Ethical issues in moral and social enhancement

CHAPTER 4. Moral disagreement 
4.1.
Introduction 
In this Chapter I discuss the view that making people more moral is practically 
impossible due to the lack of consensus about what is and is not moral. I ask what 
are the consequences of moral disagreement for the use of MB. First, I examine 
what cases of moral and social modification the objection applies to. I then discuss 
the concept of fundamental moral disagreement and its implication for what we 
should do. I argue that even the presence of fundamental moral disagreement does 
not give us a good reason to abandon our moral beliefs and that those 
disagreements are better accommodated on the level of political deliberation. MB is 
unlikely to affect substantive endorsed beliefs directly, so the challenge only arises 
when we try to assess whether a certain change in function is conducive to morality 
or moral outcomes. Disagreement here does not preclude meaningful improvements 
in moral capacities; it simply means that where our axiological views differ, we 
might differ in the assessment of whether an intervention is or is not moral 
enhancement in the sense of making better moral agents.
4.2.
Moral disagreement and MB 
Some may doubt the plausibility of MB, or even doubt the reasonableness of 
pursuing it, based on the claim that there is a substantial and possibly irreconcilable 
disagreement as to what is a moral way to go about things. If we disagree about 
what is moral, the argument might go, we cannot know which way we should 
modify our moral sphere – we do not even know what the goal of the modification 
should be! There is at least one understanding of moral enhancement to which this 
doubt does not apply – moral enhancement understood as a modification in the 
sphere of moral functioning that is in the personʼs self-interest outlined in section 
1.2.3. Being better or worse moral agent is not at issue here, and so the doubt does 
not have a bite.
And what about moral enhancement defined as making people better moral agents? 
It seems that the argument is in this case, at least 
prima facie
, plausible. If moral 
disagreement undermines our moral knowledge, it could have consequences for the 

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project of making people more moral, be it by non-traditional means and traditional 
ones such as moral education. But let us have a closer look. 
Although there is a good amount of disagreement about what moral education 
should look like, most of us would not say for that reason that it is better to have no 
moral education at all, that we should not teach our children that lying is wrong or 
that striving to further develop ourselves as moral agents in our adulthood is a 
misguided proposition. Why is that? Firstly, because despite possible theoretical 
differences, there is a good amount of consensus about which acts or kinds of acts 
are morally wrong or morally right. On most, if not all, reasonable accounts of what 
is moral, killing a person for no other reason apart from the pleasure one derives 
from this act is wrong. There is also substantial agreement that, generally speaking, 
we ought to keep our promises or avoid lying.
Moreover, there is a substantial amount of consensus about things that are 
necessary or conducive to moral agency and sensitivity, and conducive to morally 
good kinds of motivation, outcomes, etc. To give just one example – one of those 
things is concern and respect for other moral agents, which in turn requires a 
number of cognitive and affective capacities. The certain amount of agreement 
(more or less limited, depending on how high we will put the bar) means that the 
objection from disagreement does not apply to the numerous instances when 
disagreement is absent or weak enough. Objections from disagreement will not 
apply to improving our ability to be moral in those cases. 
The presence of disagreement is often used to demonstrate the inadequacy of moral 
realism, and so to justify certain conclusions about the metaphysics of morals.
13
However, this argument is susceptible to the objection that it proves too much and –
since it is an inference to the best explanation – the objection that there are 
alternative explanations of moral disagreement. When moral disagreement is 
present, it can be the result of several factors. It may be the result of disagreement 
about non-moral facts, both about morality and about the world. The disagreement 
can also have its source in some kinds of procedural failure in the reasoning 
13
For example, see Mackieʼs (1977) well-known ʻargument from relativityʼ. 

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process. Alternatively, the apparent disagreement may be an instance of the case 
when people are talking past each other, and do not understand each othersʼ claims 
(Harman, 1975; Wong, 1984). In those cases we may hope that at least some 
disagreement may be removed. Abilities necessary to engage in a collective inquiry 
and discussion with others may be helpful in facilitating this process. Some kinds of 
enhancement (enhancement of reasoning skills, for example) may aid us in being 
better prepared for that process.