Process of Conquest and Post–Conquest Organization
As it gained political and economic power, the Russian Empire showed a clear
interest in Central Asia, beginning in the late 1830s and early 1840s. Russia’s
incursion into the region occurred at a time when the Central Asian khanates
themselves were in a state of permanent confrontation with one another. Thus, the
emirs of Bukhara undertook military campaigns against the Kokand Khanate in
1840, 1842, 1862, and 1865. As a result, the areas located between the two states
(e.g., Ura-Tyube or Istaravshan, Khujand, Nau, Dzhizak) suffered heavily. These
constant wars among the khanates drove down living standards and weakened the
states themselves, thus facilitating Russia’s conquests of Central Asia and of the
Ferghana Valley itself.
Just before mid-century, Russia undertook a broad study of the military, political,
and economic capacities of the Central Asian khanates and of regional trade routes.
At the same time Russian factory owners who were interested in new sources of
cotton and other resources and new markets demanded that the Russian government
pursue an active policy toward the khanates. The desire to preempt any possible
British moves into the region further prompted Russia to act militarily.
1
By 1847 Russian troops had conquered the Syr Darya estuary and constructed
a fort at what is now Aralskoe, paving the way for an invasion of the Kokand
Khanate, then ruled by Khudayar Khan. In 1851 General Lev Perovskii, an advo-
cate of decisive actions against the khanates, was appointed governor-general of
Orenburg and Samara. In 1853 he took control of Ak-Mechet, a strategic Kokandi
fort located on the right bank of the Syr Darya River, renaming it Fort Perovskii.
He then strengthened it and incorporated it into Russia’s Syr Darya military line.
Another “Siberian” line of forts was built from Semipalatinsk to Vernii (Almaty).
Clearly, the Russian Empire was readying a major invasion of the khanates.
70 R. ABDULLAEV, KHOTAMOV, KENENSARIEV
The Crimean War (1853–56) and subsequent period of urgent internal reforms
stalled Russia’s advance into the region until the early 1860s, at which time the
tsar’s armies inflicted a decisive defeat on the weakened and ethnically divided
Kokand Khanate.
2
In the fall of 1862 they conquered Kokand’s dominions of Pish-
pek (later Frunze, and now Bishkek) and Tokmak, the fort of Suzak in 1863, and
the towns of Turkestan, Aulie-Ata, and Chimkent (Shymkent) over the course of
1864. Forts built during these campaigns created a new Kokand line that integrated
all the existing forts into a continuous front line.
3
Having secured Chimkent, General M.G. Cherniaev moved on Tashkent in the
fall of 1864. As shown in the preceding chapter, the city offered significant resis-
tance with the help of Kokand’s people headed by the famous commander Alikuli
Amirlashkar. The Russians had to retreat with substantial losses.
By spring 1865, Cherniaev had taken control of Tashkent, in the process killing
significant numbers of the indigenous population for whom he felt no sympathy.
For him, the Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, Kipchaks, and other peoples of the
Kokand Khanate were not people but khalatniki (robe-wearers) “who should be
beaten for their robes alone.”
4
Meanwhile, Russia’s invasion of the Kokand Khanate aroused indignation in the
British government, which filed a note of protest to Russia. The country’s Minister
of Foreign Affairs A.M. Gorchakov laconically replied that Russia, like any other
great power, had its own interests in the region and that its actions in Central Asia
were no different from England’s activities in India and Afghanistan.
5
During Russia’s campaign against Tashkent, the rulers of Bukhara and Khiva
rendered no support to the city and even rejoiced at its defeat. General D.I.
Romanovskii, writing in 1866, explained how Russia could exploit these local
enmities: “They [Bukharans and Kokandis] do not conceal their mutual hatred.
On many occasions their respective envoys have expressed their readiness to as-
sist us, the Kokandis for an attack on Bukhara and the Bukharans for an offensive
against Kokand.”
