Ferghana Valley

hodja-aka
, according to the decoded evidence of Parpiev’s conversations, was in Kabul.
135. In this case, the opposition of Muhammad-Sadiq Muhammad-Yusuf to some of the 
theologians in Andijan and Kokand is particularly true.
136. Since the republics of this region gained independence, Tashkent increasingly 
became the center of religious life in Uzbekistan. In Tajikistan, Dushanbe became the center 
of political Islam. In Kyrgyzstan, the main center of Islam (including political activity) is 
still in the south of the country, that is the eastern part of the Ferghana Valley.
137. For more information see Babadzhanov, Debates over Islam.
138. The most symbolic figure in the process of calling for tolerance toward HT was 
Rafi’zhon Kamolov (killed in August 2006), who told us in an interview on July 20, 2006 
that he treated the members of this party in the same way he would treat other Muslims. That 
is why HT members prayed at his mosque, including young people from local jamaats.
139. It appears that southern districts of Kyrgyzstan has become the regional center of 
HT.
140. We noted during the interviews we conducted in July–August 2006 that the 
members of regional HT divisions had very low level of education. For example, one of our 
interlocutors (Aravan village, Osh district) said that Shiites originated from Shafi’i madhhab, 
and thought Israel is one of the states of the United States of America.
141. Babadzhanov, Debates over Islam, pp. 39–60.
142. Incidentally, recently Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami demonstrated the same militaristic 
interpretation of jihad, which gives us reason to include it into the list of radical parties. 
For details see M. Olcott and B. Babadzhanov, “Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan: Non-Violent 
Methods of Struggle or Instigation to Terror?” in State and Religion in Countries with a 
Muslim Population,
ed. Z. Munaviarov and R. Krumm, Tashkent, 2004, pp. 163–172.
143. Our interviews in the cities of the Ferghana Valley, July 2006.
144. Special thanks to my colleague from Osh, I. Mirsaidov, for providing the detailed 
contents of the movie. Currently, he is preparing a special article with a description 
and commentary on this film, to be published on Ferghana.ru’s section on terrorist 
organizations.
145. According to what we know, this coordination is willingly exercised only by the 
authorities. However, in fact, this is a “struggle with the consequences” and not with the 
causes of religiously motivated terrorism.
146. In section of the article, especially in the conclusion, the works of other expert 
colleagues were used, in particular, the work of V.N. Ushakov, Politicheskii islam v 
Tsentralnoi Azii,
Moscow and Bishkek, 2005.
147. F. Poiarkov, Poslednii epizod dunganskogo vosstaniia (Malenkaia stranitsa iz 
proshloi zhizni Semirechia
), Frunze [1901] 1983, p. 54.
148. Kyrgyzstan-Rossiia. Istoriia vzaimootnoshenii (XVIII–XIX vv.). Sbornik dokumentov 
i materialov,
Bishkek, 1998, p. 45.
149. A.V. Piaskovskii, Vosstanie 1916 goda v Srednei Azii i Kazakhstane. Sbornik 
dokumentov,
Moscow, 1960, p. 74.
150. Ibid., p. 80.
151. Abu Zakhra, Nazariat ul-kharb fi-1-islam, Cairo, 1958, p. 12.
152. Sotsiologicheskii opros. Institut strategicheskogo analiza i prognoza KR//Otchet 
za 2005,
Bishkek, 2006.
153. Dannye perepisi statisticheskogo Komiteta Kyrgyzstana za 2000–2001 god, Bishkek, 
pp. 260–261.
154. Currently, the fine is 8 som per one missed prayer.
155. For more details on this organization, see above on the Uzbek part of the Ferghana 
Valley.
156. B. Babadzhanov, “Sredneaziatskoe dukhovnoe upravlenie (SADUM): predystoriia i 

