A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

Reason and Conduct
(New York, Alfred Knopf, 1962),
pp. 134–170. See also Huntington Terrell, “Moral Objectivity and Freedom,” 
Ethics,
vol. 76 (1965),
pp. 117–127, for a discussion to which I am indebted.
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78. Autonomy and Objectivity

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cal ordering, the division of the basic structure into two parts, and so on.
Taken all together the parties hope that these and other devices will
simplify political and social questions so that the resulting balance of
justice, made possible by the greater consensus, outweighs what may
have been lost by ignoring certain potentially relevant aspects of moral
situations. The complexity of problems of justice is up to the persons in
the original position to decide. Although ethical differences are bound to
remain, seeing the social world from the original position does permit
essential understandings to be reached. The acceptance of the principles
of right and justice forges the bonds of civic friendship and establishes
the basis of comity amidst the disparities that persist. Citizens are able to
recognize one another’s good faith and desire for justice even though
agreement may occasionally break down on constitutional questions and
most certainly on many issues of policy. But unless there existed a com-
mon perspective, the assumption of which narrowed differences of opin-
ion, reasoning and argument would be pointless and we would have no
rational grounds for believing in the soundness of our convictions.
It is clear that this interpretation of autonomy and objectivity depends
upon the theory of justice. The idea of the original position is used to give
a consistent rendering of both notions. Of course, if it is believed that the
principles of justice would not be chosen, the content of these concep-
tions would have to be suitably altered. One who holds that the principle
of utility would be consented to thinks that our autonomy is expressed by
following this criterion. Nevertheless, the general idea will be the same,
and both autonomy and objectivity are still explicated by reference to the
initial situation. But some have characterized autonomy and objectivity in
an entirely different way. They have suggested that autonomy is the
complete freedom to form our moral opinions and that the conscientious
judgment of every moral agent ought absolutely to be respected. Objec-
tivity is then attributed to those judgments which satisfy all the standards
that the agent himself has in his liberty decided are relevant.
2
These
standards may or may not have anything to do with taking up a common
point of view that others might reasonably be expected to share; nor of
course is the corresponding idea of autonomy connected with such a
perspective. I mention these other interpretations only to indicate by
contrast the nature of the contract doctrine.
From the standpoint of justice as fairness it is not true that the consci-
entious judgments of each person ought absolutely to be respected; nor is
2. See Aiken, ibid., pp. 162–169.
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it true that individuals are completely free to form their moral convic-
tions. These contentions are mistaken if they mean that, having arrived at
our moral opinions conscientiously (as we believe), we always have a
claim to be allowed to act on them. In discussing conscientious objection,
we noted that the problem here is that of deciding how one is to answer
those who strive to act as their erring conscience directs them (§56). How
do we ascertain that their conscience and not ours is mistaken, and under
what circumstances can they be compelled to desist? Now the answer to
these questions is found by ascending to the original position: a person’s
conscience is misguided when he seeks to impose on us conditions that
violate the principles to which we would each consent in that situation.
And we can resist his plans in those ways that would be authorized when
the conflict is viewed from that perspective. We are not literally to respect
the conscience of an individual. Rather we are to respect him as a person
and we do this by limiting his actions, when this proves necessary, only as
the principles we would both acknowledge permit. In the original posi-
tion the parties agree to be held responsible for the conception of justice
that is chosen. There is no violation of our autonomy so long as its
principles are properly followed. Moreover, these principles stipulate that
on many occasions we cannot shift the responsibility for what we do onto
others. Those in authority are accountable for the policies they pursue and
the instructions they lay down. And those who acquiesce in carrying out
unjust commands or in abetting evil designs cannot in general plead that
they did not know better or that the fault rests solely with those in higher
positions. The details concerning these matters belong to partial compli-
ance theory. The essential point here is that the principles that best con-
form to our nature as free and equal rational beings themselves establish
our accountability. Otherwise autonomy is likely to lead to a mere colli-
sion of self-righteous wills, and objectivity to the adherence to a consis-
tent yet idiosyncratic system.
