Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010 Bravo Lab China da

PRC Politics = Only Risk of War

There is very little risk of China challenging the US in Asia or starting a war, only domestic political turmoil could cause Sino-US conflict
Sutter 2007

(Robert Sutter, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, “Does China Seek to Dominate Asia and Reduce US influence as a Regional Power?”, Carnegie Debates, April 20, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Sutter_paper.pdf)

To answer the question, I follow a pattern used in my long professional career of providing information and analysis about China and Asia to congressional and executive branch policy makers. The pattern has involved providing relevant historical context and using balance in assessing contemporary developments. A major goal is to provide perspective that will moderate US excitement about China—either positive or negative. In my opinion, history seems clear about the lessons of US excitement about China—it leads to exaggeration about the opportunities or dangers posed by China, which in turn provides a poor basis for US policy and often leads to policy that is not well aligned with US interests. In sum, section 1 of this paper looks at relevant patterns and behavior of the United States and China in Asia since the start of the cold war. They show that the United States tends to exaggerate recent threats to its leadership in Asia, and that China remains determined to resist and reduce great power involvement along China’s periphery. Section 2 provides an assessment of Chinese leaders’ current intentions toward the United States in Asia, and argues that US policy makers would be prudent if they remained attentive for possible changes in the current comparatively moderate Chinese approach to the United States in Asia in favor of a more assertive Chinese stance. Section 3 foresees continued effective checks on a possibly more assertive or coercive Chinese approach to Asia. Those checks are based on the twin forces of effective US security and economic power in Asia and by pervasive hedging of independent-minded Asian governments.

Nationalism Destroys “Peaceful Rise”

Nationalism-fueled debates about opposition to US presence undermine the movement for “peaceful rise”
Sutter 2007

(Robert Sutter, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, “Does China Seek to Dominate Asia and Reduce US influence as a Regional Power?”, Carnegie Debates, April 20, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Sutter_paper.pdf)

While still seeking a multipolar world, China’s leaders in recent years have seen their policy goals and interests best served by muting opposition to the United States and US leadership in Asian and world affairs. In general, China’s goals in Asia have been: · To promote stability and a “peaceful environment” conducive to domestic Chinese economic development and political stability. · To seek advantageous economic contacts and relationships. · To reassure China’s neighbors about the implications of China’s rise. · To isolate Taiwan. · To gain regional influence relative to other powers (e.g. Japan, India, and the United States). Over the past decade, China’s leaders have adjusted their policies and approach to Asia in ways that appear to accord with changing circumstances and the costs and benefits for Chinese interests: · Jiang Zemin in the mid-1990s enhanced his leadership stature in the lead up to China’s 15th Communist Party Congress in 1997 by modifying Deng Xiaoping’s injunction for China to maintain a low-profile in world politics. Jiang reached out to Asian and world powers seeking “strategic partnerships” that enhanced both China’s and Jiang’s international profile at this important time in Chinese domestic politics. · China at this time also endeavored to reassure Asian neighbors alarmed by Chinese military actions in the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis by proposing a “New Security Concept” that promoted “good neighbor” relations with most in Asia—Taiwan and the United States were the main exceptions. · By mid 2001, before the terrorist attack on America, China decided to reduce sharply its rhetorical and political opposition to US “hegemony” in Asian and world affairs. The continued strong public opposition to the United States in Asia had not been popular with Asian governments unwilling to choose between China and the United States. It also ran the risk of significant push back from the newly elected George W. Bush administration that had a decidedly more wary view of China’s rise than its predecessor. · By late 2003, Chinese officials began formulating a new public approach focused on China’s “peaceful rise” in Asia that was designed to reassure most concerned powers—Taiwan remained the main exception—that China’s rise would not be adverse to their interests. Reassuring the United States seemed particularly important, and China remained remarkably discreet in dealing with most differences with the United States.

Nationalists= Expansion

The young nationalists in China are extremely violent and want to invade Taiwan. Only the current government can contain them.

