A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

Socialization and Society,
ed. J. A. Clausen (Boston, Little, Brown, 1968), and Hoffman, “Moral
Development,” pp. 282–319.
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expresses doubt and distrust, and a certain arrogance and tendency to
suspicion. Clearly the morality of authority must be subordinate to the
principles of right and justice which alone can determine when these
extreme requirements, or analogous constraints, are justified. The child’s
morality of authority is temporary, a necessity arising from his peculiar
situation and limited understanding. Moreover, the theological parallel is
a special case which, in view of the principle of equal liberty, does not
apply to the basic structure of society (§33). Thus the morality of author-
ity has but a restricted role in fundamental social arrangements and can
be justified only when the unusual demands of the practice in question
make it essential to give certain individuals the prerogatives of leadership
and command. In all cases, the scope of this morality is governed by the
principles of justice.
71. THE MORALITY OF ASSOCIATION
71. The Morality of Association
The second stage of moral development is that of the morality of associa-
tion. This stage covers a wide range of cases depending on the association
in question and it may even include the national community as a whole.
Whereas the child’s morality of authority consists largely of a collection
of precepts, the content of the morality of association is given by the
moral standards appropriate to the individual’s role in the various associa-
tions to which he belongs. These standards include the common sense
rules of morality along with the adjustments required to fit them to a
person’s particular position; and they are impressed upon him by the
approval and disapproval of those in authority, or by the other members of
the group. Thus at this stage the family itself is viewed as a small associa-
tion, normally characterized by a definite hierarchy, in which each mem-
ber has certain rights and duties. As the child becomes older he is taught
the standards of conduct suitable for one in his station. The virtues of a
good son or a good daughter are explained, or at least conveyed by
parental expectations as shown in their approvals and disapprovals. Simi-
larly there is the association of the school and the neighborhood, and also
such short-term forms of cooperation, though not less important for this,
as games and play with peers. Corresponding to these arrangements one
learns the virtues of a good student and classmate, and the ideals of a
good sport and companion. This type of moral view extends to the ideals
adopted in later life, and so to one’s various adult statuses and occupa-
tions, one’s family position, and even to one’s place as a member of
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71. The Morality of Association

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society. The content of these ideals is given by the various conceptions of
a good wife and husband, a good friend and citizen, and so on. Thus the
morality of association includes a large number of ideals each defined in
ways suitable for the respective status or role. Our moral understanding
increases as we move in the course of life through a sequence of posi-
tions. The corresponding sequence of ideals requires increasingly greater
intellectual judgment and finer moral discriminations. Clearly some of
these ideals are also more comprehensive than others and make quite
different demands upon the individual. As we shall see, having to follow
certain ideals quite naturally leads up to a morality of principles.
Now each particular ideal is presumably explained in the context of the
aims and purposes of the association to which the role or position in
question belongs. In due course a person works out a conception of the
whole system of cooperation that defines the association and the ends
which it serves. He knows that others have different things to do depend-
ing upon their place in the cooperative scheme. Thus he eventually learns
to take up their point of view and to see things from their perspective. It
seems plausible, then, that acquiring a morality of association (repre-
sented by some structure of ideals) rests upon the development of the
intellectual skills required to regard things from a variety of points of
view and to think of these together as aspects of one system of coopera-
tion. In fact, when we consider it, the requisite array of abilities is quite
complex.
11
First of all, we must recognize that these different points of
view exist, that the perspectives of others are not the same as ours. But we
must not only learn that things look different to them, but that they have
different wants and ends, and different plans and motives; and we must
learn how to gather these facts from their speech, conduct, and counte-
nance. Next, we need to identify the definitive features of these perspec-
tives, what it is that others largely want and desire, what are their control-
ling beliefs and opinions. Only in this way can we understand and assess
their actions, intentions, and motives. Unless we can identify these lead-
ing elements, we cannot put ourselves into another’s place and find out
what we would do in his position. To work out these things, we must, of
course, know what the other person’s perspective really is. But finally,
having understood another’s situation, it still remains for us to regulate
our own conduct in the appropriate way by reference to it.
Doing these things to a certain minimum degree at least comes easily
11. For the following remarks, I am indebted to John Flavell, 
The Development of Role-Taking and
Communication Skills in Children
(New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1968), pp. 208–211. See also
G. H. Mead, 
Mind, Self and Society
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1934), pp. 135–164.
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to adults, but it is difficult for children. No doubt this explains in part why
the precepts of the child’s primitive morality of authority are usually
expressed in terms referring to external behavior, and why motives and
intentions are largely neglected by children in their appraisal of actions.
The child has not yet mastered the art of perceiving the person of others,
that is, the art of discerning their beliefs, intentions, and feelings, so that
an awareness of these things cannot inform his interpretation of their
behavior. Moreover, his ability to put himself in their place is still untu-
tored and likely to lead him astray. It is no surprise, then, that these
elements, so important from the final moral point of view, are left out of
account at the earliest stage.
12
But this lack is gradually overcome as we
assume a succession of more demanding roles with their more complex
schemes of rights and duties. The corresponding ideals require us to view
things from a greater multiplicity of perspectives as the conception of the
basic structure implies.
I have touched upon these aspects of intellectual development for the
sake of completeness. I cannot consider them in any detail, but we should
note that they obviously have a central place in the acquisition of moral
views. How well the art of perceiving the person is learned is bound to
affect one’s moral sensibility; and it is equally important to understand
the intricacies of social cooperation. But these abilities are not sufficient.
Someone whose designs are purely manipulative, and who wishes to
exploit others for his own advantage, must likewise, if he lacks over-
whelming force, possess these skills. The tricks of persuasion and games-
manship call upon the same intellectual accomplishments. We must, then,
examine how we become attached to our fellow associates and later to
social arrangements generally. Consider the case of an association the
public rules of which are known by all to be just. Now how does it come
about that those taking part in the arrangement are bound by ties of
friendship and mutual trust and that they rely on one another to do their