A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

particular ethical theory, it is evident in what sense the sequence of stages
represents a progressive development and not simply a regular sequence.
Just as persons gradually formulate rational plans of life that answer to
their deeper interests, so they come to know the derivation of moral
precepts and ideals from the principles that they would accept in an initial
situation of equality. Ethical norms are no longer experienced merely as
constraints, but are tied together into one coherent conception. The con-
nection between these standards and human aspirations is now compre-
hended, and persons understand their sense of justice as an extension of
their natural attachments, and as a way of caring about the collective
good. The many chains of reasons with their various stopping points are
no longer simply distinct but are seen as elements of a systematic view.
These remarks assume, however, a particular theory of justice. Those who
espouse a different one will favor another account of these matters. But in
any case, some conception of justice surely has a place in explaining
moral learning, even if this conception belongs solely to the psychologi-
cal theory and is not itself accepted as philosophically correct.
76. THE PROBLEM OF RELATIVE STABILITY
76. Relative Stability
I now turn to the comparison between justice as fairness and other con-
ceptions with respect to stability. It may be useful to recall that the
problem of stability arises because a just scheme of cooperation may not
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be in equilibrium, much less stable. To be sure, from the standpoint of the
original position, the principles of justice are collectively rational; every-
one may expect to improve his situation if all comply with these princi-
ples, at least in comparison with what his prospects would be in the
absence of any agreement. General egoism represents this no-agreement
point. Nevertheless, from the perspective of any one man, both first-per-
son and free-rider egoism would be still better. Of course given the condi-
tions of the original position neither of these options is a serious candi-
date (§23). Yet in everyday life an individual, if he is so inclined, can
sometimes win even greater benefits for himself by taking advantage of
the cooperative efforts of others. Sufficiently many persons may be doing
their share so that when special circumstances allow him not to contribute
(perhaps his omission will not be found out), he gets the best of both
worlds: on these occasions anyway things proceed much as if free-rider
egoism had been acknowledged.
Just arrangements may not be in equilibrium then because acting fairly
is not in general each man’s best reply to the just conduct of his associ-
ates. To insure stability men must have a sense of justice or a concern for
those who would be disadvantaged by their defection, preferably both.
When these sentiments are sufficiently strong to overrule the temptations
to violate the rules, just schemes are stable. Meeting one’s duties and
obligations is now regarded by each person as the correct answer to the
actions of others. His rational plan of life regulated by his sense of justice
leads to this conclusion.
As I remarked earlier, Hobbes connected the question of stability with
that of political obligation. One may think of the Hobbesian sovereign as
a mechanism added to a system of cooperation which would be unstable
without it. The general belief in the sovereign’s efficacy removes the two
kinds of instability (§42). Now it is evident how relations of friendship
and mutual trust, and the public knowledge of a common and normally
effective sense of justice, bring about the same result. For given these
natural attitudes and the desire to do what is just, no one wishes to
advance his interests unfairly to the disadvantage of others; this removes
instability of the first kind. And since each recognizes that these inclina-
tions and sentiments are prevalent and effective, there is no reason for
anyone to think that he must violate the rules to protect his legitimate
interests; so instability of the second kind is likewise absent. Of course,
some infractions will presumably occur, but when they do feelings of
guilt arising from friendship and mutual trust and the sense of justice tend
to restore the arrangement.
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Moreover, a society regulated by a public sense of justice is inherently
stable: other things equal, the forces making for stability increase (up to
some limit) as time passes. This inherent stability is a consequence of the
reciprocal relation between the three psychological laws. The more effec-
tive operation of one law strengthens that of the other two. For example,
when the second law leads to stronger attachments, the sense of justice
acquired by the third law is reinforced because of the greater concern for
the beneficiaries of just institutions. And going the other way, a more
effective sense of justice leads to a more secure intention to do one’s
share, and the recognition of this fact arouses more intense feelings of
friendship and trust. Again, it seems that with a firmer assurance of one’s
own worth and a livelier capacity for fellow feeling brought about by
more favorable conditions for the first law, the effects governed by the
other two laws should be similarly enhanced. Conversely, persons who
have developed a regulative sense of justice and are confident in their
self-esteem are more likely to care for their children with manifest inten-
tion. Thus all three psychological principles conspire together to support
the institutions of a well-ordered society.