Here we should note that in times of social doubt and loss of faith in
long established values, there is a tendency to fall back on the virtues of
integrity: truthfulness and sincerity, lucidity and commitment, or, as some
say, authenticity. If no one knows what is true, at least we can make our
beliefs our own in our own way and not adopt them as handed to us by
others. If the traditional moral rules are no longer relevant and we cannot
agree which ones should take their place, we can in any event decide with
a clear head how we mean to act and stop pretending that somehow or
other it is already decided for us and we must accept this or that authority.
Now of course the virtues of integrity are virtues, and among the excel-
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lences of free persons. Yet while necessary, they are not sufficient; for
their definition allows for most any content: a tyrant might display these
attributes to a high degree, and by doing so exhibit a certain charm, not
deceiving himself by political pretenses and excuses of fortune. It is
impossible to construct a moral view from these virtues alone; being
virtues of form they are in a sense secondary. But joined to the appropri-
ate conception of justice, one that allows for autonomy and objectivity
correctly understood, they come into their own. The idea of the original
position, and the principles chosen there, show how this is achieved.
In conclusion then a well-ordered society affirms the autonomy of
persons and encourages the objectivity of their considered judgments of
justice. Any doubts that its members may entertain about the soundness
of their moral sentiments when they reflect upon how these dispositions
were acquired may be dispelled by seeing that their convictions match the
principles which would be chosen in the original position or, if they do
not, by revising their judgments so that they do.
79. THE IDEA OF SOCIAL UNION
79. The Idea of Social Union
We have already seen that despite the individualistic features of justice as
fairness, the two principles of justice provide an Archimedean point for
appraising existing institutions as well as the desires and aspirations
which they generate. These criteria provide an independent standard for
guiding the course of social change without invoking a perfectionist or an
organic conception of society (§41). But the question remains whether
the contract doctrine is a satisfactory framework for understanding the
values of community and for choosing among social arrangements to
realize them. It is natural to conjecture that the congruence of the right
and the good depends in large part upon whether a well-ordered society
achieves the good of community. I shall take up several aspects of this
question in this and the three following sections.
We may begin by recalling that one of the conditions of the original
position is that the parties know that they are subject to the circumstances
of justice. They assume that each has a conception of his good in the light
of which he presses claims against the rest. So although they view society
as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, it is typically marked by a
conflict as well as by an identity of interests. Now there are two ways of
viewing these suppositions. The first is that taken by the theory of justice:
the idea is to derive satisfactory principles from the weakest possible
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assumptions. The premises of the theory should be simple and reasonable
conditions that everyone or most everyone would grant, and for which
convincing philosophical arguments can be given. At the same time, the
greater the initial collision of claims into which the principles can intro-
duce an acceptable order, the more comprehensive the theory is likely to
be. Therefore a deep opposition of interests is presumed to obtain.
The other way to think of these suppositions is to regard them as
describing a certain kind of social order, or a certain aspect of the basic
structure that is actually realized. Thus we are led to the notion of private
society.
3
Its chief features are first that the persons comprising it, whether
they are human individuals or associations, have their own private ends
which are either competing or independent, but not in any case comple-
mentary. And second, institutions are not thought to have any value in
themselves, the activity of engaging in them not being counted as a good
but if anything as a burden. Thus each person assesses social arrange-
ments solely as a means to his private aims. No one takes account of the
good of others, or of what they possess; rather everyone prefers the most
efficient scheme that gives him the largest share of assets. (Expressed
more formally, the only variables in an individual’s utility function are
commodities and assets held by him, and not items possessed by others
nor their level of utility.)
We may suppose also that the actual division of advantages is deter-
mined largely by the balance of power and strategic position resulting
from existing circumstances. Yet this division may of course be perfectly
fair and satisfy the claims of mutuality. By good fortune the situation may
happen to lead to this outcome. Public goods consist largely of those
instrumentalities and conditions maintained by the state for everyone to
use for his own purposes as his means permit, in the same manner that
each has his own destination when traveling along the highways. The
theory of competitive markets is a paradigm description of this type of
society. Since the members of this society are not moved by the desire to
act justly, the stability of just and efficient arrangements when they exist
normally requires the use of sanctions. Therefore the alignment of private
and collective interests is the result of stabilizing institutional devices
applied to persons who oppose one another as indifferent if not hostile
3. The notion of private society, or something like it, is found in many places. Well-known
examples are in Plato,