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370 BABADJANOV, MALIKOV, NAZAROV
posledstviia raspada,” in Mnogomernye granitsy Tsentralnoi Azii, vol. 2, ed. M.B. Olcott and 
A. Malashenko, Moscow, 1999; B. Babadzhanov, “O fetvakh SADUM protiv ‘neislamskikh’ 
obychaev,” pp. 65–78.
157. Representatives of the radical approaches emerged in the early 1990s in southern 
Kyrgyzstan, under the influence of Uzbeks living in the Ferghana Valley and related by blood to 
the Uzbek diaspora of Saudi Arabia, which used them as agents of the ideas of Wahhabism. 
158. The ideological work of Hizb ut-Tahrir consists of two dimensions: a purely religious 
one based on political-legal fatwas, which delegitimize the constitutional order and laws of 
the secular state of political Islam; and recruitment, which involves promoting and attracting 
new members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, consisting mainly of practicing Muslims. The permanent 
religious source is the Muslim community in Kyrgyzstan.
159. The transnational project aims to build a global Islamic state.
160. Islamization based on the administrative and legislative framework is to be preferred.
161. This includes political terror as a method of struggle, but terror (irkhab) is considered 
the most extreme measure, beyond the permission (ruhsa) to use mental or other kinds of 
pressure.
162. As an example of the active implementation of this program over the past few 
years, we can cite the speech of one of HT activists on protecting the rights of consumers of 
electricity, assistance to young families in the new buildings, and organization of large-scale 
meals during the holidays of Qurban and Orozo Ayt/Uraza ‘Id in the south of Kyrgyzstan. 
See www.24.kg/community/2008/11/05/97189.html.
163. The first publications of Taki al-Dina Nabhani were issued with the slogan from 
the hadith Al-khukmu li-Llakh: “All power belongs to Allah.”
164. A. Alisheva, Religioznaia situatsiia v Kyrgyzstane, Tsentr. Aziia i Kavkaz, Bishkek, 
1999.
165. Hizb ut-Tahrir document “Partiinoe splochenie” (n.p., n.d.).
166. Michael C. Hudson, “Islam and Political Development,” in Islam and Development, 
ed. John Esposito, Syracuse, 1980, p. 134.
167. Ibid.
168. Here and below, we use the results of surveys and studies by an independent group 
led by the author Bakhtiyar Babadjanov.
169. From an interview with a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir with fifteen years’ experience, 
Khatamzhan from Nookat.
170. A. Kniazev, “Afganskii uzel: vyzovy i ugrozy dlia Tsentralnoi Azii” (Doklad na 
nauchnoi konferentsii po vneshnemu vektoru politiki stran Tsentralnoi Azii),” Issyk Kul, 
October 25, 2008.
171. From a 2007 interview with the former HT emir of Talas district.
172. From a personal interview with Tursunbay Bakir Uluu on December 15, 2008.
173. A. Ignatenko correctly points out that the term Wahhabism currently is not used in 
its original sense (as the name-eponym of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the religious-
political movement that emerged in the eighteenth century in Arabia), but in its second, 
well-established meaning: a political current, the followers of which, basing themselves on 
a specific and subjective interpretation of Islam, carry out activities (mainly with the use of 
violence) aimed at changing the socio-political system, primarily in countries where Islam 
is spreading. Ignatenko also believes that the radicalization of Muslim societies in such 
cases does not follow the scheme: an increase in social and economic problems leads to 
the search for ideological expression and to the Islamic radicalism in the form of Salafism, 
(See A.A. Ignatenko, Khalify bez khalifata, Moscow, 1988, p. 33). 
174. Interview with the leaders of the Foundation of Adep Bashat and the adviser to 
mufti in Kyrgyzstan, Iusuf Loma Ajy.
175. Especially in its centers of theological studies such as Samarkand, Kokand, and 
Tashkent, theologians of other schools (e.g., Shafi’i) traditionally coexisted with those who 

