gaged in it to satisfy, the appropriate principles of justice. We must try to
assess the relative stability of these systems.
Now I assume that the
boundaries of these schemes are given by the notion of a self-contained
national community. This supposition is not relaxed until the derivation
of the principles of justice for the law of nations (§58), but the wider
problems of international law I shall not further discuss. It is also essen-
tial to note that in the present case equilibrium and stability are to be
defined with respect to the justice of the basic structure and the moral
conduct of individuals. The stability of a conception of justice does not
imply that the institutions and practices of the well-ordered society do not
alter. In fact, such a society will presumably
contain great diversity and
adopt different arrangements from time to time. In this context stability
means that however institutions are changed, they still remain just or
approximately so, as adjustments are made in view of new social circum-
stances. The inevitable deviations from justice are effectively corrected or
held within tolerable bounds by forces within the system. Among these
forces I assume that the sense of justice shared by the members of the
community has a fundamental role. To some degree, then, moral senti-
ments are necessary to insure that the basic structure
is stable with respect
to justice.
I now turn to how these sentiments are formed, and on this question
there are, broadly speaking, two main traditions. The first stems histori-
cally from the doctrine of empiricism and is found in the utilitarians from
Hume to Sidgwick. In its most recent and developed form it is repre-
sented by social learning theory. One main contention is that the aim of
moral training is to supply missing motives: the desire to do what is right
for
its own sake, and the desire not to do what is wrong. Right conduct is
conduct generally beneficial to others and to society (as defined by the
principle of utility) for the doing of which we commonly lack an effective
motive, whereas wrong conduct is behavior generally injurious to others
and to society for the doing of which we often have a sufficient motive.
Society must somehow make good these defects. This is achieved by the
approbation and disapprobation of parents and of others in authority, who
when necessary use rewards and punishments ranging from bestowal and
withdrawal of affection to the administration of pleasures and pains.
Eventually by various psychological processes we acquire a desire to do
what is right and an aversion to doing what is wrong.
A second thesis is
that the desire to conform to moral standards is normally aroused early in
life before we achieve an adequate understanding of the reasons for these
norms. Indeed some persons may never grasp the grounds for them in the
401
69. A Well-Ordered Society
utilitarian principle.
4
The consequence is that our subsequent moral senti-
ments are likely to bear the scars of this early training which shapes more
or less roughly our original nature.
Freud’s theory is similar in important respects to this view. He holds
that the processes by which the child comes to have moral attitudes center
around the oedipal situation and the deep conflicts to which it gives rise.
The moral precepts insisted upon by those in authority (in this case the
parents) are accepted by the child as the best way to resolve his anxieties,
and the resulting attitudes represented by the
superego are likely to be
harsh and punitive reflecting the stresses of the oedipal phase.
5
Thus
Freud’s account supports the two points that an essential part of moral
learning occurs early in life before a reasoned basis for morality can be
understood, and that it involves the acquisition of new motives by psy-
chological processes marked by conflict and stress. Indeed, his doctrine is
a dramatic illustration of these features. It follows that since parents and
others in authority are bound to be in various ways misguided and self-
seeking in their use of praise and blame,
and rewards and punishments
generally, our earlier and unexamined moral attitudes are likely to be in
important respects irrational and without justification. Moral advance in
later life consists partly in correcting these attitudes in the light of what-
ever principles we finally acknowledge to be sound.
The other tradition of moral learning derives from rationalist thought
and is illustrated by Rousseau and Kant, and sometimes by J. S. Mill, and
more recently by the theory of Piaget. Moral learning is not so much a
matter of supplying missing motives as one of the free development of
our innate intellectual and emotional capacities according to their natural
bent. Once the powers of understanding
mature and persons come to
recognize their place in society and are able to take up the standpoint of
others, they appreciate the mutual benefits of establishing fair terms of
social cooperation. We have a natural sympathy with other persons and an
4. This sketch of moral learning draws from James Mill, the section of the
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