A theory of Justice: Revised Edition

parties will be indignant with him. Someone who feels guilty, then, is
apprehensive about the resentment and indignation of others, and the un-
certainties which thereby arise. By contrast, someone who feels ashamed
anticipates derision and contempt. He has fallen short of a standard of
excellence, given in to weakness, and shown himself unworthy of asso-
ciation with others who share his ideals. He is apprehensive lest he be cut
off and rejected, made an object of scorn and ridicule. Just as the feelings
of guilt and shame have different principles in their explanations, they
lead us to anticipate different attitudes in other persons. In general, guilt,
resentment, and indignation invoke the concept of right, whereas shame,
contempt, and derision appeal to the concept of goodness. And these
remarks extend in the obvious way to feelings of duty and obligation (if
there are such), and to proper pride and a sense of one’s own worth.
Finally, we can ask: (g) What are the characteristic temptations to
423
73. The Moral Sentiments

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actions that give rise to the moral feeling and how is the feeling typically
resolved? Here again there are marked differences between the moral
emotions. Feelings of guilt and shame have different settings and are
overcome in distinct ways, and these variations reflect the defining prin-
ciples with which they are connected and their peculiar psychological
bases. Thus, for example, guilt is relieved by reparation and the forgive-
ness that permits reconciliation; whereas shame is undone by proofs of
defects made good, by a renewed confidence in the excellence of one’s
person. It is also clear, for example, that resentment and indignation have
their characteristic resolutions, since the first is aroused by what we
regard as wrongs done to ourselves, the second is concerned with wrongs
done to others.
Yet the contrasts between the feelings of guilt and shame are so strik-
ing that it is helpful to note how they fit in with the distinctions made
between different aspects of morality. As we have seen, a breach of any
virtue may give rise to shame; it suffices that one prizes the form of
action among one’s excellences (§67). Analogously, a wrong can always
occasion guilt whenever others are in some way harmed, or their rights
violated. Thus guilt and shame reflect the concern with others and with
one’s person that must be present in all moral conduct. Nevertheless,
some virtues, and so those moralities that emphasize them, are more
typical of the standpoint of one feeling than the other, and therefore are
more closely connected with it. Thus in particular, the moralities of su-
pererogation provide the stage for shame; for they represent the higher
forms of moral excellence, the love of humankind and self-command, and
in choosing them one risks failure from their very nature. It would be a
mistake, however, to emphasize the perspective of one feeling more than
the other in the complete moral conception. For the theory of right and
justice is founded on the notion of reciprocity which reconciles the points
of view of the self and of others as equal moral persons. This reciprocity
has the consequence that both perspectives characterize moral thought
and feeling, usually in roughly even measure. Neither concern for others
nor for self has priority, for all are equal; and the balance between persons
is given by the principles of justice. And where this balance moves to one
side, as with the moralities of supererogation, it does so from the election
of self, which freely takes on the larger part. Thus while we may think of
the points of view of the self and of others as characteristic of some
moralities historically, or of certain perspectives within a full conception,
a complete moral doctrine includes both. All by themselves, a morality of
shame or of guilt is but a part of a moral view.
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The Sense of Justice

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In these remarks I have stressed two main points. First of all, the moral
attitudes are not to be identified with characteristic sensations and behav-
ioral manifestations, even if these exist. Moral feelings require certain
types of explanations. Thus, second, the moral attitudes involve the ac-
ceptance of specific moral virtues; and the principles which define these
virtues are used to account for the corresponding feelings. The judgments
that elucidate different emotions are distinguished from one another by
the standards cited in their explanation. Guilt and shame, remorse and
regret, indignation and resentment, either appeal to principles belonging
to different parts of morality or invoke them from contrasting points of
view. An ethical theory must explain and find a place for these distinc-
tions, although presumably each theory will try to do so in its own way.
74. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN MORAL
AND NATURAL ATTITUDES
74. Moral and Natural Attitudes
There is a further aspect of moral attitudes that I have noted in the sketch
of the development of the sense of justice, namely, their connection with
certain natural attitudes.
18
Thus in examining a moral feeling we should
ask: what if any are the natural attitudes to which it is related? Now there
are two questions here, one the converse of the other. The first asks about
the natural attitudes that are shown to be absent when a person fails to
have certain moral feelings. Whereas the second asks which natural atti-
tudes are evidenced to be present when someone experiences a moral
emotion. In sketching the three stages of morality I have been concerned
only with the first question, since its converse raises other and more
difficult problems. I have held that, in the context of the authority situ-
ation, the child’s natural attitudes of love and trust for those in authority
lead to feelings of (authority) guilt when he violates the injunctions
addressed to him. The absence of these moral feelings would evidence a
lack of these natural ties. Similarly, within the framework of the morality
of association, the natural attitudes of friendship and mutual trust give
rise to feelings of guilt for not fulfilling the duties and obligations recog-
nized by the group. The absence of these feelings would imply the ab-
sence of these attachments. These propositions must not be mistaken for
their converses, for while feelings of indignation and guilt, say, can often
18. Throughout this section, and indeed on the subject of the moral emotions generally, I am very
much indebted to David Sachs.
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74. Moral and Natural Attitudes

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be taken as evidence for such affections, there may be other explanations.
In general, moral principles are affirmed for various reasons and their
acceptance is normally sufficient for the moral feelings. To be sure, on the
contract theory principles of right and justice have a certain content, and
as we have just seen, there is a sense in which acting in accordance with
them can be interpreted as acting from a concern for mankind, or for the
good of other persons. Whether this fact shows that one acts in part from
certain natural attitudes, especially as these involve attachments to par-
ticular individuals, and not simply from the general forms of sympathy
and benevolence, is a question that I shall leave aside here. Certainly the
preceding account of the development of morality supposes that affection
for particular persons plays an essential part in the acquisition of moral-
ity. But how far these attitudes are required for later moral motivation can
be left open, although it would, I think, be surprising if these attachments
were not to some degree necessary.
Now the connection between the natural attitudes and the moral senti-
ments may be expressed as follows: these sentiments and attitudes are
both ordered families of characteristic dispositions, and these families
overlap in such a manner that the absence of certain moral feelings
evidences the absence of certain natural ties. Or alternatively, the pres-
ence of certain natural attachments gives rise to a liability to certain
moral emotions once the requisite moral development has taken place.
We can see how this is so by an example. If A cares for B, then failing a
special explanation A is afraid for B when B is in danger and tries to
come to B’s assistance. Again, if C plans to treat B unjustly, A is indig-
nant with C and attempts to prevent his plans from succeeding. In both
cases, A is disposed to protect B’s interests. Further, unless there are
special circumstances, A is joyful when together with B, and when B
suffers injury or dies, A is stricken with grief. If the injury to B is A’s
responsibility, A will feel remorse. Love is a sentiment, a hierarchy of
dispositions to experience and to manifest these primary emotions as the
occasion elicits and to act in the appropriate way.
19
To confirm the con-
nection between the natural attitudes and the moral sentiments one sim-
ply notes that the disposition on A’s part to feel remorse when he injures
B, or guilt when he violates B’s legitimate claims, or A’s disposition to
feel indignation when C seeks to deny B’s right, are as closely related
psychologically with the natural attitudes of love as the disposition to be
19. On this point, see A. F. Shand,