sense of justice as he recognizes that he and those for whom he cares
are the beneficiaries of these arrangements.
Perhaps the most striking feature of these laws (or tendencies) is that
their formulation refers to an institutional
setting as being just, and in the
last two, as being publicly known to be such. The principles of moral
psychology have a place for a conception of justice; and different formu-
lations of these principles result when different conceptions are used.
Thus some view of justice enters into the explanation of the develop-
ment of the corresponding sentiment; hypotheses about this psychologi-
cal process incorporate moral notions even if these are understood only as
part of the psychological theory. This
much seems straightforward, and
assuming that ethical ideas can be stated clearly, there is no difficulty in
seeing how there can be laws of this kind. The preceding outline of moral
development indicates how these matters can be worked out. After all, the
sense of justice is a settled disposition to adopt and to want to act from
the moral point of view insofar at least as the principles of justice define
it. It is hardly surprising that these principles should be involved in the
formation of this regulative sentiment. Indeed, it seems likely that our
understanding of moral learning cannot far exceed
our grasp of the moral
conceptions that are to be learned. Analogously, our understanding of
how we learn our language is limited by what we know about its gram-
matical and semantic structure. Just as psycholinguistics depends upon
linguistics, so the theory of moral learning depends upon an account of
the nature of morality and its various forms. Our common sense ideas
about these matters do not suffice for the aims of theory.
No doubt some prefer that social theories
avoid the use of moral
notions. For instance, they may wish to explain the formation of affec-
tive ties by laws referring to the frequency of interaction among those
engaged in some common task, or to the regularity with which some
persons take the initiative or exercise authoritative guidance. Thus one
law may state that among
equals cooperating together, where equality is
defined by the accepted rules, the more often individuals interact with one
another, the more likely it is that friendly feelings develop between them.
Another law may assert that the more someone in a position of authority
uses his powers and leads those subject to him, the more they come to
respect him.
21
But since these laws (or tendencies)
do not mention the
21. For examples of suggested laws (or tendencies) of this type, see G. C. Homans,
The Human
Group
(New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1950), pp. 243, 247, 249, 251. In a later book, however, the
notion of justice is explicitly brought in. See
Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms
(New York,
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961), pp. 295f, which applies the theory developed at pp. 232–264.
430
The Sense of Justice
justice (or fairness) of the
arrangement in question, they are bound to be
very limited in scope. Those subject to another exercising authority will
surely regard him differently depending upon whether the whole arrange-
ment is just and well designed to advance what they take to be their
legitimate interests. And the same is true of cooperation among equals.
Institutions are patterns of human conduct defined by public systems of
rules, and the very holding of the offices and positions which they define
normally indicates certain intentions and aims.
The justice or injustice
of society’s arrangements and men’s beliefs about these questions pro-
foundly influence the social feelings; to a large extent they determine how
we regard another’s accepting or rejecting an institution, or his attempt to
reform or defend it.
It may be objected that much social theory does well enough without
using any moral ideas. The obvious example is economics. However, the
situation in economic theory is peculiar in
that one can often assume a
fixed structure of rules and constraints that define the actions open to
individuals and firms, and certain simplifying motivational assumptions
are highly plausible. The theory of price (its more elementary parts any-
way) is an illustration. One does not consider why buyers and sellers
behave in accordance with the rules of law governing economic activity;
or how preferences get formed or legal norms established. For the most
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