There seems to be no doubt then that justice as fairness is a reasonably
stable moral conception. But a decision in the original position depends
on a comparison: other things equal, the preferred conception of justice is
the most stable one. Ideally we should compare the contract view with all
its rivals in this respect, but as so often I shall only consider the principle
of utility. In order to do this, it is useful to recall three elements that enter
into the operation of the psychological laws: namely, an unconditional
caring for our good, a clear awareness of the reasons for moral precepts
and ideals (aided by explanation and instruction, and the possibility of
giving precise and convincing justifications), and the recognition that
those complying with these precepts and ideals, and doing their part in
social arrangements, both accept these norms and express in their life and
character forms of human good which evoke our admiration and esteem
(§70). The resulting sense of justice is stronger the more these three ele-
ments are realized. The first enlivens the sense of our own worth strength-
ening the tendency to answer in kind, the second presents the moral
conception so that it can be readily understood, and the third displays the
adherence to it as attractive. The most stable conception of justice, there-
fore, is presumably one that is perspicuous to our reason, congruent with
our good, and rooted not in abnegation but in affirmation of the self.
Now several things suggest that the sense of justice corresponding to
justice as fairness is stronger than the parallel sentiment inculcated by the
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other conceptions. First of all, the unconditional concern of other persons
and institutions for our good is far stronger on the contract view. The
restrictions contained in the principle of justice guarantee everyone an
equal liberty and assure us that our claims will not be neglected or
overridden for the sake of a larger sum of benefits, even for the whole
society. We have only to keep in mind the various priority rules, and the
meaning of the difference principle as rendered by its Kantian interpreta-
tion (persons are not to be treated as means at all) and its relation to the
idea of fraternity (§§29, 17). The effect of these aspects of justice as
fairness is to heighten the operation of the reciprocity principle. As we
have noted, a more unconditional caring for our good and a clearer
refusal by others to take advantage of accident and happenstance, must
strengthen our self-esteem; and this greater good must in turn lead to a
closer affiliation with persons and institutions by way of an answer in
kind. These effects are more intense than in the case of the utility princi-
ple, and so the resulting attachments should be stronger.
We can confirm this suggestion by considering the well-ordered soci-
ety paired with the principle of utility. In this case, the three psychologi-
cal laws have to be altered. For example, the second law now holds that
persons tend to develop friendly feelings toward those who with evident
intention do their part in cooperative schemes publicly known to maxi-
mize the sum of advantages, or the average well-being (whichever variant
is used). In either case the resulting psychological law is not as plausible
as before. For suppose that certain institutions are adopted on the public
understanding that the greater advantages of some counterbalance the
lesser losses of others. Why should the acceptance of the principle of
utility (in either form) by the more fortunate inspire the less advantaged
to have friendly feelings toward them? This response would seem in
fact to be rather surprising, especially if those in a better situation have
pressed their claims by maintaining that a greater sum (or average) of
well-being would result from their satisfaction. No reciprocity principle
is at work in this case and the appeal to utility may simply arouse suspi-
cion. The concern which is expressed for all persons by counting each as
one (by weighing everyone’s utility equally) is weak compared to that
conveyed by the principles of justice. Thus the attachments generated
within a well-ordered society regulated by the utility criterion are likely
to vary widely between one sector of society and another. Some groups
may acquire little if any desire to act justly (now defined by the utilitarian
principle) with a corresponding loss in stability.