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ISLAM IN THE FERGHANA VALLEY 371
did not recognize separate communities. In general, such diversity was evolving into a 
collision between the different leaders, which was typical for the Soviet and post-independece 
periods. See Babadjanov et al., “Disputes on Muslim Authority in Central Asia.”
176. The territory of Sughd region is 26 thousand square kilometers, the population—1,900,000 
people. There are fourteen districts and seven towns in the region.
177. Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, Hizb ut-Tahrir.
178. Salafi, Islamskoe Dvijenie Turkestana.
179. Bayat, Tablighi Jaamat, Islam Jihad.
180. More on this method of illegal education see the Uzbekistan section of this chapter.
181. Ibid.
182. Sadriddin Kalandari, Shodam, ki KhNIT dar manzili kamina ba dunyo omad, 
Dushanbe, 2003, pp. 127–139.
183. KhNIT. 30 sol. Zodai ormoni mardum, Dushanbe, 2003, p. 141.
184. This newspaper isnow called Najot (Salvation).
185. Kalandari, Shodam, pp. 127–139.
186. KhNIT. 30 sol, pp. 142–144.
187. Ibid., p. 141; Ibn Kathir-Abu al-Fida, Imad ad-Din, Isma’il ibn ‘Umar ibn Kathir 
al’-Qurayshi al-Bursawi (1326–ca. 1370), a well-known scientist, faqih, Qur’an interpreter 
(mufassir), and the author of many books of commentaries on the Qur’an.
188. Regulations of PIVT (Partiya Islamskogo Vozrojdeniya Tadjikistana).
189. Vechernii Dushanbe, September 24–30, 2007.
190. From Bakhtiyar Babadjanov’s interviews.
191. Aleksandr Kniazev, “Grozit li Tadzhikistanu ‘makovaia’ revoliutsiia?” August 20, 
2006, www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1156048860.
192. Ibid.
193. Salafiya, from the Arabic salafi (be original), is a fundamentalist religious-ethical 
line within Sunnism, created in the fourteenth century and based on the works of Ibn 
Taymiyyah. It hailed the era of the Medina communities (622–630) as the “golden age” of 
Islam. The most prominent Salafi preacher is Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. Currently, 
Saudi Arabia is considered the center of Salafism. 
194. Hadiths were collected mainly by early scholars from Central Asia such as the 
Imam al-Bukhari.
195. Imam Ibn Hanbal—the founder of Hanbali mazhab.
196. The founder of Shafi’i madhhab.
197. See V.E. Makari, Ibn Taymiyyah’s Ethics, Berkeley, 1983.
198. In other words, their activities are monitored by the special organs of internal security.
199. Parvina Khamidova, “Vokrug dvizheniia ‘Salafiia,’ aktivizirovavshegosia v 
poslednee vremia v Tadzhikistane tsirkuliruet mnogo slukhov, vedutsia spory i diskussii. 
Kto oni? K chemu stremiatsia? K chemu mozhet privesti rost ikh vliianiia?” Radio Liberty, 
July 24, 2008.
200. Daler Gufronov, “Interviu s Akbar Turadzhonzoda,” Asia-Plus, July 24 2008, www.
centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1216929960.
201. Ibid.
202. Ibid.
203. “V Tadzhikistane zapretili fundamentalistskoe dvizhenie ‘Salafiia,’ ” Asia-Plus, 
January, December 8, 2004.
204. Unofficial sources claim the movement has between 20,000 and 40,000 adherents.
205. See the section in this chapter on Uzbekistan for more details.
206. “Hizb ut-Tahrir s tochki zreniia prokratury.” Interviu korrespondenta IAA “Varorud” 
K. Komilova so starshim pomoshchnikom prokurora Sogdiiskoi oblasti, sovetnikom iustitsii 
pervogo klassa Urunovym Asadullo Urunovichem,www.varorud.org/old/analitics/security/
security161105.html.

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372 BABADJANOV, MALIKOV, NAZAROV
207. Ibid.
208. Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest, pp. 153–87.
209. See the section on Kyrgyzstan in this chapter.
210. According to the information service “Novosti,” the trial of Saidkamoliddin Nosirov 
was concluded and he was sentenced to imprisonment for fourten years. Forty-two-year-old 
Saidkamoliddin Nosirov was charged under six articles of the Criminal Code of Tajikistan, 
although he did not plead guilty. Nosirov is the first citizen of Uzbekistan convicted of being 
memebr of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Tajikistan.
211. T. Turaev, “Kak vedetsia borba s religioznymi ekstremistami v Sogdiiskoi oblasti? 
(rasskaz spetsialista),” Varorud, no. 47, December 8, 2004.
212. Zurah Todua, “‘Khizb ut-Takhrir’ v Tsentralnoi Azii,” www.i-r-p.ru/page/stream-
trends/index-8725.html.
213. Akbar Turadzhonzoda, “Islam, protivorechashchii Koranu,” Aziia-Plius, February 
12, 2004.
214. Ibid.
215. Ibid.
216. Daydzhest-press, no. 46, November 13, 1997.
217. Sanobar Maksudova, “V Kabule arestovan glava isfarinskoi (Tadzhikistan) iacheiki, 
‘Islamskogo dvizheniia Uzbekistana’ A. Kaiumov,” Khovar, January 16, 2009, www.
centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1232140200.
218. Erkin Yurt, “Ugroza stabilnosti Tsentr. Azii—religioznyi terrorizm?” July 29, 2004, 
www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1091070000.
219. “Spetsifika proiavlenii terrorizma i ekstremizma v Tsentralnoi Azii: osnovnye 
tendentsii i itogi 2005–2006,” Doklad tsentra antiterroristicheskih programm proiavleniia 
terrorizma i ekstremizma v stranakh Tsentralnoi Azii v 2000–2006, http://studies.agentura.
ru/centres/cap/itogi2005–2006/.
220. Ibid.
221. Ibid.
222. Aleksandr Tikhonov, “Alfa kyrgyzskoi proby,” February 7, 2007, www.i-r-p.ru/
page/stream-trends/index-8725.html.
223. Nigora Bukhari-zade, Khanafiti protiv salafitov, December 23, 2008, www.ariana.
su/?S=2.08122306262.

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14
The Ferghana Valley and the 
International Community
Inomjon I. Bobokulov (Uzbekistan)