem generally, see Wisnovsky [231].

19 Qur’ ¯an, 16:40: “Our statement to a thing, when we wish it [to be], consists

merely in our saying to it ‘Be!’, and then it is” (inna-ma¯ qawluna¯

li-shay’in idha¯ aradna¯hu an naqu¯ la lahu kun fa-yaku¯ nu); and 36:82:

“His command, when he wishes a thing [to be], is merely that he say

‘Be!’ and then it is” (inna-ma¯ amruhu idha¯ ara¯da shay’an an yaqu¯ la

kun fa-yaku¯ nu).

20 Nas.ı¯r al-Dı¯n al-T. u¯ sı¯, Sharh. al-isha¯ ra¯ t, in Sharh. ay al-isha¯ ra¯ t (Qom:

1983 or 1984), 189.16–19 (inside box on the page).

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Avicenna 135

21 Fakhr al-Dı¯n al-Ra¯zı¯, Sharh. al-Isha¯ ra¯ t, in Sharh. ay al-isha¯ ra¯ t, 192.5–13

(outside box).

22 Sa‘d al-Dı¯n al-Tafta¯za¯nı¯, Sharh. al-‘aqa¯ ’id al-nasafiyya (Cairo: 1916),

16.2–17.3 (top part of inside box); trans. E. Elder, A Commentary on

the Creed of Islam (New York: 1950), 11–12.

23 Mah.m¯ ud al-Is.fah¯an¯ı, Mat.

¯ ali‘ al-anz. ¯ ar sharh. t.

awa¯ li‘ al-anwa¯ r (Cairo:

1902), 39–41; English trans. by E. Calverley and J. Pollock,Nature,Man

and God in Medieval Islam (Leiden: 2002), vol. I, 192–7.

24 In fact many historians of medieval European thought are now actively

engaged in re-examining the traditional distinction between philosophy

and theology; see the articles contained in J. Aertsen and A. Speer,

eds.,Was ist Philosophie imMittelalter? Akten des X. Internationalen

Kongresses fu¨ r mittelalterliche Philosophie (Berlin: 1998).

25 That al-F ¯ar¯ab¯ı saw himself as part of the tradition of the Ammonian

synthesis is evident throughout his treatise On the Harmony between

the Opinions of the Two Philosophers, Plato the Divine and Aristotle,

but particularly in his claim that Ammonius’ arguments about

God’s being both an efficient and final cause were so well known that

they did not require citation: al-Fa¯ ra¯bı¯, Kita¯b al-jam‘ bayna ra’yay alh.

ak¯ımayni Afl ¯ at.

¯ un al-il ¯ ah¯ı wa-Arist.

u¯ t.a¯ lı¯s, ed. F. Dieterici, Alfa¯ ra¯bı¯’s

philosophische Abhandlungen (Leiden: 1890), 24.24–25.1.

26 On the history of this issue see Wisnovsky [233].

27 E.g., al-Shahrast ¯an¯ı, Kit ¯ ab al-mus.

a¯ ra‘a, ed. W. Madelung and trans.

T. Mayer, Struggling with the Philosopher: A Refutation of Avicenna’s

Metaphysics (London: 2001), 8.6–11.2; 24.3–31.2; and 43.3–46.10 (trans.

23–5, 33–7, and 44–6).

28 E.g., al-Ra¯zı¯, Sharh. al-isha¯ ra¯ t, 200.3–204.7.

29 To some extent this dilemma is symptomatic of Avicenna’s ambivalence

over the degree of genuine agency enjoyed by humans during the

act of intellection; on this see now D. Hasse, “Avicenna on Abstraction,”

in Wisnovsky [104], 39–72.

30 See al-Bayd. ¯aw¯ı’s (and following him, al-Is.fah¯an¯ı’s) description of the

position of the “philosophers” (here probably referring to Avicenna) at

Mat.

¯ ali‘ al-anz. ¯ ar: Sharh. t.

awa¯ li‘ al-anwa¯ r 36 (English trans. byCalverley

and Pollock, vol. I, 176–7).

