A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

particular form of well-ordered society. These steps I take to be identified
by the main structural features of the complete scheme of principles,
ideals, and precepts, as these are applied to social arrangements. As I
shall explain, we are led to distinguish between the moralities of author-
ity, of association, and of principles. The account of moral development
is tied throughout to the conception of justice which is to be learned,
and therefore presupposes the plausibility if not the correctness of this
theory.
8
A caveat is apropos here similar to that I made before in regard to the
remarks on economic theory (§42). We want the psychological account
of moral learning to be true and in accordance with existing knowledge.
But of course it is impossible to take the details into account; I sketch at
best only the main outlines. One must keep in mind that the purpose of
the following discussion is to examine the question of stability and to
8. While the view of moral development to follow in §§70–72 is designed to fit the theory of
justice, I have borrowed from several sources. The idea of three stages the content of which is given
by precepts, role ideals, and principles is similar to William McDougall, 
An Introduction to Social
Psychology
(London, Methuen, 1908), chs. VII–VIII. Piaget’s 
The Moral Judgment of the Child
suggested to me the contrast between the morality of authority and the moralities of association and
principles, and much of the description of these stages. See also Kohlberg’s further elaboration of this
type of theory in the references cited in note 6 above, esp. pp. 369–389, on his six stages. In the last
several paragraphs of §75 I note some differences between the view I present and these writers.
Concerning Kohlberg’s theory, I should add here that I believe the morality of association is parallel
to his stages three to five. Development within this stage is being able to assume more complex,
demanding, and comprehensive roles. But more important, I assume that the final stage, the morality
of principles, may have different contents given by any of the traditional philosophical doctrines
we have discussed. It is true that I argue for the theory of justice as superior, and work out the
psychological theory on this presumption; but this superiority is a philosophical question and cannot,
I believe, be established by the psychological theory of development alone.
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contrast the psychological roots of the various conceptions of justice.
The crucial point is how the general facts of moral psychology affect
the choice of principles in the original position. Unless the psychologi-
cal account is defective in a way that would call into question the ac-
knowledgment of the principles of justice rather than the standard of
utility, say, no irreparable difficulty should ensue. I also hope that none
of the further uses of psychological theory will prove too wide of the
mark. Particularly important among these is the account of the basis
of equality.
70. THE MORALITY OF AUTHORITY
70. The Morality of Authority
The first stage in the sequence of moral development I shall refer to as the
morality of authority. While certain aspects of this morality are preserved
at later stages for special occasions, we can regard the morality of author-
ity in its primitive form as that of the child. I assume that the sense
of justice is acquired gradually by the younger members of society as
they grow up. The succession of generations and the necessity to teach
moral attitudes (however simple) to children is one of the conditions of
human life.
Now I shall assume that the basic structure of a well-ordered society
includes the family in some form, and therefore that children are at first
subject to the legitimate authority of their parents. Of course, in a broader
inquiry the institution of the family might be questioned, and other ar-
rangements might indeed prove to be preferable. But presumably the
account of the morality of authority could, if necessary, be adjusted to fit
these different schemes. In any event, it is characteristic of the child’s
situation that he is not in a position to assess the validity of the precepts
and injunctions addressed to him by those in authority, in this case his
parents. He lacks both the knowledge and the understanding on the basis
of which their guidance can be challenged. Indeed, the child lacks the
concept of justification altogether, this being acquired much later. There-
fore he cannot with reason doubt the propriety of parental injunctions.
But since we are assuming that the society is well-ordered we may sup-
pose, so as to avoid needless complications, that these precepts are on the
whole justified. They accord with a reasonable interpretation of familial
duties as defined by the principles of justice.
The parents, we may suppose, love the child and in time the child
comes to love and to trust his parents. How does this change in the child
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come about? To answer this question I assume the following psychologi-
cal principle: the child comes to love the parents only if they manifestly
first love him.
9
Thus the child’s actions are motivated initially by certain
instincts and desires, and his aims are regulated (if at all) by rational
self-interest (in a suitably restricted sense). Although the child has the
potentiality for love, his love of the parents is a new desire brought about
by his recognizing their evident love of him and his benefiting from the
actions in which their love is expressed.
The parents’ love of the child is expressed in their evident intention to
care for him, to do for him as his rational self-love would incline, and in
the fulfillment of these intentions. Their love is displayed by their taking
pleasure in his presence and supporting his sense of competence and
self-esteem. They encourage his efforts to master the tasks of growing up
and they welcome his assuming his own place. In general, to love another
means not only to be concerned for his wants and needs, but to affirm his
sense of the worth of his own person. Eventually, then, the love of the
parents for the child gives rise to his love in return. The child’s love does
not have a rational instrumental explanation: he does not love them as a
means to achieve his initial self-interested ends. With this aim in view he
could conceivably act as if he loved them, but his doing so would not
constitute a transformation of his original desires. By the stated psycho-
logical principle, a new affection is in time called into being by the
evident love of the parents.
