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cluding
the Baltic states, Hungary, and Romania, together will regard this as
an opportunity not only to return to older borders but also to protect them
selves against any future Russian state. A powerful secondary benefit for
these countries is this: by increasing their strength, they will be further pro
tecting themselves against their traditional Western enemy, Germany. These
Eastern European countries will be looking at this as an opportunity for re
defining the balance of power in the region. India,
for all its size, will not be
in this game. Geographically isolated by the Himalayas, India will not be
able to take serious advantage of the situation.
The American view of this activity in the 2020s will be supportive. East
ern Europe, Turkey, and Japan will be allies of the United States. Turkey and
Japan will have been its allies for seventy- five
years by that point, Eastern
Europe for thirty years. During the confrontation with Russia, each will,
more or less,
and for its own reasons, work with the United States, which
will regard them,
as it did other allies, as extensions of the American will.
The events of the 2020s will have much broader implications beyond
Russia and China, however. The first will be the changing status of Asia in
relation to the Pacific, and therefore in relation to the United States. The
second will be the state of the Muslim world following the U.S.–jihadist
war. The third will be the internal order of
Europe in an age of Franco-
German decline and Eastern European emergence. The fragmentation of
NATO is a given once the Germans and the French opt out of defending the
Baltic countries. NATO is based entirely on collective defense,
the idea that
an attack on one member is an attack on all members. Embedded in this
idea is the understanding that NATO is prepared, in advance, to go to the
defense of any member country that is at risk. Since
the Baltic states will be
at risk, a force will need to be forward deployed there as well as in Poland.
The unwillingness of some of the members to participate in collective de
fense means that action will need to be taken outside the context of NATO.
NATO, therefore, will cease to exist in any meaningful form.
All of these issues will be on the table in the 2010s as the confrontation
with Russia develops. They will be suspended—or at the very least not be
high on the global agenda—during the conflict. But eventually these ques
tions are going to reemerge. Once
the Russian threat has passed, each of
these regions must come to terms with its own geopolitics.
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