31 E.g., al-Tafta¯za¯nı¯, Sharh. al-‘aqa¯ ’id al-nasafiyya, 52.2–60.5 and 69.2–

72.10 (top part of the inside box; English trans. by Elder, 36–40 and

49–53). For a Sh¯ı‘¯ı counterargument, seeH.

aydar A¯ mulı¯ (d. after 1385),

Ja¯mi‘ al-asra¯ r, ed. H. Corbin and O. Yahia (Paris: 1969), 139.7–142.11.

32 See Im¯am al-H. aramayn al-Juwayn¯ı (d. 1085), al-‘Aq¯ıda al-Niz.

a¯miyya,

ed. M. Z. al-Kawthar¯ı (Cairo: 1948), 16.19ff., 14.12ff., and 25.3ff.;

and Kita¯b al-irsha¯d, ed. and French trans. J.-D. Luciani (as El-Irchad

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136 robert wisnovsky

par Imam el-Haramein) (Paris: 1938), 17.16ff. and 94.3ff.; al-Sanu¯ sı¯

(d. 1490), al-‘Aqı¯da al-sanu¯ siyya, in Ibra¯hı¯m al-Ba¯ ju¯ rı¯ (d. 1860),

H.

a¯ shiya ‘ala¯ matn al-Sanu¯ siyya (Cairo: 1856), 57.8–58.2 (marg.);

Ibr ¯ah¯ım al-Laq¯an¯ı (d. ca. 1631), Jawhara al-tawh. id (Cairo: n.d.), 28.1

and 31.1; and al-Fad. a¯ lı¯ (d. 1821), Kifa¯ya al-‘awa¯mm fı¯ ‘ilm al-kala¯m,

in Ibr ¯ah¯ım al-B¯aj ¯ ur¯ı, H.

a¯ shiya ‘ala¯ Kifa¯ya al-‘awa¯mm (Cairo: 1906),

31.1–33.1; 38.2–4 and 44.1 (all top section of page).

33 Ab ¯ u al-Mu‘¯ın al-Nasaf¯ı, Kit ¯ ab tabs.

ira al-adilla, ed. K. Sal¯ama (Damascus:

1993), 61.1–63.3.

34 ‘Alla¯ma al-H. illı¯, Kashf al-mura¯d fı¯ sharh. Tajrı¯d al-i‘tiqa¯d (Beirut:

1979), 305.1–306.12; al-La¯hı¯jı¯, Shawa¯ riq al-ilha¯m fı¯ sharh. Tajrı¯d alkala

¯m (Is.faha¯n: reprint of lithograph from 1878/1893), 494.13–504.26.

35 Al-T. u¯ sı¯, Sharh. al-isha¯ ra¯ t, 194.13–17 (inside box). I argue against

al-T. u¯ sı¯’s interpretation in Wisnovsky [233].

36 For a concise overview, see now Gutas [94]; see also Wisnovsky [261].

Some work on the naturalization of Avicenna’s metaphysics in Sh¯ı‘¯ı

kala¯m has been done; see, for example, Schmidtke [259], esp. 180–6,

and Schmidtke [260], esp. 37–114, and nowA. al-Rahim, “The Twelver-

Sh¯ı‘¯ı Reception of Avicenna in the Mongol Period,” in Reisman [103],

219–31. On the Sunn¯ı side, by contrast, little is available apart from van

Ess’ (German) translation of and commentary on the first part of the

Sunn¯ı mutakallim al-¯Ij¯ı’s (d. 1355) Book of Stations: see J. van Ess, Die

Erkenntnislehre des ‘Ad. udaddı¯n al-I¯cı¯: U¨ bersetzung und Kommentar

des 1. Buches seinerMawa¯qif (Wiesbaden: 1966), and even this concentrates

more on epistemology than metaphysics. But see also Y.Michot,

“L’avicennisation de la sunna, du sab’eisme au leurre de la H.

an¯ıfiyya:

`a propos du Livre des religions et des sectes, II d’al-Shahrast¯an¯ı,”

Bulletin de philosophie m´edi ´evale 35 (1993), 113–20, and J. Michot,

“La pand’emie avicennienne au VIe/XIIe si `ecle: pr’esentation, editio

princeps et traduction de l’introduction du Livre de l’advenue du

monde (Kita¯b h. udu¯ th al-‘a¯ lam) d’Ibn Ghayla¯n al-Balkhı¯,” Arabica 40

(1993), 287–344.

