A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

particular occasions. I wish to clarify the connection between moral sen-
timents, attitudes, and feelings, and the relevant moral principles.
The main features of moral sentiments can perhaps be best elucidated
by considering the various questions that arise in trying to characterize
them and the various feelings in which they are manifested.
17
It is worth-
while to observe the ways in which they are distinguished both from each
other and from those natural attitudes and feelings with which they are
likely to be confused. Thus, first of all, there are such questions as the
following: (a) What are the linguistic expressions that are used to give
voice to having a particular moral feeling, and the significant variations,
if any, in these expressions? (b) What are the characteristic behavioral
indications of a given feeling, and what are the ways in which a person
typically betrays how he feels? (c) What are the characteristic sensations
and kinesthetic feelings, if any, that are connected with moral emotions?
When a person is angry, for example, he may feel hot; he may tremble
and experience a tightening of the stomach. He may be unable to speak
17. These questions are suggested by applying to the concept of the moral feelings the kind of
inquiry carried out by Wittgenstein in the 
Philosophical Investigations
(Oxford, Basil Blackwell,
1953). See also, for example, G. E. M. Anscombe, “Pretending,” 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian So-
ciety,
supp. vol. 32 (1958), pp. 285–289; Phillipa Foot, “Moral Beliefs,” 
Proceedings of the Aristote-
lian Society,
vol. 59 (1958–1959), pp. 86–89; and George Pitcher, “On Approval,” 
Philosophical
Review,
vol. 67 (1958). See also B. A. O. Williams, “Morality and the Emotions,” 
Inaugural Lecture,
Bedford College, University of London, 1965. It may be a difficulty with the emotive theory of ethics
as presented by C. L. Stevenson in 
Ethics and Language
(New Haven, Yale University Press, 1944)
that it cannot identify and distinguish the moral from the nonmoral feelings. For a discussion of this
question, see W. P. Alston, “Moral Attitudes and Moral Judgments,” 
Nous,
vol. 2 (1968).
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without his voice shaking; and perhaps he cannot suppress certain ges-
tures. If there are such characteristic sensations and behavioral manifesta-
tions for a moral feeling, these do not constitute the feeling of guilt,
shame, indignation, or whatever. Such characteristic sensations and mani-
festations are neither necessary nor sufficient in particular instances for
someone to feel guilty, ashamed, or indignant. This is not to deny that
some characteristic sensations and behavioral manifestations of distur-
bance may be necessary if one is to be overwhelmed by feelings of guilt,
shame, or indignation. But to have these feelings it is often sufficient that
a person sincerely say that he feels guilty, ashamed or indignant, and that
he is prepared to give an appropriate explanation of why he feels as he
does (assuming of course that he accepts this explanation as correct).
This last consideration introduces the main question in distinguishing
the moral feelings from other emotions and from each other, namely: (d)
What is the definitive type of explanation required for having a moral
feeling, and how do these explanations differ from one feeling to another?
Thus when we ask someone why he feels guilty, what sort of answer do
we want? Certainly not any reply is acceptable. A reference merely to
expected punishment is not enough; this might account for fear or anxi-
ety, but not for guilt feelings. Similarly, mention of harms or misadven-
tures that have fallen upon oneself as a consequence of one’s past actions
explains feelings of regret but not those of guilt, and much less those of
remorse. To be sure, fear and anxiety often accompany feelings of guilt
for obvious reasons, but these emotions must not be confused with the
moral feelings. We should not suppose, then, that the experience of guilt
is somehow a mixture of fear, anxiety, and regret. Anxiety and fear are not
moral feelings at all, and regret is connected with some view of our own
good, being occasioned, say, by failures to further our interests in sensible
ways. Even such phenomena as neurotic guilt feelings, and other devia-
tions from the standard case, are accepted as feelings of guilt and not
simply as irrational fears and anxieties because of the special type of
explanation for the departure from the norm. It is always supposed in
such cases that a deeper psychological investigation will uncover (or has
uncovered) the relevant similarity to other guilt feelings.
