A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

part, these matters are taken as given, and at a certain level there is no
objection to this. On the other hand, the so-called economic theory of
democracy, the view that extends the basic ideas and methods of price
theory to the political process, must for all its merits be regarded with
caution.
22
For a theory of a constitutional regime cannot take the rules as
given, nor simply assume that they will be followed. Clearly the political
process is importantly one of enacting and revising rules and of trying to
control the legislative and executive branches of government. Even if
everything is done in accordance with constitutional procedures, we need
to explain why these are accepted. Nothing analogous to the constraints
of a competitive market holds for this case; and there are no legal sanc-
tions in the ordinary sense for many sorts of unconstitutional actions by
parliaments and chief executives, and the political forces they represent.
The leading political actors are guided therefore in part by what they
regard as morally permissible; and since no system of constitutional
checks and balances succeeds in setting up an invisible hand that can be
22. For references to this theory of democracy, see §31, note 2, and §54, note 18. Of course, those
who have developed the theory are aware of this limitation. See, fee example, Anthony Downs, “The
Public Interest: Its Meaning in a Democracy,” 
Social Research,
vol. 29 (1962).
431
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relied upon to guide the process to a just outcome, a public sense of
justice is to some degree necessary. It would appear, then, that a correct
theory of politics in a just constitutional regime presupposes a theory
of justice which explains how moral sentiments influence the conduct of
public affairs. I touched upon this question in connection with the role
of civil disobedience; it suffices to add here that one test of the contract
doctrine is how well it serves this purpose.
A second point about the psychological laws is that they govern
changes in the affective ties which belong to our final ends. To clarify
this, we may observe that to explain an intentional action is to show how,
given our beliefs and the available alternatives, it accords with our plan of
life, or with that subpart of it relevant in the circumstances. Often this is
done by a series of explanations saying that a first thing is done in order
to achieve a second; that the second thing is done in order to achieve a
third, and so on, the series being finite and ending at an aim for the sake
of which the previous things are done. In accounting for our various
actions, we may cite many different chains of reasons, and these normally
stop at different points given the complexity of a plan of life and its plu-
rality of ends. Moreover, a chain of reasons may have several branches,
since an action may be done to advance more than one end. How activi-
ties furthering the many ends are scheduled and balanced against each
other is settled by the plan itself and the principles upon which it is based.
Now among our final ends are the attachments we have for persons, the
interests we take in the realization of their interests, and the sense of jus-
tice. The three laws describe how our system of desires comes to have
new final ends as we acquire affective ties. These changes are to be distin-
guished from our forming derivative desires as a consequence of addi-
tional knowledge or further opportunities, or from our determining our
existing wants in a more specific way. For example, someone wishing to
travel to a certain place is informed that a certain route is the best. Upon
accepting this advice, he has a desire to proceed in a particular direction.
Derivative desires of this sort have a rational explanation. They are de-
sires to do what in view of the evidence on hand will most effectively
realize our present aims, and they shift along with knowledge and belief,
and the available opportunities. The three psychological laws do not
provide rational explanations of desires in this sense; rather they charac-
terize transformations of our pattern of final ends that arise from our rec-
ognizing the manner in which institutions and the actions of others affect
our good. Of course, whether an aim is final or derivative is not always
easy to ascertain. The distinction is made on the basis of a person’s
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The Sense of Justice

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rational plan of life and the structure of this plan is not generally obvious,
even to him. Yet for our purposes here, the distinction is clear enough.
A third observation is that the three laws are not merely principles of
association or of reinforcement. While they have a certain resemblance to
these learning principles, they assert that the active sentiments of love and
friendship, and even the sense of justice, arise from the manifest intention
of other persons to act for our good. Because we recognize that they wish
us well, we care for their well-being in return. Thus we acquire attach-
ments to persons and institutions according to how we perceive our good
to be affected by them. The basic idea is one of reciprocity, a tendency to
answer in kind. Now this tendency is a deep psychological fact. Without
it our nature would be very different and fruitful social cooperation frag-
ile if not impossible. For surely a rational person is not indifferent to
things that significantly affect his good; and supposing that he develops
some attitude toward them, he acquires either a new attachment or a new
aversion. If we answered love with hate, or came to dislike those who
acted fairly toward us, or were averse to activities that furthered our good,
a community would soon dissolve. Beings with a different psychology
either have never existed or must soon have disappeared in the course of
evolution. A capacity for a sense of justice built up by responses in kind
would appear to be a condition of human sociability. The most stable
conceptions of justice are presumably those for which the corresponding
sense of justice is most firmly based on these tendencies (§76).
Finally, several comments about the account of moral development as
a whole. The reliance upon the three principles of moral psychology is of
course a simplification. A fuller account would distinguish between dif-
ferent kinds of learning and therefore between instrumental conditioning
(reinforcement) and classical conditioning, so likely to shape our emo-
tions and feelings. A consideration of modeling and imitation, and the
learning of concepts and principles, would also be necessary.
23
There
is no reason to deny the significance of these forms of learning. For
our purposes, though, the three-stage schema may suffice. Insofar as it
stresses the forming of attachments as final ends, the sketch of moral
learning resembles the empiricist tradition with its emphasis on the im-
portance of acquiring new motives.
There are also ties with what I have called the rationalistic view. For
one thing, the acquisition of the sense of justice takes place in stages
connected with the growth of knowledge and understanding. One must
23. See Brown, 
Social Psychology,
pp. 411f.
433
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develop a conception of the social world and of what is just and unjust if
the sentiment of justice is to be acquired. The manifest intentions of
others are recognized against a background of public institutions as inter-
preted by one’s view of the self and its situation. I have not maintained,
however, that the stages of development are innate or determined by
psychological mechanisms. Whether various native propensities influence
these stages is a matter I have left aside. Rather a theory of right and
justice is used to describe what the expected course of development might
be. The manner in which a well-ordered society is arranged, and the
full system of principles, ideals, and precepts that govern the complete
scheme, provide a way of distinguishing the three levels of morality. It
seems plausible that, in a society regulated by the contract doctrine,
moral learning would follow the order presented. The stages are deter-
mined by the structure of what is to be learned, proceeding from the
simpler to the more complex as the requisite capacities are realized.
Last of all, by founding the account of moral learning explicitly upon a