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michael e. marmura

7 Al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı

The writings of al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı (d. 1111) mark a critical stage in the

history of Arabic philosophy. He is noted for his classic, The

Incoherence of the Philosophers (Taha¯ fut al-fala¯ sifa), an incisive

critique largely of the metaphysics and psychology of Avicenna

(d. 1037). At the same time, he is also noted for adopting Avicennian

philosophical ideas. This at first sight seems paradoxical, if

not downright inconsistent. In fact, he adopted them after reinterpreting

them in terms of his Ash‘arite occasionalist perspective (to

which we will shortly turn), rendering them consistent with his theology.

This reinterpretation is not without intrinsic philosophical

interest.

Al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı was a renowned Islamic lawyer (faq¯ıh), speculative

theologian (mutakallim), but above all an Islamic mystic (s.

u¯ fı¯). In

his autobiography, written a few years before his death, he states

that it was the quest after certainty that motivated his intellectual

and spiritual journey and that he finally found this certainty

in direct mystical experience, dhawq, a technicalS.

u¯ fı¯ term that literally

means “taste.”1 Although trained in the Ash‘arite school of

speculative theology, kala¯m, to which he contributed two works,

he was also critical of this discipline. This has raised the question

of whether his mysticism was at odds with his theology, which

included the reinterpreted, assimilated, Avicennian philosophical

ideas. A close reading – in proper context – of his writings during

the period in which he became a mystic suggests that this is

not really the case. As we hope to indicate, his mysticism and

his theological–philosophical affirmations tend to complement each

other.

137

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138 michael e. marmura

life and career

Born in 1058 in the city of T.

u¯ s or its environs in northeast Persia,

al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı had a traditional Islamic education inmadrasas, religious

colleges that focused on the study of religious law. After studying in

T.

u¯ s, then Jurja¯n, hewent (around 1077) toNı¯sha¯pu¯ rwhere he studied

with the renowned Im¯am al-H. aramayn al-Juwayn¯ı, a jurisconsult of

the school of al-Sha¯ fi‘ı¯ (d. 820) and a leading theologian of the kala¯m

of al-Ash‘arı¯ (d. 935). It is probable that during his studies inNı¯sha¯pu¯ r

he had some exposure to philosophy: its intensive study came later

when in Baghdad.

Al-Juwayn¯ı died in 1085. Al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı seems to have remained in

Nı¯sha¯pu¯ r for some six years. He acquired the reputation of being

a brilliant scholar who contributed works on Sh¯ afi‘¯ı law. In 1091,

the vizier Niz.

¯am al-Mulk appointed him as professor of law in the

Niz.

¯amiyya at Baghdad. This was the most prestigious of a number

of colleges that took their name from their founder, Niz.

¯am al-Mulk,

the vizier of the Seljuk Turkish sultans, for the teaching of Sh¯ afi‘¯ı

law. These sultans wielded real power in Baghdad, but their power

was legitimized by the ‘Abb¯asid caliph. The Seljuk Turks had adopted

Islam in its Sunn¯ı (orthodox) form and were hence in conflict with

the Sh¯ı‘ite F¯at.imid anti-caliphate in Cairo. The Niz.¯amiyya colleges

were intended in part to counteract F¯at.imid religious doctrine. One of

the books al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı wrote when he came to Baghdad, The Scandal of

the Esoterics (Fad.

¯ a’ih.

al-ba¯ tiniyya), commissioned by the ‘Abba¯ sid

caliph, al-Mustaz.hir (d. 1118), was a theological attack on F¯at.imid

doctrine.

Al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı taught at Baghdad from 1091 until 1095. Probably early

during this period, he underwent a period of skepticism. For in his

quest after certainty, as he tells us in his autobiography,2 he could no

longer trust the senses. How could one trust the strongest of these

senses, sight? We look at the shadow and see it static, but later find

out that it has moved and has been moving all the time, gradually,

imperceptibly. Again, we look at the sun and it appears to us to be

the size of a coin, but astronomical proof shows that it is greater than

our earth. This skepticism extended to reason. If the senses cannot

be trusted, can one trust reason? Here again, al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı found no

guarantee that the primary principles of reason – the principle of

the excluded middle, for example – can be trusted. For one cannot

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Al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı 139

demonstrate their truthwithout circularity,without assuming them.

