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BESHIMOV, SHOZIMOV, BAKHADYROV
the unknown on its own path, posing the further question of whether, and how,
they would relate to one other.
For more than a century the population of the Ferghana Valley, like that of all
Central Asia, had been accustomed to their elites executing the will of Moscow. The
traditions, skills, and instincts required for self-government had all but vanished,
and were replaced by whatever was necessary to function under a strictly central-
ized Communist government. By 1991 Central Asia had outpaced development
in India, China, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan.
2
Yet if the USSR by then claimed to
be a modernized agro-industrial society, that world still had very weak roots in
Central Asia and in the Ferghana Valley. Although it had surpassed many other
Asian countries, the region remained more traditional and conservative than the
western part of the Soviet Union. Thus, the percent of Central Asia’s indigenous
population employed in industry was the lowest in the USSR (Kyrgyzstan, 34
percent; Uzbekistan, 31 percent; Tajikistan, 28 percent). The percent of the total
industrial workforce comprised of native peoples was only 53 percent for Uzbeks
in Uzbekistan, 25 percent for Kyrgyz in Kyrgyzstan, and 48 percent for Tajiks in
Tajikistan.
3
Military and industrial enterprises and technical institutes were staffed
mainly by Russians and Slavs, with Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Kyrgyz relegated to the
trades, services, agriculture, health care, teaching, and Party offices. Hence, the
new states began with very weak human capital.
Because of the underdeveloped state of indigenous, as opposed to imperial,
industry, rural populations played a decisive role in social life, at least at the local
level. At the top, former Soviet elites continued on in most cases, forging new
relations with an unpredictable Russia, China, and the Muslim world, as well as
the West, and working to establish new forms of identity.
Central Asians, and especially residents of the Ferghana Valley, were complete
newcomers to the notion of a nation state.
4
The old khanates of the region had
absolutely no concept of ethnicity. But as new states, the three countries of the
Ferghana Valley were swept up in issues of ethnic identity in a mono-ethnic society,
a notion that was not only alien to their heritage but already an obsolete prototype.
5
Yet under the pressure of a collapsing USSR, the notion of a society built according
to the principles of unity amid diversity had begun to disintegrate, leaving the field
to the ideal of national interest.
This engendered rivalries among countries and weakened regional cooperation.
Each country pursued its own path, which meant that in the Ferghana Valley one
can trace three separate processes of change.
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