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‘enhancement’. The vagueness and ambiguity of the concepts might give rise to a
different interpretation of them. Perhaps the most intuitive
understanding of the
phrase ‘moral enhancement’ is ‘making morally better people.’ This is how I have
interpreted this phrase in this chapter, in order to be able to engage in the current
debate. This interpretation, however, might be restricting our discussion about the
prospects brought by increased understanding and control over the biological
underpinnings of morality. A less intuitive take on
moral enhancement might be
more suitable for our discussion. The phrase ‘moral modification,’ consistently with
the use of ‘MB’ in this work, could better capture what we have in mind, that is, a
greater degree of value-neutrality, in the sense of leaving open the question of what
exactly is morally good and accepting that there are different conceptions of the
good. The focus here would be on the possibility of modifying and influencing
various aspects of our moral functioning, rather than on whether it is conducive to
the good, morally permissible or obligatory.
A similar approach, however, was criticized by Jotterand (2011). Jotterand
characterizes the current moral discourse as being emotivist, that is, equating moral
decisions
with expressions of preference, an attitude or feeling. Supported by
MacIntyre’s (1981) critique, he states that ‘the modern and emotivist self represents
its own self-ruling point of reference and therefore does not need to be liable to
anyone as moral agent.’ (Jotterand, 2011, p 5). That, according to Jotterand,
introduces a problem for achieving consensus due to competing interests and
visions of the good. As
an upshot of that observation, Jotterand criticizes
transhumanists as not being able to provide an answer to the question of what is an
optimal level of morally relevant traits or moral emotions, e.g. empathy or moral
indignation (2011, p.7).
However, the focus on modifying emotions and the acceptance of pluralism need
not imply
emotivist ideas about morality, nor the disposing of the need for
reasoning and moral theory informing moral judgments. I am not sure whether
transhumanists are indeed implying that there is no need to take a philosophical or
normative standpoint or attempt to be value free. Not taking a normative standpoint
need not imply that there is no need to take it at some point. So it is with the
empirical investigations of morality. There is no need
of arguing what exactly
ensures best outcomes all-things-considered, what constitutes a virtue and so on
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(although such proposals are naturally welcomed) just at that point. The normative
appraisal comes later and is a separate step (see also Chapter 1). Thus, the objection
that the approaches which emphasise the manipulation of moral emotions do not
provide any content to guide one’s behavioural responses (Jotterand, 2011) is a
good observation, yet provides no good argument against
the use of emotional
modification.
Why is it preferable to remain neutral
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at first as to the question of what things are
intrinsically good, and to move later to a normative appraisal of what level of a trait
or characteristic is conducive to the good? In other words, why is it advisable to
explore our ‘coulds’ before we explore our ‘shoulds’? There are several reasons.
Firstly, this approach allows us to accept pluralism in conceptions of the good, a
fact that need not be as troubling as Jotterand seems to imply. It also allows for
discussion about – and a change in – our conceptions of the good over time. It also
makes it possible for the reader to plug in his or her substantive axiological view.
Secondly, it allows for context-sensitivity. Even
assuming that a general
understanding of the good is constant, there might be a difference in what level of
trait is conducive to the good, depending on, for example, the characteristics of the
agent (e.g. the level of ability to inhibit unwanted impulses) and the agent’s
situation. Arguing for a universal optimal level of empathy in general and for
everyone, without considering those contextual cues as well as the importance and
the guiding function of reason and moral beliefs, could be seen as both naïve and
unnecessary universalism.
However, neutrality of the kind I have proposed need not deny the importance of
moral theory, moral beliefs or a normative moral standpoint in general. In the next
section I will explore the importance of engagement with moral reasons in the
context of MB aimed at facilitating moral agency.
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Relatively neutral. I do take Quine’s point that observations are value laden, but there is a
substantial difference between being not totally value-free in our views and pushing for a
concrete axiological view. Perhaps there are some restrictions
embedded with the view I
am proposing; for example, it might be seen as offering a certain account of moral agency
or autonomy – a one that which values control over one's emotions. However, this
approach allows us to discuss a wider range of interventions, while ignoring a range of
possible differences in the conceptions of the good for the time being.
