p. 290 et seq.). A strengthening of the in-group—out-group differences between the
negotiating parties with increasingly competitive negotiation behavior and negative
effects on negotiation efficiency takes place if the collaboration within the team is
already conflictive (Halevy
2008
, p. 1694; Keenan and Carnevale
1989
, p. 990).
Naquin and Kurtzberg (
2009
) make an interesting contribution to the perception of
the counterparty. They show that the trustworthiness of the opposing team always
depends on the least trustworthy team member and not the average trustworthiness
of the individual team members.
3.2.6
Past History and Relationship Between the Negotiating Parties
A final influencing factor of the personal context in negotiations is the
past history
and
relationship
between the parties. It is easy to see that negotiations between
parties that have not previously interacted with each other will progress differently
than if they are already familiar with the other party. Both cases arise in the
industrial plant and project business, whereas many other interactions on the capital
goods markets, such as in the supplier business, almost exclusively include a past
history or a relationship of some kind.
With regard to negotiations between organizations, Geiger (
2007
) argues that a
past history or relationship between the parties is primarily reflected in a higher
level of mutual knowledge, trust and commitment (p. 64 et seq.). Commitment also
integrates future prospects, namely the expectation of executing future transaction
following the current negotiation with the counterparty (Patton and Balakrishnan
2010
). According to Greenhalgh and Chapman (
1998
), a strong relationship
between two negotiating parties also involves features such as openness, common
interests, empathy, respect and a few additional attributes, which are primarily
applicable for personal relationships (p. 483).
Despite the dominance of negotiations with a past history in practice, i.e. some
type of relationship between the parties, surprisingly little research has dealt with
the influence of past history and relationships (Gelfand et al.
2006
, p. 428). This
lack can partially be ascribed to the research economy and the limited access to time
series data. The studies available paint a fundamentally positive picture of the
impact of a past history or relationship (with positive connotations) on the course
and outcome of a negotiation. In their study, O’Connor et al. (
2005
) show that the
presence of a positive past history (i.e. a successful conclusion rather than the
failure of the first negotiation) led to a higher probability of agreement and higher
negotiation efficiency in a subsequent negotiation (p. 357 et seq.). In an industrial
business relationship simulation, Geiger (
2007
, p. 213) was able to demonstrate that
this reduced the competitive behavior of the negotiating partners, increased the
integrative behavior and ultimately led to higher rates of agreement and higher
negotiation efficiency. However, the studies by Fry et al. (
1983
) and O’Connor and
Arnold (
2011
) show that a positive past history and relationship does not automati-
cally lead to better economic outcomes of negotiations: For example, if the
endeavor to maintain or extend the relationship is too great, this may deter the
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