There are several ways in which this psychological law may be ana-
lyzed into further elements. Thus it is unlikely that the child’s recognition
of parental affection causes directly a returning sentiment. We may con-
jecture several other steps as follows: when the parents’ love of the child
is recognized by him on the basis of their evident intentions, the child is
assured of his worth as a person. He is made aware that he is appreciated
for his own sake by what are to him the imposing and powerful persons in
his world. He experiences parental affection as unconditional; they care
for his presence and spontaneous acts, and the pleasure they take in him is
not dependent upon disciplined performances that contribute to the well-
being of others. In due course, the child comes to trust his parents and to
have confidence in his surroundings; and this leads him to launch out and
to test his maturing abilities, all the while supported by their affection and
9. The formulation of this psychological law is drawn from Rousseau’s 
Emile,
p. 174. Rousseau
says that while we like from the start what contributes to our preservation, this attachment is quite
unconscious and instinctive. “Ce que transforme cet instinct en sentiment, l’attachement en amour,
l’aversion en haine, c’est l’intention manifestée de nous nuire ou de nous être utile.”
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encouragement. Gradually he acquires various skills and develops a sense
of competence that affirms his self-esteem. It is in the course of this
whole process that the child’s affection for his parents develops. He
connects them with the success and enjoyment that he has had in sustain-
ing his world, and with his sense of his own worth. And this brings about
his love for them.
We must now consider how the child’s love and trust will show itself.
At this point it is necessary to keep in mind the peculiar features of the
authority situation. The child does not have his own standards of criti-
cism, since he is not in a position to reject precepts on rational grounds. If
he loves and trusts his parents, he will tend to accept their injunctions. He
will also strive to be like them, assuming that they are indeed worthy of
esteem and adhere to the precepts which they enjoin. They exemplify, let
us suppose, superior knowledge and power, and set forth appealing exam-
ples of what is demanded. The child, therefore, accepts their judgment of
him and he will be inclined to judge himself as they do when he violates
their injunctions. At the same time, of course, his desires exceed the
bonds of what is permitted, for otherwise there would be no need for
these precepts. Thus parental norms are experienced as constraints and
the child may rebel against them. After all, he may see no reason why he
should comply with them; they are in themselves arbitrary prohibitions
and he has no original tendency to do the things he is told to do. Yet if he
does love and trust his parents, then, once he has given in to temptation,
he is disposed to share their attitude toward his misdemeanors. He will be
inclined to confess his transgression and to seek reconciliation. In these
various inclinations are manifested the feelings of (authority) guilt. With-
out these and related inclinations, feelings of guilt would not exist. But it
is also true that the absence of these feelings would indicate a lack of love
and trust. For given the nature of the authority situation and the principles
of moral psychology connecting the ethical and the natural attitudes, love
and trust will give rise to feelings of guilt once the parental injunctions
are disobeyed. Admittedly in the case of the child it is sometimes difficult
to distinguish feelings of guilt from the fear of punishment, and espe-
cially from the dread of the loss of parental love and affection. The child
lacks the concepts for understanding moral distinctions and this will
reflect itself in his behavior. I have supposed, however, that even in the
child’s case we can separate (authority) guilt feelings from fear and
anxiety.
In the light of this sketch of the development of the morality of author-
ity, it seems that the conditions favoring its being learned by the child are
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70. The Morality of Authority

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these.
10
First, the parents must love the child and be worthy objects of his
admiration. In this way they arouse in him a sense of his own value and
the desire to become the sort of person that they are. Secondly, they must
enunciate clear and intelligible (and of course justifiable) rules adapted to
the child’s level of comprehension. In addition they should set out the
reasons for these injunctions so far as these can be understood, and they
must also follow these precepts insofar as they apply to them as well. The
parents should exemplify the morality which they enjoin, and make ex-
plicit its underlying principles as time goes on. Doing this is required not
only to arouse the child’s inclination to accept these principles at a later
time, but also to convey how they are to be interpreted in particular cases.
Presumably moral development fails to take place to the extent that these
conditions are absent, and especially if parental injunctions are not only
harsh and unjustified, but enforced by punitive and even physical sanc-
tions. The child’s having a morality of authority consists in his being
disposed without the prospect of reward or punishment to follow certain
precepts that not only may appear to him largely arbitrary but which in no
way appeal to his original inclinations. If he acquires the desire to abide
by these prohibitions, it is because he sees them as addressed to him by
powerful persons who have his love and trust, and who also act in con-
formity with them. He then concludes that they express forms of action
that characterize the sort of person he should want to be. In the absence of
affection, example, and guidance, none of these processes can take place,
and certainly not in loveless relationships maintained by coercive threats
and reprisals.
The child’s morality of authority is primitive because for the most part
it consists of a collection of precepts, and he cannot comprehend the
larger scheme of right and justice within which the rules addressed to him
are justified. But even a developed morality of authority in which the
basis of the rules can be understood shows many of the same features,
and contains similar virtues and vices. There is typically an authoritative
person who is loved and trusted, or at least who is accepted as worthy of
his position, and whose precepts it is one’s duty to follow implicitly. It is
not for us to consider the consequences, this being left for those in au-
thority. The prized virtues are obedience, humility, and fidelity to authori-
tative persons; the leading vices are disobedience, self-will, and temerity.
We are to do what is expected without questioning, for not so to act
10. Here I borrow and adapt from E. E. Maccoby, “Moral Values and Behavior in Childhood,” in