In general, it is a necessary feature of moral feelings, and part of what
distinguishes them from the natural attitudes, that the person’s explana-
tion of his experience invokes a moral concept and its associated princi-
ples. His account of his feeling makes reference to an acknowledged right
or wrong. When we question this, we are likely to offer various forms of
guilt feelings as counterexamples. This is easy to understand since the
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earliest forms of guilt feelings are those of authority guilt, and we are
unlikely to grow up without having what one may call residue guilt
feelings. For example, a person raised in a strict religious sect may have
been taught that going to the theater is wrong. While he no longer be-
lieves this, he tells us that he still feels guilty when attending the theater.
But these are not proper guilt feelings, since he is not about to apologize
to anyone, or to resolve not to see another play, and so on. Indeed, he
should say rather that he has certain sensations and feelings of uneasi-
ness, and the like, which resemble those which he has when he feels
guilty. Assuming, then, the soundness of the contract view, the explana-
tion of some moral feelings relies on principles of right that would be
chosen in the original position, while the other moral feelings are related
to the concept of goodness. For example, a person feels guilty because he
knows that he has taken more than his share (as defined by some just
scheme), or has treated others unfairly. Or a person feels ashamed be-
cause he has been cowardly and not spoken out. He has failed to live up to
a conception of moral worth which he has set himself to achieve (§68).
What distinguishes the moral feelings from one another are the principles
and faults which their explanations typically invoke. For the most part,
the characteristic sensations and behavioral manifestations are the same,
being psychological disturbances and having the common features of
these.
It is worthwhile to note that the same action may give rise to several
moral feelings at once provided that, as is often the case, the appropriate
explanation for each one can be given (§67). For example, a person who
cheats may feel both guilty and ashamed: guilty because he has violated a
trust and unfairly advanced himself, his guilt being in answer to the
injuries done to others; ashamed because by resorting to such means he
has convicted himself in his own eyes (and in those of others) as weak
and untrustworthy, as someone who resorts to unfair and covert means to
further his ends. These explanations appeal to different principles and
values, thus distinguishing the corresponding feelings; but both explana-
tions frequently apply. We may add here that for a person to have a moral
feeling, it is not necessary that everything asserted in his explanation be
true; it is sufficient that he accepts the explanation. Someone may be in
error, then, in thinking that he has taken more than his share. He may not
be guilty. Nevertheless, he feels guilty since his explanation is of the right
sort, and although mistaken, the beliefs he expresses are sincere.
Next, there is a group of questions concerning the relation of moral
attitudes to action: (e) What are the characteristic intentions, endeavors,
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and inclinations of a person experiencing a given feeling? What sorts of
things does he want to do, or find himself unable to do? An angry man
characteristically tries to strike back, or to block the purposes of the
person at whom he is angry. When plagued by feelings of guilt, say, a
person wishes to act properly in the future and strives to modify his
conduct accordingly. He is inclined to admit what he has done and to ask
for reinstatement, and to acknowledge and accept reproofs and penalties;
and he finds himself less able to condemn others when they behave
wrongly. The particular situation will determine which of these disposi-
tions are realized; and we may also suppose that the family of disposi-
tions which may be elicited varies according to the morality of the indi-
vidual. It is clear, for example, that the typical expressions of guilt and the
appropriate explanations will be quite different as the ideals and roles of
the morality of association become more complex and demanding; and
these feelings in turn will be distinct from the emotions connected with
the morality of principles. In justice as fairness, these variations are
accounted for in the first instance by the content of the corresponding
moral view. The structure of precepts, ideals, and principles shows what
sorts of explanations are required.
Further, we can ask: (f) What emotions and responses does a person
having a particular feeling expect on the part of other persons? How does
he anticipate that they will react toward him, as this is shown, say, in
various characteristic distortions in his interpretation of others’ conduct
toward him? Thus, one who feels guilty, recognizing his action as a
transgression of the legitimate claims of others, expects them to resent his
conduct and to penalize him in various ways. He also assumes that third