6
In 1865 Russia renamed the conquered Kokand territories as Turkestan and
moved the capital to Tashkent, which it placed under the governor-general of
Orenburg. Two years later it elevated Tashkent to the status of a separate governor-
generalship and folded into it all the parts of the Kazakh steppes, the Kokand Khan-
ate, and the Emirate of Bukhara that had been conquered since 1847. It consisted
of two sub-regions: the Syr Darya province based in Tashkent and the Semireche
(Seven Rivers) province based in Vernii. K.P. Kaufman was appointed governor-
general and vested with independent authority to undertake military campaigns
and diplomatic negotiations with the neighboring states.
7
In 1868 Kaufman proposed a deal to the ruler of Kokand, Khudayar Khan,
consisting of several provisions: Khudayar Khan would grant Russian merchants
the right to visit all cities of the khanate and to establish representatives in each
city, equalize taxes for Russian and Muslim merchants, and allow Russian caravans
free passage into other areas of Kokand.
8
By signing this agreement Khudayar
COLONIAL RULE AND INDIGENOUS RESPONSE 71
Khan became a vassal of the Russian Empire. After settling issues with Khudayar
Khan and inflicting military defeats on the neighboring khanates, Kaufman forced
Bukhara and Khiva to sign similar treaties in 1868 and 1873 respectively, making
them protectorates of the Russian Empire as well.
These military campaigns significantly shrank the territories of the Kokand
Khanate and forced its economy into decline. To pay the large indemnity to Russia,
Khudayar Khan had to increase taxes, which led to protests both in the periphery
and in central districts of the ethnically diverse khanate. Many blamed Khudayar
Khan for betraying Kokand’s interests and for becoming dependent on Russia.
Heavy taxes, especially on cattle, led to revolt in the summer of 1873. The uprising
erupted in the villages of Kasan and Nanaia near Namangan and soon consumed
the whole Ferghana Valley, raging unchecked until February 1876. Kyrgyz nomads
and cattle breeders refused to pay the increased tax and retreated to inaccessible
mountain areas. As noted in the previous chapter, Ishak Mulla Hasan-ogly (Iskak
Asan uulu), an ethnic Kyrgyz known as Pulat Khan, led an armed rebellion against
the khan in July 1873.
9
Various ethnic groups of the Ferghana Valley participated
in the revolt, but it was the Kyrgyz who constituted the military core of Pulat
Khan’s rebellion.
This uprising alarmed not only Khudayar Khan but also the Russians, who sent
special punitive detachments against the rebels, crushing them by February 1876.
Losses among the rebels were enormous. Speaking of only one day, Lieutenant
General Golovachev indicated in his report to the minister of war that “up to 20,000
residents of Andijan perished on January 8 as a result of our artillery.”
10
Russian
forces also suffered heavy losses at Andijan. “The battle was dreadful, unprec-
edented; lots of Russians were killed, some troops simply fled,” wrote General
Kuropatkin in his diary.
11
Following the suppression of the military revolt, Ishak
Mulla (Pulat Khan) and some of his confidants were hanged in Margilan in March,
1876, while his followers were physically punished, jailed, or sent into exile. In
spite of this, the Alai Kyrgyz from the mountains adjoining the Ferghana Valley
continued to offer resistance.
Khudayar Khan fled Kokand for Tashkent in July 1875, whence the Russians
sent him to Orenburg.
12
The khan’s abdication opened the fight for his throne.
With Kipchak backing against the Kyrgyz, Khudayar Khan’s eldest son, Nasreddin
Bek, emerged as the successor. But neither the rebels nor the Russian army trusted
Nasreddin Bek, which prompted Tsar Alexander II on February 19, 1876 to disband
the Kokand Khanate and rename it Ferghana province. A new governor-generalship
was established under M.D. Skobelev at Novyi Margilan (now Ferghana). To kill
all thoughts of reestablishing the khanate, the Russians sent Nasreddin Bek to the
remote Russian city of Vladimir. Only after four years were the last khan and his
wife allowed to return to Tashkent, where Nasreddin Khan died in 1882, at the
age of thirty-two.
