340 BABADJANOV, MALIKOV,
NAZAROV
religion had declined to the status of a cultural artifact. In responding to it, the new
elites in the three Ferghana countries reverted to Soviet approaches and failed to
develop flexible policies toward religion. Far from solving the problem, they ob-
fuscated it. Meanwhile, the opening of the external borders and the nominal return
of Central Asia to the lap of Islamic civilization led to increased public interest in
Islam and to its politicization. At the same time, after the collapse of the USSR
Central Asian countries benefited from major investments made by the Muslim
world, mainly from the Gulf states. Central Asian leaders strengthened their links
with the Muslim world by making pilgrimages to Mecca. However, the response
came not from Muslim governments but from religious-political parties, most of
which were committed to radical Islamist ideologies.
Thanks to these developments, Islam in Kyrgyzstan is not only reclaiming the
societal role it lost ninety years ago, but is acquiring new forms of influence that
cannot be ignored. Broadly speaking, the goal of the new currents is to integrate all
Muslim countries into one cultural-confessional space, and to ensure that Central Asia,
including Kyrgyzstan and the Ferghana Valley, are part of it. One might refer to this
as Islamic globalization, taking place in the context of authoritarian regimes. In this
sense, events in the Ferghana Valley must be seen as part of a larger development.
This Islamic mobilization arose as a political protest against the powerful impact
of external forces on the Arab-Muslim world.
151
Events in recent years in Palestine,
Lebanon, and elsewhere show that despite its inability to solve basic social and
political problems, and its tendency to experience internal schisms, political Islam
can still mobilize huge masses of sympathetic people and legitimize its actions in
the eyes of society. This obviously would not pass unnoticed in Central Asia.
Initially the new authorities in Kyrgyzstan and elsewhere endeavored to show
their commitment to Islamic tradition as a part of national culture. Later they
came to treat the Islamic resurgence with more caution, seeking to submit Muslim
organizations and movements to state control. Even though these measures were
by no means successful, the question remains as to what extent re-Islamization
can actually be achieved. After all, the consolidation of micro-communities in the
Ferghana Valley, including the Kyrgyz part, came about more by national, ethnic,
tribal, political, and economic forces than by Islam. Indeed, it is the regional and
ethnic divisions that define the ideologically disparate groups that comprise the
Muslim communities (
jamaats) of Kyrgyzstan’s part of the Ferghana Valley.
A 2005 study that included the two Ferghana districts of Jalalabad and Osh, as
well as northern Kyrgyzstan, revealed that 82 percent of respondents believed in
God, and among them a similar percent had received higher educations. Fully a
quarter observe religious laws and perform Muslim rites, while half said they did
so but only irregularly.
152
Every year the Muslims of Kyrgyzstan become more a
part of the political process, especially after the democratizing new constitution of
2007 made it advantageous for political parties to recruit Muslims into their lists.
Today Kyrgyzstan stands on the threshold of a struggle among the various political
forces to determine who will succeed in bringing Muslims to their side. This is quite
ISLAM IN THE FERGHANA VALLEY 341
interesting, as it raises the question whether the Muslim community, a patchwork
of
ethnic groups and clans, can speak in one voice in politics.
153
More than a half of the population of the Kyrgyz Republic (54 percent) lives
in the southern region, which includes the Ferghana Valley and Batken province,
which directly adjoins it. Three-quarters of the total consists of ethnic Kyrgyz. At
the moment, there is a massive outflow of Kyrgyz north to the capital of Bishkek,
to the Chui Valley, and especially to Russia. Between 2005 and 2008, nearly
650,000 Kyrgyz left the Ferghana region, while as many as a million (officially
only 600,000) Uzbeks and Tajiks entered, largely on account of the more liberal
economic environment in Kyrgyzstan. Thus, the region is now dominated by only
two groups—Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. The rise of Kyrgyz nationalism has had the effect
of pitting these two groups against each other. However, it should be noted that
a region-wide mobilization of an Islamic alliance would have the reverse effect,
putting them all on one
side against infidel forces, whether domestic or foreign.
Most authorities long considered the formerly nomadic Kyrgyz, with their
shamanist traditions, to be inherently less religious than the settled inhabitants of
the ancient oasis. To be sure,
the Kyrgyz, while part of the conservative majority,
always followed rather strange and even bizarre forms of the faith. But whatever
the situation in the past, it cannot be denied that the process of Islamist revival over
the past two decades has enabled the faith to steadily expand its influence on social
relations among Ferghana Kyrgyz. Increasingly, Kyrgyz from all regions resort
to Islam as the highest court of appeal in addressing their daily concerns. In spite
of this, Islam still has been unable to fulfill the important integrative function in
society. In spite of Soviet efforts to destroy them, Kyrgyz tribal structures and their
replication within the government have proven very stable and entirely relevant to
present-day realities. Acknowledging this, the division of north and south appears
to be a more decisive factor in domestic affairs than the much smaller differences
among the clans of each region.
A 2008 survey of students at secular universities in Osh and Bishkek sheds light
on their views on religion. Barely a quarter attend Friday prayers even irregularly,
but this is from two to three times more than the figure from a 2003 study. Also,
while 53 percent identify themselves as “not religious,” 63 percent regard them-
selves as primarily Muslim and only secondarily Kyrgyz. These positions clearly
contradict the stereotype of the irreligious Kyrgyz, as opposed to the pious Uzbeks.
Today’s youth are undergoing an ideological transformation, shifting from a tra-
ditional and passive understanding of Islam to an active commitment to Muslim
values. This heightens the possibilities for religious-political perspectives and par-
ties, and indeed 67 percent thought that believers should be free to form political
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