A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

Philosophy, Politics, and Society,
second series,
ed. Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1962), pp. 129–131; and W. G.
Runciman, 
Relative Deprivation and Social Justice
(London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966),
pp. 274–284.
447
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position.
34
But how far should this tendency be carried? It seems that even
when fair opportunity (as it has been defined) is satisfied, the family will
lead to unequal chances between individuals (§46). Is the family to be
abolished then? Taken by itself and given a certain primacy, the idea of
equal opportunity inclines in this direction. But within the context of the
theory of justice as a whole, there is much less urgency to take this
course. The acknowledgment of the difference principle redefines the
grounds for social inequalities as conceived in the system of liberal equal-
ity; and when the principles of fraternity and redress are allowed their
appropriate weight, the natural distribution of assets and the contingen-
cies of social circumstances can more easily be accepted. We are more
ready to dwell upon our good fortune now that these differences are made
to work to our advantage, rather than to be downcast by how much better
off we might have been had we had an equal chance along with others if
only all social barriers had been removed. The conception of justice,
should it be truly effective and publicly recognized as such, seems more
likely than its rivals to transform our perspective on the social world and
to reconcile us to the dispositions of the natural order and the conditions
of human life.
Last of all, we should recall here the limits of a theory of justice. Not
only are many aspects of morality left aside, but no account is given of
right conduct in regard to animals and the rest of nature. A conception of
justice is but one part of a moral view. While I have not maintained that
the capacity for a sense of justice is necessary in order to be owed the
duties of justice, it does seem that we are not required to give strict justice
anyway to creatures lacking this capacity. But it does not follow that
there are no requirements at all in regard to them, nor in our relations
with the natural order. Certainly it is wrong to be cruel to animals and the
destruction of a whole species can be a great evil. The capacity for
feelings of pleasure and pain and for the forms of life of which animals
are capable clearly imposes duties of compassion and humanity in their
case. I shall not attempt to explain these considered beliefs. They are
outside the scope of the theory of justice, and it does not seem possible to
extend the contract doctrine so as to include them in a natural way. A
correct conception of our relations to animals and to nature would seem
to depend upon a theory of the natural order and our place in it. One of
the tasks of metaphysics is to work out a view of the world which is
suited for this purpose; it should identify and systematize the truths deci-
34. See Williams, ibid., pp. 125–129.
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sive for these questions. How far justice as fairness will have to be revised
to fit into this larger theory it is impossible to say. But it seems reasonable
to hope that if it is sound as an account of justice among persons, it
cannot be too far wrong when these broader relationships are taken into
consideration.
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CHAPTER IX. THE GOOD OF JUSTICE
In this chapter I take up the second and last part of the problem of
stability. This concerns the question whether justice as fairness and good-
ness as rationality are congruent. It remains to be shown that given the
circumstances of a well-ordered society, a person’s rational plan of life
supports and affirms his sense of justice. I approach this problem by
discussing in turn the various desiderata of a well-ordered society and the
ways in which its just arrangements contribute to the good of its mem-
bers. Thus I note first that such a society allows for persons’ autonomy
and the objectivity of their judgments of right and justice. I indicate next
how justice combines with the ideal of social union, mitigates the propen-
sity to envy and spite, and defines an equilibrium in which the priority of
liberty obtains. Finally, by an examination of the contrast between justice
as fairness and hedonistic utilitarianism, I attempt to show how just
institutions provide for the unity of the self and enable human beings to
express their nature as free and equal moral persons. Taking these fea-
tures together, I then argue that in a well-ordered society an effective
sense of justice belongs to a person’s good, and so tendencies to instabil-
ity are kept in check if not eliminated.
78. AUTONOMY AND OBJECTIVITY
78. Autonomy and Objectivity
Before taking up the various features of a well-ordered society, I should
emphasize that I am concerned with the problem of congruence only for
this social form. We are therefore still limiting ourselves to strict compli-
ance theory. Yet this case is the first one to examine, for if congruence
fails for a well-ordered society it seems bound to fail everywhere. On the
other hand, it is by no means a foregone conclusion even in this instance
that the right and the good are congruent. For this relation implies that the
members of a well-ordered society, when they appraise their plan of life
450

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by the principles of rational choice, will decide to maintain their sense of
justice as regulative of their conduct toward one another. The requisite
match exists between the principles of justice that would be agreed to in
the absence of information and the principles of rational choice that are
not chosen at all and applied with full knowledge. Principles accounted
for in strikingly different ways nevertheless fit together when those of
justice are perfectly realized. Of course, this congruence has its explana-
tion in how the contract doctrine is set up. But the relation is not a matter
of course and its basis needs to be worked out.
I shall proceed by examining a number of features of a well-ordered
society which all told lead rational persons to confirm their sense of
justice. The argument is cumulative and depends upon a convergence of
observations the force of which is not summed up until later (§86).
