GLOBALIZING CONFUCIANISM
65
Journal of East-West Thought
recognize, or have recognized, spiritual substances. But after thinking hard about it, I
judge that they did, although perhaps they did not recognize these substances as
separate, that is, existing quite apart from matter.” Leibniz then goes on to give an
account of how he understands the Neo-Confucian philosophical discussion of the
li-
qi
理氣
dyad, no doubt the signature cosmological and axiological theory debate
internal to the Neo-Confucian would of discourse.
Li
is
often translate as pattern,
order, cosmic principle, and coherent principle or texture and
qi
(which almost defies
translation into even multiple English terms) as vital energy or configurational force
in terms of the Neo-Confucian philosophical debates.
What is so absorbing in reading Leibniz is that he intuitively understood the
profundity of the Neo-Confucian debate that swirled for centuries (and continues
today) around the correct understanding of the
li-qi
interaction. Aquinas once argued
that a philosopher or philosophical theologian had a special obligation in discussing
the work of other thinkers. Not only did the scholar need honestly need to describe the
work of others even when in disagreement, but that this description must be based on
the best possible interpretation of the other position. Aquinas even went so far as to
argue that if the critical scholar could think of a better defense of the other position,
then the scholar must provide this improved version of the material under debate. This
is precisely what strikes a modern reader of Leibniz. Perhaps because of his
detachment form the China mission field he as able to more dispassionately analyze
the Neo-Confucian worldview. It is probably not an exaggeration
to state that no
European thinker gave his readers a better or more sophisticated reading of the
Confucian and Neo-Confucian philosophical world than Leibniz until well into the
20
th
Century. It took hundreds of years for European scholars to catch up with
Leibniz’s brilliant dialogue with the Confucians of Ming-Qing China.
While it is now clear that the general early modern European enthusiasm for
Confucianism waned by the end of the 18
th
Century and the beginning of the 19
th
Centuries as witness in the negative opinions of great philosophers such as Kant and
Hegel, in the early part of the 18
th
Century Christian Wolff continued the work of
Leibniz in two fascinating short essays (Ching and Oxtoby 1992),
Discourse on the
Practical Philosophy of the Chinese
(1721-1726) and
On the Philosopher King and
Ruling Philosopher
. As Wolff explained, these two texts caused him a number of
problems in the republic of letters of his day. Defending what Wolff took to be the
just appreciation of Confucian philosophy did not sit
well with more conservative
Protestant and Roman Catholic thinkers.
While Leibniz was especially famous for his interpretation of the philosophy and
philosophical theology of the Confucians and Neo-Confucians, Wolff rightly chose to
write about the practical and ethical aspects of the Confucian Way. In this regard
Wolff demonstrated as much foresight as his older colleague Leibniz (Ching and
Oxtoby: 1992). Whatever else Confucianism may be, it is certainly a form of personal
and social ethics as well as an extended reflection on statecraft. In Chinese this is
summarized by the formula of
neisheng waiwang
內聖
外王
or the sage within, the
king without. This means that an authentic Confucian must cultivate the sagely mind-
heart as a person and share this learning with the larger social world. As Wolff noted