13
Russia’s military conquest forced upon the peoples of Central Asia a new sys-
tem of law, politics, and socio-economic relations that from the very beginning
72 R. ABDULLAEV, KHOTAMOV, KENENSARIEV
redefined Central Asia as a periphery and made it utterly dependent on the Russian
center. Imposed on local traditions by force, the new system weakened the region’s
traditional patterns of life and further undermined national development there.
14
By 1886 the Russians imposed new administrative borders, dividing the
governor-generalship into provinces, districts, and sub-districts, along with coter-
minous military units on the same territories. Thus, the Ferghana province included
the districts of Andijan, Kokand, Margilan, Namangan, Osh, Chust, and Chemion
district (renamed Isfara in 1879).
The administrative and territorial divisions which the Russian Empire created
in Turkestan bore little relation to the geographical, historical, economic, or ethno-
cultural realities of the region. Instead, they reflected the same imperial principles
of rule that prevailed throughout the Russian Empire. Both the territorial divisions
and the administrative apparatus and procedures were defined and set in motion by
a complex bureaucratic machinery based in the capital of St. Petersburg.
The key link to the imperial capital was the Chancellery of the governor-general
of Turkestan, created in 1867 and based in Tashkent. This executive organ existed
under the minister of war. It was responsible for staffing, inspections, taxes and
work duties, road construction, mining, and all dealings with Russia’s protectorates
of Khiva and Bukhara, as well as relations with the neighboring countries of the
Orient. The Chancellery and its special commissions participated in the drafting of
all laws relating to Turkestan. These were then reviewed by the ministries and State
Council in St. Petersburg. In practice, the Chancellery’s powers over all political,
administrative, and military issues were practically unlimited. Hence, it was the
Russian Ministry of War that controlled the region.
Military governors headed provincial offices and also commanded the troops,
15
wielding dictatorial powers over every aspect of life in the Ferghana Valley. They
designated places where both settled and nomadic populations were allowed to meet,
confirmed elected district administrators and appointed all others, confirmed candi-
dates standing for election as judges, and appointed and dismissed at will all district
administrators and their staffs. The governor- general appointed district heads, but
the military governors reported on their activities to the governor-general and passed
on complaints from the local populace concerning taxes they levied.
16
The governor-general of the Ferghana province was also vested with police and
judicial powers. He could fine indigenous persons up to 100 rubles and hold them in
custody for up to one month. His powers also included control over judicial bodies
and prisons and the confirmation of sentences in criminal cases.
17
The most important governmental institution was the Ferghana province ad-
ministration, a collegial body chaired by an assistant to the military governor. This
group performed administrative, judicial, law enforcement, financial and economic
functions.
18
Its economic department carried out a series of important duties,
among them allocating land to settled and nomadic populations, superintending
religious endowments ( waqfs), managing water resources, imposing levies on the
indigenous population, compiling budgets for land and peasant-related duties,
COLONIAL RULE AND INDIGENOUS RESPONSE 73
handling expenditures, supervising the collection of customs duties and settling
disputes, approving contracts, issuing licenses for mining, and establishing private
industrial enterprises.
19
The head of the district administration also commanded the district’s troops. The
governor-general appointed and dismissed district chiefs on the recommendation of
the provincial military governors. The district chief also served as the chief of police,
land captain, city mayor, and chairman of the body overseeing taxes on land.
The district administration was also charged with the difficult tasks of manag-
ing taxes paid in labor, peacekeeping, settling disputes over water and land, and
overseeing the work of the provincial and district administrations. It is no exag-
geration to say that the provincial head had a monopoly of power in almost all
spheres of social and economic life as he applied the logic and spirit of the tsarist
colonial policy locally. The provincial administration was in effect all-powerful,
but nonetheless worked tirelessly in the pursuit of its own interests tirelessly to
strengthen and expand its authority all the more.
The Ferghana administration divided both the nomadic and settled populations
into districts (volosts) and each district into villages (auls). District and village
elders, who exercised administrative and police authority, were elected to three-
year terms and were confirmed by the military governor. To weaken the power
of the traditional Kyrgyz elites, the Russian administration based the district and
village units on territorial rather than clan principles. The clan elites resisted this,
recognizing it as an attack on the clan structure itself. The colonial administration
defended its actions as part of an effort to remove the “inconveniencies inherent in
the [traditional] administrative system.”