Kurlantzick 8 (Josh, scholar in Carnegie Endowment’s China Program, “China’s Next-Generation Nationalists”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://www.carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=20095) MKB

The explosion of nationalist sentiment, especially among young people, might seem shocking, but it's been simmering for a long time. In fact, Beijing's leadership, for all its problems, may be less hard-line than China's youth, the country's future. If China ever were to become a truly free political system, it might actually become more, not less, aggressive. China's youth nationalism tends to explode over sparks like the Tibet unrest. It burst into violent anti-American protests after NATO's accidental bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in 1999. (Most young Chinese I've met don't believe that the bombing was an accident.) Even after 9/11, a time when the governments of China and the United States were building a closer relationship, some young Chinese welcomed America's pain. "When the planes crashed into the World Trade Center, I really felt very delighted," one student told Chinese pollsters. Youth nationalism exploded again into anti-Japan riots across China in 2005, after the release of Japanese textbooks deemed offensive in China for their apparent whitewashing of World War II atrocities. During the riots, I was working in Lanzhou, a gritty, medium-sized city in industrial central China. Day after day, young Chinese marched through Lanzhou and looked for shops selling Japanese goods to smash up -- though, of course, these stores were owned by local Chinese merchants. Hardly uneducated know-nothings, young nationalists tend to be middle-class urbanites. Far more than rural Chinese, who remain mired in poverty, these urbanites have benefited enormously from the country's three decades of economic growth. They also have begun traveling and working abroad. They can see that Shanghai and Beijing are catching up to Western cities, that Chinese multinationals can compete with the West, and they've lost their awe of Western power. Many middle-aged Chinese intellectuals are astounded by the differences between them and their younger peers. Academics I know, members of the Tiananmen generation, are shocked by some students' disdain for foreigners and, often, disinterest in liberal concepts such as democratization. University students now tend to prefer business-oriented majors to liberal arts-oriented subjects such as political science. The young Chinese interviewed for a story last fall in Time magazine on the country's "Me Generation" barely discussed democracy or political change in their daily lives. Beijing has long encouraged nationalism. Over the last decade, the government has introduced new school textbooks that focus on past victimization of China by outside powers. The state media, such as the People's Daily, which hosts one of the most strongly nationalist Web forums, also highlight China's perceived mistreatment at the hands of the United States and other powers. In recent years, too, the Communist Party has opened its membership and perks to young urbanites, cementing the belief that their interests lie with the regime, not with political change -- and that democracy might lead to unrest and instability. According to Minxin Pei of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "The party showers the urban intelligentsia, professionals and private entrepreneurs with economic perks, professional honors and political access." In the 1980s, by contrast, these types of professionals and academics were at the forefront of Tiananmen protests. The state media also increasingly highlight the problems of rural China -- China now has income inequality on par with many Latin American nations -- suggesting to urbanites the economic and political catastrophe that might befall them if these rural peasants swamped wealthy cities. Now, though, according to Chinese officials, it appears that the Chinese government actually wants to tamp down nationalism. Some officials privately worry that nationalist protests, even ones targeting other countries, ultimately will transform into unrest against Beijing, like previous outbursts of patriotism in China before communist rule in 1949, which eventually turned into nationwide convulsions. In 2005, Beijing initially fed the anti-Japan feelings with public statements. Then Beijing -- which depends on Tokyo as a crucial trading partner and source of aid -- tried to tamp down tensions by keeping much of the protest details out of the state media. Ultimately, though, Beijing had to roll out riot-control police in large cities. Similarly, after a 2001 collision between American and Chinese military planes that killed the Chinese pilot, Beijing struggled to keep street protests from erupting into riots. In the long run, this explosive nationalism calls into question what kind of democracy China could be. Many Chinese academics, for example, believe that, at least in the early going, a freer China might become a more dangerous China. Able to truly express their opinions, young Chinese would be able to put intense pressure on a freer government to adopt a hard line against the West -- even, perhaps, to invade Taiwan. By contrast, the current Chinese regime has launched broad informal contacts with Taiwan's new rulers, including an April meeting between Chinese President Hu Jintao and incoming Taiwanese Vice President Vincent Siew -- contacts denounced by many bloggers.