This skepticism, he tells us, was an illness that afflicted himfor two

months, until God restored to him belief in reason.

The four years of teaching at the Niz.

¯amiyya were also the years

of al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı’s intensive studies of philosophy and his writing of

a number of works relating to it. Of these, the most important

was his The Incoherence of the Philosophers. He also wrote The

Aims of the Philosophers (Maqa¯ s. id al-fala¯ sifa), a work of exposition

that closely followed Avicenna’s Persian work, The Book of Knowledge

for [Prince] ‘Ala¯ ‘ı¯ [al-Dawla] (Da¯nishna¯ma-yi ‘Ala¯ ’ı¯). The Aims

became known in its Latin translation to the medievalWest, but was

mistakenly thought to be an expression of al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı’s own philosophy.

In introducing it and at the end of this work, al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı states

that he wrote it to explain the Islamic philosophers’ theories as a prelude

to his refuting them in the Incoherence. Curiously, however, the

Incoherence neither mentions nor alludes to it. It is possible that he

initially wrote it to summarize for himself the philosophical theories

he was studying and that later, when he decided to circulate it,

he added the statements that he wrote it as a prelude to the Incoherence.

This, however, is speculation. Another work of this period,

explicitly related to the Incoherence, is The Standard for Knowledge

(Mi‘ya¯ r al-‘ilm). It was expressly written as an appendix to the Incoherence.

This is essentially an exposition of Avicenna’s logic, the

most comprehensive of several expositions of this logic he wrote.

To this period also belongs his most important theological work,

Moderation in Belief (al-Iqtisa¯d fı¯ al-i‘tiqa¯d). It is an Ash‘arite work

which al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı held in high regard. Written after the Incoherence,

it is closely related to it. The purpose of the Incoherence, as al-

Ghaz¯ al¯ı clearly states, is to refute the philosophers, not to affirmtrue

doctrine.3 The affirmation of doctrine is embodied in the Moderation

and in a shorter complementary Ash‘arite work, the Principles

of Belief (Qawa¯ ‘id al-‘aqa¯ ‘id), incorporated in his later voluminous

work, The Revival of the Sciences of Religion (Ih. ya¯ ’ ‘ulu¯m al-dı¯n),4

written after he left Baghdad to follow theS.

u¯ fı¯ path.

This decision followed a spiritual crisis. As he tells it in his autobiography,

he realized that his motivation in pursuing his career

as teacher and writer was worldly success. It was not an authentic

religious impulse. He also hints at a deeper reason, namely, a

dissatisfaction with the purely doctrinal and rational approaches to

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140 michael e. marmura

religion. These bypassed the most essential aspect of the religious

life – the directly experiential, the dhawq we referred to earlier. He

had read the works of S.u¯ fı¯s and wanted to follow their practice. This

meant seclusion and devotion unencumbered by worldly concerns.

He decided to leave Baghdad and the prestigious teaching position

he held. To do so without opposition from the authorities, he gave as

his reason his intention to go on pilgrimage to Mecca. After making

appropriate arrangements for the welfare of his family, he traveled to

Syria and secluded himself in the mosque inDamascus. He then went

to Jerusalem and the Dome of the Rock, and also visited Hebron. He

then visited Mecca and Medina.

He spent some eleven years away from teaching as he became

a S.u¯ fı¯. During this period he wrote his magnum opus, the Ih. ya¯ ’,

which strove to reconcile traditional Muslim belief withS.

u¯ fism. In

related works, al-Ghaz¯ al¯ı tended to interpret what theS.

u¯ fı¯s termed

the “annihilation” (al-fana¯ ’) of the self in God as “closeness” (qurb)

to the divine attributes, a view more acceptable to traditional Islamic

belief. The Ih. ya¯ ’ included homilies designed to nurture Islamic piety,