I begin by noting that we sometimes doubt the soundness of our moral
attitudes when we reflect on their psychological origins. Thinking that
these sentiments have arisen in situations marked say by submission
to authority, we may wonder whether they should not be rejected alto-
gether. Since the argument for the good of justice depends upon the
members of a well-ordered society having an effective desire to act justly,
we must allay these uncertainties. Imagine then that someone experiences
the promptings of his moral sense as inexplicable inhibitions which for
the moment he is unable to justify. Why should he not regard them as
simply neurotic compulsions? If it should turn out that these scruples are
indeed largely shaped and accounted for by the contingencies of early
childhood, perhaps by the course of our family history and class situation,
and that there is nothing to add on their behalf, then there is surely no
reason why they should govern our lives. But of course to someone in a
well-ordered society there are many things to say. One can point out to
him the essential features of the development of the sentiment of justice
and how eventually the morality of principles is to be understood. More-
over his moral education itself has been regulated by the principles of
right and justice to which he would consent in an initial situation in which
all have equal representation as moral persons. As we have seen, the
moral conception adopted is independent of natural contingencies and ac-
cidental social circumstances; and therefore the psychological processes
by which his moral sense has been acquired conform to principles that he
himself would choose under conditions that he would concede are fair
and undistorted by fortune and happenstance.
Nor can someone in a well-ordered society object to the practices of
moral instruction that inculcate a sense of justice. For in agreeing to
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principles of right the parties in the original position at the same time
consent to the arrangements necessary to make these principles effective
in their conduct. Indeed, the adaptability of these arrangements to the
limitations of human nature is an important consideration in choosing a
conception of justice. Thus no one’s moral convictions are the result of
coercive indoctrination. Instruction is throughout as reasoned as the de-
velopment of understanding permits, just as the natural duty of mutual
respect requires. None of the ideals, principles, and precepts upheld in the
society takes unfair advantage of human weakness. A person’s sense of
justice is not a compulsive psychological mechanism cleverly installed by
those in authority in order to insure his unswerving compliance with rules
designed to advance their interests. Nor is the process of education sim-
ply a causal sequence intended to bring about as an end result the appro-
priate moral sentiments. As far as possible each stage foreshadows in its
teaching and explanations the conception of right and justice at which it
aims and by reference to which we will later recognize that the moral
standards presented to us are justified.
These observations are evident consequences of the contract doctrine
and the fact that its principles regulate the practices of moral instruction
in a well-ordered society. Following the Kantian interpretation of justice
as fairness, we can say that by acting from these principles persons are
acting autonomously: they are acting from principles that they would
acknowledge under conditions that best express their nature as free and
equal rational beings. To be sure, these conditions also reflect the situ-
ation of individuals in the world and their being subject to the circum-
stances of justice. But this simply means that the conception of autonomy
is that fitting for human beings; the notion suited to superior or inferior
natures is most likely different (§40). Thus moral education is education
for autonomy. In due course everyone will know why he would adopt the
principles of justice and how they are derived from the conditions that
characterize his being an equal in a society of moral persons. It follows
that in accepting these principles on this basis we are not influenced
primarily by tradition and authority, or the opinions of others. However
necessary these agencies may be in order for us to reach complete under-
standing, we eventually come to hold a conception of right on reasonable
grounds that we can set out independently for ourselves.
Now on the contract view the notions of autonomy and objectivity are
compatible: there is no antinomy between freedom and reason.
1
Both au-
1. The question of the compatibility of autonomy and objectivity is discussed by H. D. Aiken in his
452
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tonomy and objectivity are characterized in a consistent way by reference
to the original position. The idea of the initial situation is central to the
whole theory and other basic notions are defined in terms of it. Thus
acting autonomously is acting from principles that we would consent to
as free and equal rational beings, and that we are to understand in this
way. Also, these principles are objective. They are the principles that we
would want everyone (including ourselves) to follow were we to take
up together the appropriate general point of view. The original position
defines this perspective, and its conditions also embody those of objectiv-
ity: its stipulations express the restrictions on arguments that force us to
consider the choice of principles unencumbered by the singularities of the
circumstances in which we find ourselves. The veil of ignorance prevents
us from shaping our moral view to accord with our own particular attach-
ments and interests. We do not look at the social order from our situation
but take up a point of view that everyone can adopt on an equal footing.
In this sense we look at our society and our place in it objectively: we
share a common standpoint along with others and do not make our judg-
ments from a personal slant. Thus our moral principles and convictions
are objective to the extent that they have been arrived at and tested by
assuming this general standpoint and by assessing the arguments for them
by the restrictions expressed by the conception of the original position.
The judicial virtues such as impartiality and considerateness are the ex-
cellences of intellect and sensibility that enable us to do these things well.
One consequence of trying to be objective, of attempting to frame our
moral conceptions and judgments from a shared point of view, is that we
are more likely to reach agreement. Indeed, other things equal, the pre-
ferred description of the initial situation is that which introduces the
greatest convergence of opinion. It is partly for this reason that we accept
the constraints of a common standpoint, since we cannot reasonably
expect our views to fall into line when they are affected by the contingen-
cies of our different circumstances. But of course our judgments will not
coincide on all questions, and in fact many if not most social issues
may still be insoluble, especially if viewed in their full complexity. This
is why the numerous simplifications of justice as fairness are acknowl-
edged. We have only to recall the reasons for such notions as the veil of
ignorance, pure procedural justice (as opposed to allocative justice), lexi-
essay “The Concept of Moral Objectivity,” in