professionnelle, seems to me, on the contrary, the best source o f the insights
into language and literature that we seek, a quality to be cultivated rather
than shunned. It would be sad indeed if fear o f overinterpretation should
lead us to avoid or repress the state o f wonder at the play o f texts and in
terpretation, which seems to me all too rare today, though admirably rep
resented in the novels or semiotic explorations o f Umberto Eco.
16. Barthes, S/Z, 16.
8
Omniscience
Omniscience” is a notion I have used in discussing narrative, with
out giving it much thought, but also without much conviction that “the
omniscient narrator” is a well-grounded concept or really helps account for
narrative effects. Looking into the matter, I find this is not untypical. Crit
ics refer to the notion all the time, but few express much confidence in it.
The idea o f omniscience has not received much critical scrutiny. '
Recently I have spent time working on this problem, in a return
An early version of this chapter was written for the 2003 conference of the Society
for the Study o f Narrative Literature in Berkeley, California. I am grateful to Dor
othy Hale for the invitation to speak at the conference, and to the audience and
fellow keynote speakers, Mary Poovey and Elaine Scarry, for their responses to the
paper. I have also profited from discussion with audiences at the School o f Criti
cism and Theory, Cornell, and at the Universities of Torino and Siena, and at the
2005 Narrative conference in Louisville. I would like to thank Marlon Kuzmick
for research and advice on the tradition of theological debates about omniscience
and Harry Shaw, Audrey Wasser, and Jim Phelan for comments on drafts.
I.
Notable exceptions are Audrey Jaffe, Vanishing Points: Dickens, Nar
rative, and the Subject o f Omniscience (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1991); Richard Maxwell, “Dickens’ Omniscience,” E L H ^6 (1979): 290-313; Meir
Sternberg, The Poetics o f Biblical Narrative (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1985); Meir Sternberg, ExpositionalModes and Temporal Ordering in Fiction
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978); and recently, Nicholas Royle, The
Uncanny (New York: Routledge, 2003).
1 84
C O N C E P T S
to narratological matters, which I had rather neglected for a number of
years. Studying omniscience while observing a president who espouses To
tal Information Awareness, manifestly thinks he has nothing to learn from
anyone, and is convinced o f the infallibility o f his judgment o f evil in its
accordance with God’s, I have tried to keep my rising repugnance from
attaching to the concept o f omniscience in narrative poetics. I have en
deavored to separate the concept o f narrative omniscience from current
political fantasy, and I hope I have succeeded. I am reminded, though,
o f Virginia W oolf’s comment in a letter to her sister after receiving a vis
it fromT. S. Eliot, who talked o f his religious conversion: “I mean there’s
something obscene in a living person sitting by the fire and believing in
God.”^
I do not think the idea o f omniscience is obscene, but I have reached
the conclusion that it is not a useful concept for the study o f narration,
that it conflates and confuses several different factors that should be sep
arated if they are to be well understood— that it obfuscates the various
phenomena that provoke us to posit the idea. Wallace Martin writes that
“ omniscient narration’ becomes a kind o f dumping ground filled with a
wide range o f distinct narrative techniques.”^ I believe that we should try
to recover and recycle what we have dumped there. In one o f the alterna
tives I have seen, Nicholas Royle proposes in The Uncanny to replace omni
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