20
It made the same claim when it abolished
the clan chiefs’ authority and introduced instead elected elders, explicitly defend-
ing the move in terms of “maintaining stability” and achieving the more efficient
collection of taxes.
A two-step process was introduced for electing district chiefs. First, each fifty
households elected a delegate to a village assembly, which met in the presence
of the Russian administrators. As a rule, the Russians would keep order but not
interfere in the electoral process. A quorum of two-thirds was required for an as-
sembly’s votes to be considered valid. Then second, the district assembly elected
the district chief and judges, set pay scales for local officials, and oversaw all roads,
bridges, and irrigation systems, as well as domestic construction. The district head
maintained order with the help of the police, conducted criminal investigations,
communicated the laws and decrees of the colonial administration to the populace,
and could—with the concurrence of the provincial head—convene and dissolve
district assemblies.
If for any reason the Russian administration did not like a district head, the
military governor could call for new elections or temporarily replace the person.
Lower level administrators frequently abused their offices by illegally exacting
payments, embezzling tax funds, and punishing anyone considered undesirable.
Elections for local officials were frequently accompanied by fierce fights among
74 R. ABDULLAEV, KHOTAMOV, KENENSARIEV
the contending factions. Judicial bodies also protected the interests of the tsarist
regime, leading to abusive practices by judges that engendered discontent among
people. The authorities set up “criteria of allegiance” for all judicial candidates,
hoping over time that such men would become reliable tools for protecting the
social and political order that the Russians hoped to establish in Turkestan.
The tsarist police were the colonial rulers’ most reliable weapons and the guard-
ians of monarchical interests in the Ferghana region. In larger cities like Kokand
and Novyi Margilan, police chiefs wielded extensive executive powers and could
call on the Russian military to reinforce their actions. Inevitably, the indigenous
population was subject to fines and arrest for even minor offenses and acts of
disobedience. To assist the police, tsarist officials deputized citizens who would
unquestioningly apply all police measures and take steps on their own to keep order.
Such minor offenses as rudeness, disrespect, and disobedience warranting large
fines and punishments were set at the sole discretion of the colonial administrators
and based on their own interests.
Tsarist authorities considered prisons as an important tool for controlling move-
ments that threatened the established order. Four jails in the Ferghana Valley (in
Novyi Margilan, Kokand, Namangan, and Osh) were supplemented by a large
number of lockup houses, military detention centers and similar facilities. All
together, Russian government regarded these assemblies, local heads, police, and
the prison system as the backbone of imperial authority in Ferghana and the best
tools for suppressing rebellion even before it started.
Initially, people from the old khanate system continued to carry out their duties,
but over time these “indigenous administrators” were reduced to a supporting role in
the colonial system. Meanwhile, following the usual imperial practice, migrants from
Central Russia settled in separate villages in rural areas, and enjoyed a high degree of
self-rule under their elders. Neither the old nor the new administrators were particularly
qualified. A minimum age of twenty-five was set for members of the local governments,
but there were no educational requirements except for judges, who had to have com-
pleted a Russian middle school. Low salaries fostered a climate of corruption.
21
During Russia’s colonization of Central Asia, the imperial authorities paid
close attention to ethnic and political relations within the region. Of course, they
took full advantage of the prevailing conflicts between ethnic groups and between
political elites. As one Russian scholar put it, “The tsarist regime used their mutual
hostilities to weaken the regional peoples and prevent them from uniting to resist
their colonial masters.”
22
As part of its colonial policy, Russia imposed territorial divisions on Turkestan
and other parts of Central Asia that would assure its continued political, military,
and economic control of the region. Actively drawing on the experience of other
colonial powers, Russia’s political elite actively and effectively applied the famous
principle of “divide and rule.” From the very beginning the colonial administration
based in Tashkent worked to sow seeds of distrust and hostility among the conquered
peoples, so as to prevent the consolidation of any nationalist movement.
COLONIAL RULE AND INDIGENOUS RESPONSE 75
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