To be sure, in any kind of well-ordered society the strength of the sense
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of justice will not be the same in all social groups. Yet to insure that
mutual ties bind the entire society, each and every member of it, one must
adopt something like the two principles of justice. It is evident why the
utilitarian stresses the capacity for sympathy. Those who do not benefit
from the better situation of others must identify with the greater sum (or
average) of satisfaction else they will not desire to follow the utility
criterion. Now such altruistic inclinations no doubt exist. Yet they are
likely to be less strong than those brought about by the three psychologi-
cal laws formulated as reciprocity principles; and a marked capacity for
sympathetic identification seems relatively rare. Therefore these feelings
provide less support for the basic structure of society. In addition, as we
have seen, following the utilitarian conception tends to be destructive of
the self-esteem of those who lose out, particularly when they are already
less fortunate (§29). Now it is characteristic of the morality of authority
when conceived as a morality for the social order as a whole to demand
self-sacrifice for the sake of a higher good and to deprecate the worth of
the individual and lesser associations. The emptiness of the self is to be
overcome in the service of larger ends. This doctrine is likely to encour-
age self-hatred with its destructive consequences. Certainly utilitarianism
does not go to this extreme, but there is bound to be a similar effect which
further weakens the capacity for sympathy and distorts the development
of affective ties.
By contrast, in a social system regulated by justice as fairness, iden-
tification with the good of others, and an appreciation of what they do as
an element in our own good (§79), might be quite strong. But this is
possible only because of the mutuality already implicit in the principles
of justice. With the constant assurance expressed by these principles,
persons will develop a secure sense of their own worth that forms the
basis for the love of humankind. By appealing straightway to the capacity
for sympathy as a foundation of just conduct in the absence of reciprocity,
the principle of utility not only requires more than justice as fairness but
depends upon weaker and less common inclinations. Two other elements
affect the strength of the sense of justice: the clarity of the moral concep-
tion and the attractiveness of its ideals. I shall consider the latter in the
next chapter. There I try to show that the contract view is more congruent
with our good than its rivals; and assuming this conclusion here, it lends
further support to the preceding considerations. The greater clarity of the
principles of justice was considered earlier (§49). I noted that in com-
parison with teleological doctrines, the principles of justice define a per-
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spicuous conception. By contrast, the idea of maximizing the aggregate
of well-being, or of attaining the greatest perfection, is vague and amor-
phous. It is easier to ascertain when the equal liberties are infringed and
to establish discrepancies from the difference principle than it is to decide
whether unequal treatment increases social welfare. The more definite
structure of the two principles (and the various priority rules) offers them
with greater sharpness to the intellect and thereby secures their hold on
the mind. The explanations and reasons given for them are more easily
understood and accepted; the conduct expected of us is more clearly
defined by publicly acknowledged criteria. On all three counts, then, the
contract view seems to possess greater stability.
It is remarkable that Mill appears to agree with this conclusion. He
notes that with the advance of civilization persons come more and more
to recognize that society between human beings is manifestly impossible
on any other basis than that the interests of all are to be consulted. The
improvement in political institutions removes the opposition of interests
and the barriers and inequalities that encourage individuals and classes to
disregard one another’s claims. The natural end of this development is a
state of the human mind in which each person has a feeling of unity with
others. Mill maintains that when this state of mind is perfected, it leads
the individual to desire for himself only those things in the benefits of
which others are included. One of a person’s natural wants is that there
should be harmony between his feelings and those of his fellow citizens.
He desires to know that his aims and theirs are not in opposition, that he
is not setting himself against their good but is furthering what they really
wish for.
24
Now the desire Mill characterizes here is the desire to act upon the
difference principle (or some similar criterion), and not a desire to act on
the principle of utility. Mill does not notice the discrepancy; but he seems
intuitively to recognize that a perfectly just society in which men’s aims
are reconciled in ways acceptable to them all would be one that follows
the notion of reciprocity expressed by the principles of justice. His re-
marks accord with the idea that a stable conception of justice which
elicits men’s natural sentiments of unity and fellow feeling is more likely
to incorporate these principles than the utilitarian standard. And this
conclusion is borne out by Mill’s account of the roots of the sense of
justice, for he believes that this sentiment arises not only from sympathy
24.